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Chapter 1 Introduction 
On August 13, 1965 Thomas Hughes, the Director of the State 
Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, stated on the 
significance of NATO for the US, that 
‘The choice for the United States seems to lie between, on the one hand, routinely 
submitting important foreign policy decisions to the advance scrutiny, comment, and 
perhaps even modification of its NATO allies, and thus surrendering, if only to a 
limited extent, its uninhibited freedom of action, and on the other hand, a 
continuation or even intensification of the lack of political cohesiveness in the 
Alliance.’1Apparently, the US should either commit to NATO as a further 
political institution, or retreat into a position of political freedom of 
action at the expense of alliance cohesion. The choice was essentially 
between multilateralism and unilateralism.2 
 Hughes’ statement on this choice before the Johnson administration 
says something about the state of the relations between America and its 
European allies. In the 1960s something profound and yet unavoidable 
happened in the relations between America and its European allies. 
Western Europe had recovered politically and economically from the 
war, and came to question the American preponderance of power in the 
alliance3 and the direction of the Atlantic world’s policies towards the 
Eastern bloc. In the 1960s Western Europe realigned vis-à-vis America, 
and at the same time the so-called Euro-détente emerged, sparked by the 
dual crisis of 1961-1962; the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Berlin crisis. 
This development in Western Europe naturally raised questions in 
Washington about the direction of this new mood in Western Europe, 
the consequences it had for America at large, and what to do about it.  
 While Great Britain was considered mainly in line with  American 
viewpoints, NATO, West Germany, and France were at center stage in 
Washington’s thinking, and as the 1960s progressed essential questions 
emerged from developments in these two states about the future of the 
transatlantic relations and NATO, which called into question the 
traditional thinking in these matters. Eventually the Johnson 
administration was forced by French and West German developments 
and larger Western European developments to take a stand on the vital 
matters of what principles NATO should be based on, what purpose did 
NATO serve, and how to handle the challenges from primarily West 
Germany and France, but also the rest of the allies.   
                                                 
1 INR, Aug. 13, 1965. Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (LBJL), NSF, Papers of Francis 
Bator, box 23. 
2 Hughes was unresolved on the question. See Chapter 5. 
3 The term preponderance of power is borrowed form Melvyn P. Leffler’s 
indispensable work on the Truman administration’s relations with Western Europe, 
see Leffler (1992) 
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The challenges from Western Europe, West Germany and France in 
particular, pertained to the American preponderance or responsiveness 
in foreign policy matters. This was evident, among other things, in the 
allies’ calls for equality within the alliance, in particular in foreign policy 
matters.   The allies soon realized that equality with the US in nuclear 
matters was impossible, whereas equality or expanded political 
consultation and influence on the broader policies and strategy of the 
alliance were a different matter.  This thesis researches American 
perceptions of and responses to Western European realignments, and 
departs from the proposition that from the start the US enjoyed a 
position of unilateralism in the vital foreign policy matters of the Atlantic 
alliance, and more broadly the Atlantic world. This was evident in the 
American veto-rights on nuclear matters and the exclusive position of 
deciding NATO’s grand strategy.4 It was also however, evident in the 
modus operandi of the post-War transatlantic relationship, namely that the 
US effectively formulated the Eastern policy of the entire Western bloc, 
indeed the containment policy was largely accepted by willing Western 
European governments. By the 1960s this position was challenged by 
different European allies, among which some called for multilateralist 
measures in the Atlantic alliance.  
 I hypothesize that the Johnson administration sought to retain as 
much of this exclusive position in alliance matters not just as a function 
of being a superpower including being the sole provider of nuclear 
protection of Western Europe, but also as a function of a certain Euro-
skepticism.  
 Historically the US have rejected the European reason of state for 
numerous reasons depending on the circumstances, indeed, the 1930s 
isolationism was one expression of this rejection. The core of this 
rejection however, was the perception that from the European reason of 
state flowed destruction. Thus, there was a need to protect the US from 
what developed from this reason of state, such as wars.  
 By the 1960s the alliance with Western Europe was indispensable for 
America, and as such the necessity of the alliance was never questioned 
in Washington, however the form of and premises for America’s 
relations with the European allies were. America’s behavior in alliance 
matters and policies towards the allies could, therefore, also be seen on a 
continuum of involvement and detachment.  A policy of involvement 
towards the European allies was an expression of less Euro-skepticism 
and therefore a closer involvement in the Alliance. Whereas a policy of 
detachment towards the allies and the Alliance was based on the 
rejection of the European reason of state, and depicted a reluctant US 
that sought to protect its unilateral position in the Alliance.    
                                                 
4 Lundestad (2003), p. 10-11. 
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 By researching the transatlantic relations and the alliance on these 
premises, the broader Cold War serves as a backdrop of the analysis, and 
as such the present study is an indirect study of America’s Cold War 
policies. The Cold War literature is about the super power relations and 
the transatlantic relations ranks second in the over-all power game. This 
may have had more impact on the study of the transatlantic relations 
than we realize, we may even speak about a super power effect on our 
methodology, i.e., we exclusively research the transatlantic relations 
during the Cold War on the premises of the Cold War. It raises the 
question whether this is a reflection of the reality of the Cold War that 
the super power relations wiped out all other foreign policy thinking, or 
if this reflects a truly methodological gap in our research on the Cold 
War.  
 
Research Question 
What was the Johnson administration’s interpretation and perception of 
this movement of realignment? And how did the different branches of 
policy makers propose to respond?  Were the US responses and 
perceptions of the Western European realignment ultimately involved or 
detached?   
 Furthermore, a comparison of the Johnson administration’s Western 
European policies and responses to the Western European realignments 
to the Nixon administration’s policies, is attempted to (possible) depict if 
the perceptions of the 1960s and the resulting policies were particular or 
generic?  
Methodological reflections  
Scope 
The dissertation covers the period from Johnson’s entry into the 
Presidency in 1963 to 1969 and picks up again to compare the Johnson 
administration’s policies, perceptions and interpretations of the Western 
European realignments with the Nixon-Ford administration’s behavior 
till 1975. The comparison however, is somewhat asymmetric as the 
analysis of the Johnson administration is based on primary sources and 
the Nixon-Ford administration is based on the existing literature.  
The purpose of the present study is to present a thorough analysis of 
the Johnson administration’s perceptions, policy proposals, and reactions 
to the Western European realignments that are relevant to characterize 
these policies and positions with a continuum of involvement and 
detachment. The Johnson administration’s formal policies and the 
prevailing interpretation and perception of the Western European 
realignments are therefore not the exclusive subject for analysis, the 
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many different analyses representing different positions and perceptions, 
which were carried out in the Department of State and the White House, 
are equally important. Reports and position papers from other 
departments and agencies are also included in the analysis insofar these 
pertained to the concrete political developments in Western Europe, 
which fall under the rubric realignments, and the response from those 
departments fall under the subject of political organization of America’s 
relationship with Western Europe. Thus strictly military or economic 
considerations are not analyzed.  
 The different Western European government’s policies and 
motivations for these policies are not analyzed in detail; however, 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to give a general overview of the political setting 
in Western Europe, and the political developments in France and West 
Germany in particular. 
 The analysis is not of a progressive decision-making process that 
points towards the implementation of specific policy, but rather the 
analysis is of different interpretations and perceptions, which emerged as 
a response to specific developments in Western Europe. Although the 
aim is to give an account of the different interpretations of the Western 
European realignments in the different policy making branches, 
primarily the White House and the Department of State, the sources are 
unequal. The Department of State produced more and more substantive 
analysis compared to the White House, and there is therefore an 
overweight of the State Department sources in the analysis.  
 This asymmetry is inherent and unavoidable, because the foreign 
policy making was placed in the Department of State. Although the 
National Security Advisor (NSA) institution in the White House would 
grow in size during the Johnson presidency, the NSA was not occupied 
with in depth analysis as the Department of State’s specialized bureaus 
was. Since the purpose of the present study is to give a thorough account 
of the Johnson administration’s different interpretations and not 
exclusively the formal positions and final policies, it would be expected 
that there is an overweight of material from the primary foreign policy 
analyzing department.   
 In the same manner, the asymmetry in the depth of analysis between 
the specialized reports from the Department of State and the much 
‘lighter’ position papers from the NSA does not necessarily present a 
methodological problem in terms of which category of material 
predicates interpretations better. Indeed any position on a Western 
European ‘incident’ or recommendation of a certain response to a 
Western European occurrence reflects a particular perception and 
reflects a political position.  
 The literature on the Johnson administration is very small. There are, 
in fact, only a few works dedicated to Johnson and his presidency, and 
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only a single monograph dedicated to the Johnson administration’s 
policy towards Western Europe, namely Thomas Schwartz’ monograph  
Lyndon Johnson and Europe in the Shadow of Vietnam. Although Schwartz’ 
book is the fullest account of the transatlantic relations during the 
Johnson presidency to date, his work cannot be considered exhaustive. 
Furthermore, Schwartz belongs to the rehabilitative school within the 
Johnson historiography, a perspective which clearly has an impact on 
Schwartz’ reconstruction of the history. This latter perspective is further 
discussed in Chapter 2 Historiography.    
 Therefore, despite Schwartz’ book, there is a task of reconstructing 
America’s or rather reconstructing Washington’s reading of what 
happened in these years between America and Western Europe to be 
able to analyze the Johnson administration’s perceptions  of the Western 
European realignments, and the resulting policies. Each chapter begins 
with a brief overlook of the subject covered in the chapter, and the entire 
dissertation is chronologically organized. The intention is not to give a 
full account of what happened between the US and Western Europe in 
1963-1969, but is restricted to the account of the American 
administration’s interpretation of the Western European realignments, in 
particular in West Germany and France.  
 
The Western European Policy Apparatus 
The Johnson administration’s Western European policy was created 
among the Department of State’s specialized bureaus: the Policy 
Planning Council (S/P), the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), 
and the European desk (EUR), and the White House. Dean Rusk, a 
convinced legalist, headed the Department of State throughout the 
Kennedy and the Johnson Presidencies (1961-1969).5 The Policy 
Planning Council, which had been established in 1947 by Dean Acheson 
and under George Kennan’s directorship,6 was headed by Walt Rostov in 
1961-1966 and succeeded by Henry Owen, who held the position until 
1969.7  
 The Policy Planning Council was an important branch of the 
Department of State, which produced in depth analysis, and the 
Council’s reports were substantial and often lengthy amounting to 50 
pages or more. The Policy Planning Council members took it upon 
themselves to investigate and analyze a given development in Western 
Europe, which they estimated constituted a problem, or potentially a 
problem. When the Department was called upon to give an account of a 
                                                 
5 Brands (1996), p. 5-7. 
6 Gaddis (2011), p. 265. 
7 http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/principalofficers/director-policy-
planning  
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given problem and present a solution, the reports of the Policy Planning 
Council was often the foundation for the Department’s response. The 
Council was also sometimes responding to a Presidential direction, a so-
called National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM).  
 In general, the sources from the Policy Planning Council are sources 
to the entire spectrum of policy-making, both to decisions on a specific 
Western European policy and the many deliberations and considerations, 
which flourished in the Council, including those that were discarded. As 
such the source material from the Council is a valuable source to the 
different perceptions of Western Europe and America’s Western 
European policy, including the perceptions which were behind specific 
policy proposal or responses. 
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) of the Department 
of State was formally established in 1957 to handle intelligence and 
research within the State Department. Thomas Lowe Hughes was INR’s 
director during the entire Johnson Presidency. Like the Council INR 
produced analyses on Western Europe without being commissioned by 
higher authorities, unless a NSAM called INR to do so. INR’s reports 
were often sent directly to the White House. INR’s reports differed from 
the Council’s in mainly two respects. First of all, INR’s reports were 
based on intelligence, and therefore had a different character of being an 
up-to-the-minute account, and secondly, the reports were also engaged 
in forecasting future developments. In this sense INR’s reports on de 
Gaulle were highly valued. The reports however, were analytical and 
substantial, often drawing on recent history. As such INR’s reports 
differed from other intelligence reports. INR’s analytical activities were 
not in conflict with the Council’s work.  
 The sources from INR are particularly revealing of the perceptions of 
events in Western Europe and the political nature of different Western 
European states. Contrary to the Council, INR’s reports would be 
exclusively occupied with current and real-time incidents, and seek to 
explain these, whereas the Council was also occupied with the longue 
durée, which may explain why INR’s reports were sent directly to the 
White House.  
 The Department of State’s European desk (EUR) mostly produced 
commentaries on current Western European problems and challenges to 
America’s policies. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 
William Tyler was among the chief producers of thoughts on America’s 
European policy.  
 In the White House Johnson surrounded himself with National 
Security Advisors (NSAs).  Francis Bator was appointed Deputy Special 
Assistant to Johnson in April 1964 and became Senior National Security 
Advisor in 1966. Walt Rostow left the position as director of the Policy 
Planning Council in March 1966 to become Special Assistant for 
14 
 
National Security Affairs to Johnson. Rostow succeeded McGeorge 
Bundy, who left the White House entirely.  
 The source material from the White House is primarily position 
papers or memorandums on current challenges or immediate problems, 
which also could mean that the White House confronted a long-term 
decision.   
Bator is the main provider of these position papers, and Bator most 
often presented a problem from different angles and suggested more 
than one way out. Although the position papers were far from lengthy 
analyses, they represented different lines of thinking. Rostow on the 
other hand had a tendency to produce more analytical memos to 
Johnson, but also summing up the choices of policy before Johnson. 
The White House material is excellent to reveal the choice of policy and 
therefore also, if the choice was based on different perceptions, the 
prevailing perception. 
The White House also directed the formulation of policy through the 
so-called National Security Action Memorandums (NSAMs). A proposal 
for a NSAM could come from all branches of government; indeed the 
Department of State initiated some NSAMs but mostly they originated 
in the White House. NSAMs, in general, are the documents, which state 
the executive’s priority of policy and priority of direction of policy.  
 The relations between the Department of State and the White House 
during the Johnson Presidency were unlike the state of the relation when 
Nixon took over. Rusk enjoyed Johnson’s trust and confidence, and the 
competitive element between the two branches of government was 
toned down. Rusk was a strong leader of the Department of State, and 
he managed to balance the relation with the Department of Defense.8 
This balancing was perhaps not that difficult in the area of Western 
European policy, because the Secretary of Defense McNamara shared 
the Department of State’s general ideas about Western Europe’s political 
reasoning, and the direction of America’s relations with Western Europe. 
As such Western Europe was hardly as divisive an issue as the Vietnam 
War.  
 The Central Intelligence Agency is also represented in the source 
material, and the mere fact that CIA’s reports are found in the White 
House archive tells something about the importance the White House 
attached to these reports; indeed, time and again Bator would draw 
Johnson’s attention to one of them. The reports were based on 
intelligence and preoccupied with forecasting the immediate future, and 
the sources are mostly useful as insight into the prioritization of what 
was deemed important knowledge at this particular moment in time, for 
instance in a December 1966, report about the upcoming NATO 
                                                 
8 Brands (1996), p. 9. 
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ministerial meeting, the CIA hardly touched upon the matter of the 
Harmel report.  
 There is no material from the Congress. This is not a reflection of a 
lack of interest in Western Europe on part of the Congress, but a 
reflection of the extent of influence Congressional thinking had on the 
policy-making in either the Department of State or the White House. To 
the extent Congress is part of the political process in either of these 
departments; Congressional attitudes are admitted into the analysis.  
Discipline 
The discipline is international history, which is sometimes referred to as 
diplomatic history especially in North America. This is a study of foreign 
policy, i.e., the relations between states, states and organizations, and the 
premises upon which a given state bases its foreign policy. Therefore, the 
dissertation is not within the discipline American studies, and the author 
is not an Americanist. The dissertation is not presidential history either. 
Although the literature that covers the Johnson administration is very 
much about Lyndon Johnson and his policies, Johnson is not separated 
from the administration in the present study. Johnson was, like most 
other Presidents, only human, and therefore his administration’s policies 
and perceptions were exactly that: the administration’s. I therefore have 
no intentions of giving an account of Johnson’s personal policies in the 
foreign policy area since there were no such things. If Johnson had 
personal policies they laid in the domestic area, such as the Great Society 
Reforms, thus this dissertation is not a contribution to the presidential 
Johnson literature. 
 
Terms and definitions 
Détente 
Détente is a central term for the study of the 1960s and 1970s, and refers 
to the state of lessening of tensions in the international society. The most 
important feature is that in this period détente was plural. There was a 
European détente movement, and there was a – or at least aspirations to 
- super power détente.  Détente however is also a term which raises 
questions about the nature of the Cold War. Was détente another way of 
waging the Cold War or was détente the succession of the Cold War and 
therefore a new condition in international relations? Was the aim with 
the super power’s détente to overcome the Cold War?  
 The European détente is best understood as an exclusively European 
effort in the 1960s to overcome the Cold War in Europe. The European 
détente was therefore not exclusively another way of waging the Cold 
War. It took the form of both nationalistic and common Western 
European efforts to reach out to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  
16 
 
 
Realism 
The term realism refers to the line of thinking which emerged in 
Washington at the outset of the Cold War and from which the policy of 
containment emerged. Indeed, George Kennan, the reluctant father of 
the containment policy, is among the classical realists. The point of 
departure was that the nation state was the primary actor in an anarchic 
international system, in which the balance of power essentially 
determined the level of stability between states. The Truman 
administration’s decision to enter into an alliance with Western Europe 
was also a realist construct as it was motivated to balance the Soviet 
Union.  The basic assumption that the loss of power, which presupposes 
a zero-sum understanding of power, threatened American interests and 
security in the struggle against Soviet communism was at the undisputed 
core in the Johnson administration. Realism is referred to as the Cold 
War paradigm in the dissertation.9  
 
Hegemony 
The term hegemony is exclusively used in relation to de Gaulle’s 
criticism of the American position in the Alliance and in Western 
Europe in general. Thus, the term is not used as an analytical tool or to 
characterize America’s position in Western Europe or in the alliance. 
 
Unilateralism 
The term unilateralism is an analytical tool, which refers to a certain 
superpower behavior in foreign policy. Unilateralism is used to describe 
America’s foreign policy behavior as one-sided despite the fact that the 
US was in an alliance with Western Europe, and the term entails that 
America’s unilateralist behavior was strictly guided by American national 
interest, thus from the outset with disregard for the European allies’ 
wishes, policies, and interests, indeed, without reciprocity. Often the 
European allies’ interests would coincide with America’s unilateralist 
interest; however, this still amounts to unilateralist state behavior on part 
of the US.  
 A common definition of unilateralism is that a ‘state opt out of a 
multilateral framework or act alone in addressing a particular global or regional 
challenge rather than choosing to participate in collective action’.10 In general, states 
choose unilateralism to protect the freedom of action in foreign policy or 
because the principles, which a multilateral institution embodies are 
found inimical to national interest.11  
                                                 
9 See Crockatt (1995) for a historian’s perception of realism. 
10 Malone & Khoong (2003), p. 3. 
11 Ibid. 
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 In the present study there is a certain corollary to American 
unilateralism, a corollary of self-protection against Western Europe’s 
policies and behavior in the international community, which reveals itself 
during the 1960s. In this period the US could resort to the protection of 
its unilateralist position and indeed act unilaterally to protect US interests 
at large because of reluctance of entanglement with Western Europe. 
This corollary of self-protection was grounded in the historic 
circumstances and historically based perception of Europe, Europe’s 
reason of state, and political culture. Indeed, the rejection of the 
European reason of state was founded by George Washington, and it 
had found different expressions throughout the centuries; the 1930s 
isolationism was one expression of this.12 The urge to protect American 
interests and foreign policy from Europe was grounded in this fear of 
entanglement, and it had acquired a new dimension in the Cold War’s 
overall antagonism when independent Western European states could 
rock the boat.13  
 
Multilateralism 
Ruggie defines multilateralism with a reference to the very broad 
definition Keohane puts forward,14 that multilateralism is ‘not merely that it 
coordinates national policies in groups of three or more states, which is something other 
organizational forms also do, but that it does so on the basis of certain principles of 
ordering relations among those states.’15 These principles have a certain 
character, such as principles of collective security, and are ‘‘generalized’ 
principles of conduct – that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class 
of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic 
exigencies that may exist in a specific occurrence.’16  
 This definition of multilateralism and the governing principles for 
this multilateralism also entails, according to Ruggie, that the matter, 
which the parties decide to form a multilateral institution for, necessarily 
must be indivisible. Collective security’s matter is peace, and peace is 
indivisible for the parties to a collective security organization. In the 
same manner Ruggie argues, in line with Keohane, that members of a 
multilateral institution expect an even distribution of benefits in the long 
haul and yield certain (diffuse) equality among the members. Keohane 
terms this ‘diffuse reciprocity’.17  
 Multilateralism thus becomes a very specific concept, which must not 
be confused with diplomacy and other terms that refers to cooperation 
                                                 
12 On the 1930s isolationism see Jonas (1966); Osgood (1953).  
13 See Washington’s Farewell Address of 1796; etc. 
14 Keohane (1998), p. 731. 
15 Ruggie (1992), p. 567. 
16 Ruggie (1992), p. 571. 
17 Ibid. p. 571. 
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among states. Multilateralism entails coordination of state behavior on 
the basis of certain principles of conduct, which is institutionalized in 
rules or consensus procedures.18 The development of consensus 
procedures on the relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
was the hallmark of the development of NATO in the 1960s.   
 
Involvement and detachment continuum  
I suggest that US behavior towards Western Europe during this period 
should be seen as a continuum stretching from involvement to 
detachment.19 Involvement describes the situation in which the US 
committed itself to the principles of the Alliance uncontaminated by the 
Euro-skepticism, which was embodied in the historically based rejection 
of the European reason of state. At the other end of the continuum 
detachment describes the situation when the US detached itself from 
Western Europe in the alliance as a result of Euro-skepticism deriving 
from the rejection of the European reason of state, and instead 
maintained a unilateralist position. A policy of detachment does 
therefore not refer to a complete withdrawal from the Alliance or a 
retreat into isolationism. Indeed, the US remained member of the 
Alliance.  
 The European reason of state refers to America’s perception of the 
wrongfulness of the principles, which Europe’s foreign policies have 
been based on in the pre-World War II period. The balance of power 
system, temporary and shifting alliances, and secret diplomacy were all 
principles for foreign policy conduct that the New World rejected as 
faulty, dangerous, and foreign to republican institutions and American 
interests. The European reason of state concepts thus extends beyond 
‘power politics’, as the concept seeks to encapsulate a certain value that 
has been attached to Europe’s capabilities in foreign policy. Historically 
different administrations have believed that this behavior in foreign 
policy, a certain European variant of power politics, was driven by faulty 
motives of national interests.20 Like previous administrations, the 
Johnson administration identified a European reason of state in the 
principles and motivations, the administration believed were behind the 
different Western European foreign policies and the foreign policy 
conduct. 
 
Bilateralism 
                                                 
18 Ibid. p. 574. 
19 I am inspired by the title of Norbert Elias’ article ‘Problems of Involvement and 
Detachment’ from 1956, and not the contents. 
20 See for instance Washington’s Farewell Address; Jefferson’s First Inaugural Address 
in 1801 ibid; The Monroe Doctrine, ibid; Wilson’s 14 points, or Arthur Vandenberg’s 
deliberations of the 1930s. All can be found at 1796 http://avalon.law.yale.edu 
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Bilateralism is not used as an analytical term in the present study. 
However, bilateralism is used by the Johnson administration, and as such 
bilateralism exclusively refers to the practice of Western Europe to have 
contacts of trade and culture with different states across the iron curtain 
specifically ‘outside’ the Atlantic framework and outside American 
control. This is covered in particular in Chapter 6. 
 
Perceptions 
When using the term perceptions it refers to the understanding of a 
certain phenomenon, which could be based on certain foreign policy 
strands, such as isolationism or realism. The term does not refer to 
political psychology that talks about how the policy makers perceive 
certain events, such as analogical reasoning.21 The dissertation merely 
seeks to identify certain foreign policy philosophies in the perceptions of 
Western European realignments. 
 
Between Cold War and Détente 
The Johnson Presidency covered a unique period in between the 1940s 
and 1950s confrontationist state behavior and the 1970s détente between 
the super powers. The Johnson administration is best described as ‘the 
aspirational’ administration between Cold War and détente.22 
 The administration pursued aspirational détente with the Soviet 
Union, while at the same time it upheld a very traditional view of the 
Soviet Union’s outlook; indeed the administration repeated over and 
over that the Soviet outlook had not changed, despite the Kremlin’s 
peaceful co-existence concept. In the end the aspirations for a détente 
with the Soviet Union was crowned with the Non Proliferation Treaty 
signed by the Soviet Union, America, and the United Kingdom in July, 
1968. The aspirational détente was indeed aspirational. The planned 
strategic arms limitations talks stranded as the Soviet Union invaded 
Prague in August, 1968. The Johnson administration also developed 
aspirations for an opening to China in the latter half of the 1960s.  The 
Johnson administration successfully managed to denuclearize (to some 
extent) NATO’s grand strategy with the adoption of flexible response in 
December, 1967.23  
 The Johnson administration also presided over a period in which the 
globalized and militarized containment of NSC 68 cracked. The imperial 
overstretch indeed showed itself, putting strains on the American 
                                                 
21 For an excellent theory development and study of analogical reasoning in the 
American administrations in 1950s and 1960s see Khong (1992)  
22 I borrow the term ‘aspirational’ from John Dumbrell, who characterizes Johnson’s 
détente policy as aspirational. 
23 For more on US-USSR relations see Dumbrell (2004). 
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economy, and perhaps more important straining the strength of the Cold 
War paradigm, which had successfully guided America’s foreign and 
security policy since the Truman administration. In the beginning of 
Johnson’s presidency the Vietnam War had the support of the Congress 
and the American public, but as the 1960s progressed (and there was no 
victory in sight), the Cold War paradigm and the domino theory lost its 
explanatory force both in Europe and in America. In 1968 after the Tet 
Offensive, the Johnson administration began the so-called 
‘Vietnamization’ of the war. The war in Vietnam is often cited as the sole 
reason for Johnson’s decision not to run for another term in office.24 
 By the time Nixon entered the White House, the Johnson 
administration’s many aspirations towards the Soviet Union and China 
had paved the way for the détente of 1970-1975. Indeed the Nixon 
administration commenced the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in 
November, 1969, and ended in May, 1972, with the SALT1. The Nixon 
administration opened to China in 1972. The Vietnam War was also 
terminated as the US withdrew in 1973 when the Paris Peace accords 
were signed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 For more on the strength and weakness of the Cold War paradigm see Brands (1996); 
and more on the Vietnam War, US, and the USSR see Dumbrell (2004). 
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Chapter 2 Historiography 
Beyond Vietnam 
The literature on Lyndon Johnson’s policies towards Europe is, perhaps 
not surprisingly, very small.25 Not until the 1990s did historians, primarily 
American historians, discover Johnson’s European policies, and a whole 
new field of study the so-called beyond Vietnam historiography emerged. 
The beyond Vietnam historiography covers all policy areas beyond 
Vietnam, and only a single monograph is dedicated to the Johnson 
administration’s relations with Western Europe.26 In fact, the Johnson 
administrations relations with and policies towards Eastern Europe are 
yet to be studied. However, in the brief period from the mid-1990s up 
till today the appraisal of Johnson has undergone substantial change, 
ranging from a critical account of Johnson’s (and his administration’s) 
abilities and foreign policies to a far more positive account of Johnson’s 
skills and policies.  
 The beyond Vietnam literature takes its point of departure in the 
changing circumstances in the 1960s. Europe rebelled against super 
power dominium in Europe, China tested a nuclear bomb in 1964, and 
the crisis year, 1961-1962, had set new standards for the super power 
relation. In general, the literature recognizes that the world-balance 
changed and America’s place in the world was challenged by these 
changes during Johnson’s presidency. Not surprisingly therefore is the 
exclusive parameter for the appraisal of Johnsonian policies measured 
against the administration’s ability to handle this changing setting. 
Central to this approach is the position of the Cold War paradigm in the 
administration, i.e., the strength or weakness of traditional Cold War 
thinking is believed to be able to explain Johnsonian foreign policy. 
Quite misleading the Vietnam War also has a place in the beyond 
Vietnam literature. It reflects how American scholars, at least, still 
consider the war in South East Asia of prime importance to any 
Johnsonian foreign policy including the Western European policies. 
Although the beyond Vietnam scholars all reject the traditional 
assumption, that Vietnam overshadowed every other policy area – to the 
extent that the Johnson administration neglected and mistreated other 
areas -  Vietnam is central for an understanding of American foreign 
policies during Johnson’s presidency. I believe these scholars are right 
when claiming the Vietnam War influenced other policy areas, however, 
that also goes the other way round and, in fact, foreign policy during the 
Cold War is rarely divided into exclusive areas that are untouched by 
                                                 
25 As of October 2012 there are two monographs and two anthologies that cover the 
Johnson administration.  
26 Schwartz (2003).  
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developments, circumstances, and other areas of policy, by the 1960s the 
Cold War was, indeed, globalized.27  
 
The Cold War Paradigm, Europe, and Vietnam 
In his largely interview based monograph Wages of Globalism (1996) Hal 
Brands has a rather apologetic and rehabilitative approach, claiming that 
LBJ’s non-Vietnam policies were sound and whatever flaws these 
policies may have had, was largely explained by circumstances, which 
Johnson had little or no influence on.  
 Brands’ point of departure is that Johnson and his administration to 
a large extend inherited a foreign policy, and at the same time happened 
to preside over the end of American hegemony. The Truman doctrine 
had, according to Brands, committed America globally, and Kennedy 
had committed America even further to the defense of South Vietnam.28 
Johnson however, aspired to reform America with his Great Society 
program, but had to defend what others had created – others included 
the foreign policy staff that he inherited.29 Given that the tides were 
changing and America no longer had hegemonic might and wealth, LBJ 
was unlucky to be the president who came to oversee this transformation 
of America’s position in the world. 
 Brands identifies two principles for LBJ’s foreign policy. The first 
was the far from unusual tendency of sustaining the international status 
quo, thus expressing the Cold War paradigm’s position in the 
administration. However, LBJ wanted to sustain the status quo to ‘foster a 
revolution in American domestic affairs’.30 Brands further identifies a second 
principle for LBJ’s foreign policies namely that all politics was local 
politics. Johnson knew that congressional and public support for 
America’s foreign policy was important, and with his aspiration for 
extensive domestic reform, a common front in foreign policy was 
necessary. Therefore, LBJ developed what Brands terms the ‘line of least 
political resistance’ in foreign policy.31 Johnson would choose the foreign 
policy that had least resistance in Congress, which is one reason why the 
Cold War paradigm was maintained and why the Vietnam War had 
                                                 
27 NSC68 of 1950s demanded a global, militarized commitment to fight communism.  
28 The Vietnam War is obviously a large subject. However, within the recent decade or 
so, Kennedy has been ascribed responsibility for Americanizing the war, and not 
Johnson. Johnson is instead responsible for the escalation of the war. See Dobson & 
Marsh (2006). 
29 Brands (1996), p. 4. 
30 Ibid. p. 28. 
31 Ibid. p. 262p. This aspect of Johnsonian policy has all the other Beyond Vietnam 
historians adopted. Thus, this aspect is a central intentional explanation of LBJ’s 
foreign policies.  
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Congressional backing.32 That did not mean, however, that Johnson 
subordinated foreign policy to that of domestic policy, but that LBJ 
consistently viewed foreign policy within the context of his domestic 
ambitions and policies.33 
 Johnson’s policies towards Western Europe were, according to 
Brands, conducted in the same faith. Moreover, Johnson genuinely 
believed in global containment, that Europe was important to American 
security and world peace, and as Europe, due to economic recovery, 
moved in a new direction the US had to follow. Brands argues that in the 
midst of de Gaulle’s withdrawal of France from NATO’s integrated 
command, Britain and Germany’s offset troubles, LBJ managed to both 
restore the Atlantic alliance, and battle the neo-isolationist sentiment at 
home.34 Johnson did not need, according to Brands, a debate about 
America’s commitment to Western Europe either in America or in 
Europe that would disturb the domestic program. Brands also argues 
that there were a certain limit to de Gaulle’s impact, when he states that: 
‘de Gaulle pursued policies that would have seemed challenging if 
practiced by a avowed enemy, but appeared intolerable in an 
ally.’35Brands thus puts forward a picture of Johnson’s European policies 
as somewhat reactive to changing circumstances in Europe.  
 Concluding that LBJ’s policies towards France, Britain and Germany 
was conducted with an eye to the limits of American power and 
therefore generally successful, contrary to his Vietnam policies, which 
were conducted without an eye to the same limits, Brands argues that 
under the circumstances, i.e., the challenges presented to America either 
from Western Europe or the US (neo-isolationism) Johnson did a good 
job. However, the ‘discrepancy’ between LBJ’s disastrous Vietnam policy 
and the other generally successful foreign policies is largely explained by 
what constituted American national interest. The Western European 
policy (and other non-Vietnam policies) were successful because they 
were conducted according to the line of least resistance, which were ‘not 
seriously [in] conflict’ with American national interests.  Furthermore, in 
any other areas than Vietnam it was still meaningful to conduct policies 
that sought to sustain the status quo. Brands sees this as partly good 
luck, but also as a token of the fundamentally well-functioning political 
system in America. Although the Vietnam policies were conducted also 
according to the line of least resistance, they utterly failed exactly because 
a status quo policy in relation to Vietnam was not feasible.36  
                                                 
32 Ibid. Conclusions. Congress approved and supported the war in Vietnam. According 
to Brands no other president had sent American troops into war and asked congress 
for permission, thus, according to Brands, was the war America’s and not just LBJ’s. 
33 Ibid. p. 260. 
34 Ibid. p. 107-109. 
35 Ibid. p. 88. 
36 Ibid. pp. 259-264. 
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 In Brands’ narrative the Cold War paradigm’s ability to mobilize 
public and political opinion for a protracted Cold War policy is central. 
As long as the central interests were sustaining the status quo, the 
paradigm proved effective, and for LBJ it was easier to follow the path 
of least resistance to secure a policy that safeguarded American interests. 
However, when American interests changed as in the case of Vietnam, it 
would have demanded an enormous effort to overcome that exact 
paradigm, which had been developed and gained momentum over that 
last two decades. Therefore, concludes Brands, did LBJ’s successes and 
single failure say something about a democracy’s capacity to devise 
foreign policy, in fact, concludes Brands ‘To have asked Johnson to do better 
would have been to ask the American political system to do better’.37 The Cold War 
paradigm is therefore, to Brands, the guilty party.  
 In his contribution LBJ, Germany, and the End of the Cold War to the 
anthology Lyndon Johnson Confronts the World (1994) Frank Costigliola also 
argues that the Johnson administration was locked in the Cold War 
paradigm, and that this to a large extent explains the administration’s 
policies towards Western Europe and West Germany. Accordingly, 
Costigliola argues that the Johnson administration and LBJ himself 
believed that Western alliance served a triple purpose, in the tradition of 
the 1940s, namely deter the Soviet Union, contain Germany, and as a 
vehicle for the US to orchestrate the Western alliance’s policies.38 
 Costigliola identifies a key challenge for the Johnson administration’s 
foreign policies namely to ‘tranquilize, co-opt, or otherwise manage West 
Germany’s “will” for security, reunification, and equality’ all because, according 
to Costigliola, the Johnson administration perceived this as a threat to 
the stability of Europe, exactly because Johnson and his advisors had a 
traditional perception, based on the Munich analogy, of Germany.39 In 
fact, according to Costigliola, Johnson extended the administration’s 
patronizing attitude beyond Germany, and in general, the administration 
had difficulties with considering the allies’ interests and points of view as 
serious and legitimate exactly because they were trapped in traditional 
thinking.   
 Costigliola argues that the Multilateral Force (MLF) and the bridge 
building policy of 1966 were the two primary policies towards Europe. 
The MLF was largely a concept designated during the Johnson 
administration to both tie the Germans down and direct European 
integration. However, the MLF was at the end of the day obstructed by 
primarily de Gaulle and the appeal de Gaulle’s ‘Europeanism’ had 
throughout Western Europe, and is therefore, according to Costigliola, a 
                                                 
37 Ibid. p. 263. 
38 Costigliola in Cohen & Tucker (1994), p. 174. “channeling the energies of the allies 
into constructive enterprises designated by the US”. 
39 Ibid p. 174-175. 
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token of exactly how difficult it was for the US to orchestrate European 
integration, and how traditional Cold War schemes no longer fitted the 
changed circumstances in Europe in the 1960s. The Johnson 
administration backed down from the MLF proposal; however, 
according to Costigliola the administration did it in a traditional, 
manipulative manner trying to blame the failure of the MLF on the 
European allies.40  
 The European realignments culminated with de Gaulle’s withdrawal 
from NATOs integrated command in March 1966, and de Gaulle 
managed to break alliance unity and ‘solidity of … the Cold War’, and 
thereby sat in motion West German, British, and American contacts with 
Eastern Europe.41 Costigliola thus characterizes the Johnson 
administration’s Eastern European policy as quite reactionary. Although 
Costigliola recognizes that the Johnson administration’s bridge building 
policy was about Eastern Europe and Soviet Union, and also about 
ending the Cold War, Costigliola holds out that bridge building policy 
was immediately about bridle the Western Europeans, the alliance, and 
preserve the privileged position for the US to direct and decide policies 
on behalf of the entire alliance. Moreover, the US sought to promote 
détente exactly within the alliance with just the same rationale as had 
been Truman’s when creating the alliance in 1948-1949,42 namely to 
contain communism. The shift in tactics from Cold War to détente, 
concludes Costigliola, ultimately failed during Johnson’s presidency, 
because these policies were restricted by the Cold War discourse.43 
Costigliola argues that the Vietnam War undercut the possibility of 
making peace with communists in Europe, and undercut the possibility 
to make the desired reforms. The US Congress refused to grant LBJ his 
expanded trade relations with the Eastern bloc, because the legislators 
and their constituents refused trading with the enemy, and without this 
‘the bridges between East and West were built on sand’.44  
 Contrary to Costigliola and Brands, Thomas Schwartz argues in his 
monograph Lyndon Johnson and Europe in the Shadow of Vietnam (2003) that 
Johnson and his administration succeeded with his European policies 
largely because Johnson was an able practitioner of alliance politics, and 
had a clear vision for the end of the Cold War, thus implying a break 
away from the Cold War paradigm. Schwartz argues that Johnson’s 
personal policy preferences mattered little since the very structure of the 
American security state pushed America into European questions, and 
since Europe was the ‘most significant area of the world for American 
                                                 
40 Ibid p. 179-192. 
41 Ibid p. 193. 
42 Ibid p. 193-194. 
43 ibid p. 210. 
44 Ibid p. 207. 
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interests during the Cold War’,45 the management of the alliance was not 
only the most important task for a US President but also, retrospectively, 
the effective maintenance of the alliance was the primary reason why the 
US prevailed ‘peacefully in the Cold War’.46 If the Johnson presidency is 
seen from that perspective, Schwartz argues, the Vietnam War has a less 
dominant position in Johnson’s foreign policy record. Furthermore, 
Schwartz argues that the Johnson administration introduced détente, 
which is normally ascribed to Nixon, as the bridge building policy, the 
non-proliferation treaty, and the foundered summit meeting in 1968 all 
were tokens of according to Schwartz. Schwartz characterizes Johnson’s 
policies as détente as a lever to rehabilitate Johnson, thus reflecting how 
détente has reached a prominent position in the Cold War historiography 
within recent years.  
 It is possible for Schwartz to hypothesize about the importance of 
the alliance to effectively rehabilitate Johnson, which, indeed, is his 
errand, because the 1960s witnessed the European realignments. In 
general, Schwartz paints a bleak picture of a recalcitrant Western Europe 
that Johnson and his administration managed in order to sustain the 
Atlantic alliance and Western unity. Thus, according to Schwartz, 
Western Europe challenged the alliance during the Johnson presidency. 
The crisis year and the subsequent “tense stability” led to a lesser present 
threat from the USSR in Europe, which in turn led the US to worry 
more about alliance cohesion and the prospects for instability in Europe. 
Moreover, Johnson’s détente effort with the USSR had an unraveling 
effect on the alliance. The scene was therefore set in this study for 
Johnson to manage Western Europe.  
 Schwartz argues that Johnson’s policy towards the Soviet Union was 
both a continuation of Kennedy’s policies and inspired by Roosevelt, 
accordingly, Johnson sought to improve the relation with the Soviet 
Union and lessen the threat of nuclear war. This perspective had a far 
more central role in Johnson’s foreign policy that hitherto recognized, 
according to Schwartz.47 LBJ’s European policy was therefore in effect 
guided by two component parts: first maintain and nourish the alliance 
and second improve the relation with the Soviet Union also to avoid 
nuclear war. Arguably neither of these components are exclusively 
Johnsonian, i.e., which President has not sought to avoid nuclear war 
and maintain the western alliance during the Cold War? But the method 
to accomplish this may have been somewhat new.48  
                                                 
45 Ibid 
46 Schwartz (2003), Prelude. 
47 Schwartz (2003), p. 17-20. 
48 Schwartz’s claims about a special Johnsonian quest to avoid nuclear war is somewhat 
shattered as the National Security Archive in December 2012 revealed that Johnson 
directed his administration to uphold the standing order to respond with nuclear 
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 LBJ’s relation with and handling of the West Germans followed a far 
more linear, developing course than Costigliola’s ad hoc ‘damage 
control’. According to Schwartz, Johnson believed that détente was the 
only way to an eventual German reunification, and therefore decided to 
push the Germans towards détente.49 Although Schwartz is careful not 
to give Johnson the honors of the German Ostpolitik he argues that 
Johnson paved the way.50  
 The president which Schwartz portrays is arguably more proactive 
and enterprising than the one Brands and Costigliola present. Thus, the 
Johnson administration replaced the MLF with the Nuclear Planning 
Group (NPG) and the Non-proliferation treaty (NPT) during the 1960s. 
However this was brought about because the administration needed an 
apparatus to handle the German concerns about being treated on equal 
footing with the rest of the allies.51 Schwartz argues that LBJ and his 
administration naturally saw Germany as the primary ally, however, the 
overall détente effort meant that the US-German relation needed to be 
altered, and that, according to Schwartz, had to be conducted without 
losing Germany in the process, maintain the alliance, and the Western 
orientation of Germany. Overall, Johnson succeeded in this endeavor. 52 
 The French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command 
presented, according to Schwartz, Johnson with an opportunity to both 
“assume” the role as a statesman and rally the alliance behind his 
leadership with end goal of reforming the alliance. Thus LBJ pursued a 
‘line of restraint’ in his dealings with de Gaulle contrary to what most of 
the political establishment in Washington argued for, and grabbed the 
opportunity to ‘solve many alliance-related issues’ including moving the 
alliance towards détente with the East, adopting the flexible response 
doctrine, solve the nuclear sharing problem, binding the alliance closer 
together, and at the same time ‘hold an olive branch out to the French’.53 
Schwartz argues that the détente with the East was given ‘intuitional 
weight’ with NSAM 345, which Schwartz quotes LBJ for considering 
moving the allies closer together and exploring a détente with the East as 
the ‘important thing’ to do in the wake of de Gaulle’s actions. However, 
the NSAM 345 was entitled ‘nuclear planning’ and aimed at solving the 
nuclear problem in the alliance, and then in a last paragraph Johnson 
                                                                                                                   
attacks in both the USSR and China in the event of a President disappearing or killed. 
See http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb406/.  
49 This was a break from the Hallstein Doctrine’s premise that a solution to the 
European problem would follow a solution to the German problem. 
50 Ibid. footnote 146 p. 284. 
51 Ibid. p. 52. 
52 Ibid. Conclusions. 
53 Ibid. p. 105-111. 
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directed his staff to consider the matters Schwartz claims were the 
‘important’.54 
 Schwartz in effect puts forward that on one hand LBJ was driven by 
his interest of moving towards détente, and on the other hand 
recognized that in every aspect of policy (in Europe) the US had to pay 
‘scrupulous attention … to German interests and sensitivities’ and had to savior 
the alliance, thus it is hardly possible to argue there were no amount of 
classic Cold War thinking in Johnson.55  
 LBJ announced his vision for Europe and the bridge building policy 
in October 1966. Schwartz argues that this vision for ‘making Europe 
whole again’ – as the speech was termed - was an important milestone in 
the Cold War.56 In the speech Johnson put forward his vision for 
German reunification, détente and deterrence, and the development of 
East-West relations. Schwartz characterizes bridge building policy as the 
better choice by arguing that it peacefully undermined the various 
communist systems by reaching out and putting Western life forward, an 
outcome a more militant approach hardly could have produced.57 
The Harmel exercise is also treated in Schwartz’ largely entrepreneurial 
interpretation of LBJ, accordingly the Harmel report’s recommendations 
was a ‘triumph for American diplomacy’, also because the French did not 
withdraw from the drafting, and generally Schwartz argues that the 
report affirmed LBJ’s approach to the East-West conflict, which he had 
outlined in the October 7, 1966 speech.58  
 The Vietnam War also has a place in Schwartz’ study, mostly a place 
in which he highlights exactly how little realpolitischer effect the war had 
on the US-European relation, and the US-USSR relation. Schwartz 
claims that the record shows no decisive effect of the Vietnam War upon 
the European policies, and he argues that even the Soviets eventually 
came to the negotiation table on the NPT despite the war. Schwartz 
hypothesize, in fact, that LBJ “gambled” - and won - that fighting a 
limited war in Vietnam would both enable him to achieve his Great 
Society reforms without a destructive domestic right-wing accusation of 
“who lost Vietnam”, and at the same time proceed with ‘ “thawing” the 
Cold War in Europe’ and thereby ’demonstrating to the communist world that 
he was prepared to live in peace where the lines between the two sides were clear‘, 
quite contrary to Costigliola’s assessment of the proportionate relation 
between the war and foreign policy.59 By putting this concept of limited 
war  forward as a guiding principle for LBJ’s policy as a precondition for 
                                                 
54 NSAM 345 
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/nsams/nsam345.asp  
55 Schwartz (2003), p. 110-111. 
56 Ibid. Conclusions. 
57 Ibid. p. 230-31. 
58 Ibid. p. 213. 
59 Ibid. p. 235-36. 
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him to obtain both a détente and domestic reform, Schwartz in fact 
assign the war quite an influence on America’s policies.  
 Thus Schwartz presents LBJ and his administration as rather 
innovative in the foreign policy field and leaves very little room for a 
dynamic transatlantic relation, and is in opposition to the détente 
literature that argues that the European détente was a European 
endeavor and not an American.60  
 John Dumbrell agrees with Schwartz and Costigliola that the LBJ 
administration had a détente agenda, and argues in his work Lyndon 
Johnson and Soviet Communism (2004) that the Johnson administration did 
reach important progress towards a sustained détente with the Soviet 
Union. However, Dumbrell characterizes the Johnsonian détente as 
aspirational: “the hoped for achievement of a vocabulary and lexicon of mutual 
understanding between the superpowers, a way of resolving confrontation, avoiding 
nuclear war and allowing regional disputes (even wars) to proceed without drawing 
Moscow and Washington into direct confrontation”.61 By a step by step approach 
to ease tensions, the Johnson administration sought bilateral agreements, 
62however the 1965 escalation of Vietnam War caused a break down in 
the bilateral relation, and it took the escalating Sino-Soviet rife and a 
renewed American initiative, i.e., bridge building, to resume the détente 
agenda.     
 Dumbrell recognizes that at the same time as Johnson pursued 
aspirational détente in the bilateral relation between Moscow and 
Washington, an exclusive European détente was going on. Both France 
and Germany had their own détente agendas, which Dumbrell claims is 
proof of exactly how complex the international society was in the 1960s. 
The European détente was therefore the context for an American 
détente in Europe.63 Dumbrell thereby runs somewhat counter to 
Schwartz’s view that the US had a certain impact on the development of 
the European détente, the German in particular. However, Dumbrell 
agrees with Schwartz’ claim that the ‘health of NATO was of paramount 
importance’.64 Therefore the 1966 bridge building policies was also about 
disciplining the allies and reviving the alliance.65  
 Dumbrell concludes that Johnsonian aspirational détente was not 
(probably) thought in terms ‘transcending’ or end the Cold War (even 
though Dumbrell does not rule out the possibility that some in the 
                                                 
60 The Harmel exercise for instance was of European origin and it is possible to argue 
that the allies influenced American thinking and not the other way round as Schwartz 
does. 
61 Dumbrell (2004), p. 24. 
62 On trade, defense spending, the production of nuclear fissile material etc. Ibid, p. 34-
39. 
63 Ibid, p. 24. 
64 Ibid, p. 25. 
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administration indeed believed it was possible), but rather Johnsonian 
détente was a way to pursue the rivalry with the Soviet Union in ‘a way 
which recognized the reality of intersecting US-Soviet interests and the possibility of 
partnership’.66 Dumbrell in other words subscribe to the notion that 
détente was just another way of fighting the Cold War, and thereby runs 
counter with both Costigliola’s and Schwartz’ perceptions that the 
Johnsonian détente, in fact, was thought of as a way to end the Cold 
War.  
The European détente  
The point of departure for most literature on the European détente is 
that the European détente predated and outlasted the American 
counterpart, and more recently, as the Cold War did in fact end, the 
European détente is attributed significance for the end of the war. The 
European détente, in fact, is one reason why the Cold War ended.67   
This places the rehabilitative Johnson literature on the defense as these 
scholars argue that LBJ from the moment he took over the presidency in 
November 1963 followed a détente policy towards the Soviet Union, 
whether aspirational, petite, or full blown, i.e. prior to the European 
detente. Furthermore, the rehabilitation literature runs counter to the 
position that the European détente in the 1960s was an exclusive 
European effort, which the US eventually came to support. And finally, 
Schwartz’ hypothesis on NATO and the end of the Cold War also 
somewhat counters the European détente literature. 
 The study of the European détente has recently been put on the 
research agenda, notably by European historians.  In The Cambridge 
History of the Cold War Volume II Crisis and Détente (2011) edited by Westad 
and Leffler stretches the period of crisis and then détente 1962 to 1975.  
Jussi Hanhimäki argues in his contribution Détente in Europe 1962-1975 
that the European détente was a European project, a European response 
to “the twin crisis in 1961-1962”, and it began and continued in Europe, 
even though both superpowers’ influence in Europe should not be 
overlooked. Hanhimäkki argues that Germany was the heart of the Cold 
War division of Europe, and that the German unification marked the 
end of the European Cold War, and therefore “something profound” did 
take place in the status of Germany as a result of Ostpolitik. Indeed 
Hanhimäkki claims that Ostpolitik “ushered” the era of détente.68  
 Even though the European détente had many forms, mostly 
nationalistic such as Gaullism, Hanhimäkki argues that Europeans in 
general, agreed to the need for improved relations between East and 
West, and that this ‘new era in European politics’ culminated with the CSCE 
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process, which ended ‘Europe’s postwar era’.69 Hanhimäki claims that 
Germany and Ostpolitik pertained to more than just the German-German 
relation, in fact, had it not been for the West German openings to the 
East, the process of increased exchanges across the iron curtain that 
eventually led to the CSCE, would not have been successful.70 
Hanhimäki, in other words, argues that Germany and the German 
Ostpolitik had far more influence on the East-West relation than de 
Gaulle’s Gaullism. Gaullism only reached decisive importance when 
associated with West Germany.71 Hanhimäki’s counterfactual claim that 
Germany’s opening to the East was somehow a premise for the CSCE 
reflects a certain great power approach or even a germanophile 
approach, to this particular history. However, it could be argued that it 
was a united Western Europe, and not a single great power that had 
decisive importance for the increase in exchanges across the iron curtain? 
Or put another way, would there have been a successful increase if only 
Germany participated?  
 In Westad’s and Villaume’s (eds.) anthology Perforating the Iron Curtain 
(2010) the editors argue much in line with Hanhimäkki, that ‘the pan-
European détente and the CSCE processes in the 1970s contributed in significant 
ways to the developments that led to the end of the Cold War in the 1980s’.72  
It is argued that the pan-European détente emerged from the 
revitalization of France and West Germany in the mid-1960s and 
outlasted ‘the deep freeze’ in the super power relation at least up till 
1985. Although Western Europe served as a vehicle for the détente, 
Eastern Europe was also decisive for the durability of euro-détente. In 
the anthology scholars seek to answer why the European détente ‘proved 
lasting’, and three reasons are presented, and in line with Hanhimäki’s 
argument Germany is considered crucial.  
 According to the editors Villaume and Westad, the egalitarian 
Western Europe attracted Eastern Europe, and signaled that the choice 
was no longer one between capitalism, i.e., the US, and communism, i.e. 
the Soviet Union. Secondly, West Germany came to accept the ‘historical 
and territorial boundaries’, which the Second World War had left 
Germany with, and the subsequent ‘readjustment’ was crucial. This 
process of readjustment started even before 1966 and the Great 
Coalition. The editors argue that Germany’s ‘remarkable turnabout’ 
presented a whole new picture of Germany as no longer ‘autarchic’ but a 
promoter of cooperation between East and West. Lastly the editors 
argue that the ‘durability of the alliance relationships between Western Europe and 
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the United States’ created more European influence in the alliance, and 
therefore improved the ‘cohesion on key strategic aims’.73  
 In general, the Euro-détente literature fails to consider the 
transatlantic relation much further than the above; however, in Western 
Europe the détente was indeed, accompanied by a greater call for 
equality in the alliance and more broadly speaking in the Atlantic 
partnership. The Western European realignments and the demand for 
equality, which was not just promoted by de Gaulle, was an equally 
important development in Western European politics. 
 
The Transatlantic Relation 
The study of the transatlantic alliance has been somewhat neglected 
throughout the history of the Cold War. As argued in the Introduction 
the focus on the super power relation may have had methodological 
spillover on our methodology, i.e., the transatlantic relation has hardly 
been studied, indeed, there are only four monographs on the 
transatlantic relation.74 
 Geir Lundestad’s monograph The United States and Western Europe since 
1945 From ‘Empire’ by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (2003) was and still is 
the principal work on the transatlantic relation. Lundestad sets out to 
study the transatlantic relation and focus on the ‘overall issue’ of 
cooperation versus conflict in the relation between America and Western 
Europe a measure most scholars use to understand the dynamics of the 
transatlantic relation. Lundestad also wishes to extend his 1986 ’empire’ 
by invitation thesis’,75 namely that the Western European governments 
shortly after the end of the Second World War issued invitations to 
America to become an ‘empire’, which others usually refer to as the 
American hegemony in Europe as Brands does76  
 Lundestad bases his invitation thesis on two arguments. On one 
hand, the US emerged from the war as something almost beyond a Great 
Power, indeed, never before in history had a Great Power had ‘such a vast 
lead over its potential competitors’,77 according to Lundestad. Based on this 
power, the US expanded its influence in most parts of the world, most 
notably in Western Europe. The reasons behind this expansion were 
many, including and most important America’s security interests in 
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containing Soviet communism and containing Germany. The US 
organized its empire within the framework of American values.  
On the other hand, the Western European governments invited the 
Americans in because they needed economic assistance for 
reconstruction, political support in their fight against European 
communism, and lastly Western Europe needed a military guarantee 
against Soviet attacks.78 The US accepted the invitations, according to 
Lundestad, because the US was still achieving ‘crucial objectives of its own’.79 
From this emerged a strong Atlantic structure, which was remarkably 
stable, according to Lundestad, however the balance tipped in favor of 
Western Europe during the late 1950s, indeed the American ‘role’ 
declined in Western Europe from the late 1950s to the end of the Cold 
War.  
 One token of the American ‘empire’ was, according to Lundestad, 
that whereas the US always favored European integration, American 
insistence on US sovereignty (indeed the US was an ‘empire’) precluded 
any talk about Atlantic integration, accordingly this explains why those 
parts of NATO that were ‘binding even on the US had to reflect rather 
exclusively American ideas’.80 According to Lundestad this was the reason 
behind NATO’s adoption of different strategies, such as MAD or 
flexible response.81 The European allies were, in fact, against the latter. 
In general, Lundestad’s thesis is a critique of the revisionist school of 
thought, which claims the US was the primary and most active party in 
the Cold War. Indeed, Lundestad’s most heralded contribution to the 
Cold War literature is his claim that Western Europe was the primary 
instigator of the military alliance; NATO. 
 Lundestad cites the ‘dramatic’ shifts in economic prosperity as the 
primary reason for a general shift in the balance between the US and 
Western Europe,82 and although he claims his work covers the period 
1945 – 2001, the Johnson administration (1963-1969) is exclusively 
covered in a chapter dedicated to de Gaulle’s challenge. And even in this 
chapter, the focus is mostly on the Kennedy administration’s Gaullist 
challenge. The point of departure for the (early) French crisis was, 
according to Lundestad, the clearly opposing schemes for Europe that 
de Gaulle and Kennedy had. The Grand Design contradicted de Gaulle’s 
European Europe. However, it was not until the Elysee Treaty was 
signed in January, 1963, that the Kennedy administration went into some 
kind of ‘shock’, prior to this de Gaulle’s veto of British entry into the EC 
had ‘distressed’ the administration. Lundestad argues that these two 
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incidents in 1963, in fact, was a direct contest between the two European 
concepts, the American Grand Design and the French European 
Europe.83 This contest sparked a renewed effort on part of the Kennedy 
administration to strengthen the Atlantic framework, and Kennedy’s 
biggest fear in the whole 1963 crisis was that France would strike a deal 
with the Soviet Union that would also include the Germans. The 
Germans were the primary objective with Kennedy’s policies in the wake 
of the crisis, because as Lundestad argues, de Gaulle had done ‘no more 
than could realistically have been feared from him’,84 however the German shift 
towards Gaullism was the real issue. The administration therefore moved 
to both strengthen the Atlantic framework and contain de Gaulle. The 
administration succeeded in this endeavor, both the re-launch of the 
Multilateral Force (MLF) and substantial support for the Atlanticist 
Erhard were means to this end.85 
 Lundestad appears to argue that since the administration managed to 
contain de Gaulle following the 1963 crisis, de Gaulle never really 
shocked the administration again. Indeed, the 1966 withdrawal from 
NATO’s integrated command did not come as a surprise, and Johnson 
chose a ‘soft’ response; ‘there was to be no ganging up against de Gaulle’ 
because, according to Lundestad, the Vietnam war demanded the 
Johnson administration’s full attention. 86 This latter reasoning goes 
explicitly against the ‘Beyond Vietnam’ literature. However, the 
administration did worry for a while about the Germans, and the MLF 
was trotted out again to contain the Germans, even though Lundestad 
recognizes that the MLF concept unofficially had been dropped already 
in 1964.  
 Lundestad’s characterization of the 1966 crisis, as a more or less non-
crisis, is followed with a shift in narrative from the US or other Western 
European states being the actants, to NATO suddenly emerging as such. 
Lundestad argues that ’somewhat surprisingly’ the French withdrawal 
made the cooperation between the remaining 14 members easier, which 
resulted in NATO establishing the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), the 
streamlining of ‘NATO machinery’, and adopting the Harmel report.87 
This line of thinking also somewhat contradicts the rehabilitative 
Johnson literature.  However, Lundestad considers the Harmel report a 
victory for the US ‘to a large extent at the expense of France’.88 Indeed, the 
Harmel report ratified the process detente, strengthened NATO, and 
renewed American leadership, according to Lundestad, and perhaps he 
                                                 
83 Ibid. p. 121-123. 
84 Ibid. p. 124. 
85 Ibid. p. 126-127. 
86 Ibid. p. 129. 
87 Ibid. p. 130. 
88 Ibid. p. 131. Lundestad’s account of the entire Harmel Exercise is very much in line 
with Haftendorn (1996). 
35 
 
considers this a re-invitation of the US? In the end, Lundestad concludes 
that ‘it was remarkable that de Gaulle gained as little support as he did. True, even 
the countries that remained loyal to the United States soon charted a more 
independent course, including West Germany; yet in the face of the strong challenge 
from de Gaulle, all other NATO allies were determined to show that they stood 
together under America’s leadership.’89 
 In other words, de Gaulle and Gaullism had very little impact on the 
transatlantic relation except for drawing the Atlantic closer together. 
Lundestad lastly argues that Brezhnev limited de Gaulle’s impact among 
NATO members. De Gaulle’s overtures to the Soviet leader to 
overcome the ‘bloc to bloc’ approach was rejected by the Soviet leaders, 
indeed, the Kremlin saw no reason to limit its position in Eastern 
Europe, which the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia was a token of.90   
 Much in line with Lundestad, Hanhimäki, Schoenborn, and Zancheta 
argue in their monograph Transatlantic Relations since 1945 an Introduction 
(2012) that the real crisis (French initiated) indeed was the early 1963 
crisis. The point of departure for Hanhimäki et al. is that in the last 60 
years or so Europe and North America have experienced a ‘Pax 
Transatlantica’, the transatlantic relation has blossomed and endured. 
However this piece of realia corresponds poorly with the literature on 
the transatlantic relation, indeed, in the literature it looks as if the 
transatlantic relation, according to the authors, was and is an ‘endless 
series’ of crisis and conflict. The overall question the authors pose is 
therefore: ‘which has been the more ‘normal’ (or commonplace) state of transatlantic 
relations since 1945 – tension or unity, conflict or community’.91    
 Hanhimäki et al. argue that the Second World War turned the US 
into a European power and it weakened the Europeans, and that  would 
have significant impact on the transatlantic relation. However, the US 
stayed in Europe after the war because of the ‘shared belief’ across the 
Atlantic that the war had not provided Europe with a ‘long-term solution for 
Western Europe’s security’,92 and the Soviet Union quickly emerged as a 
threat against the Western world. Much in line with Lundestad’s claim, 
the authors argue that the Western European governments welcomed 
the American aid and the security guarantee, and that the Second World 
War was the watershed on the evolution of the transatlantic relation. 
Indeed, given Europe’s devastation and the emerging Soviet threat the 
US ‘exercised a particularly preponderant influence’93 in the reconstruction and 
reshaping of post-war Europe. Furthermore, the authors subscribe to 
Lundestad’s overall estimate, that whereas the first half of the Cold War 
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the transatlantic relation was dominated by the US, the second half was 
full of Western European challenges to the American ‘predominance’.94 
 The 1960s was a period of challenge according to the authors, and 
the dual crisis of 1961-1962, namely the Berlin Wall and the Cuban 
missile crisis was the point of departure. Whereas the first crisis led to a 
more ‘independent attitude’ among the Germans, the Missile crisis led 
the European allies to question whether the Americans and the Western 
Europeans in fact shared the same strategic goals. In the end both crises 
were solved by super power agreements, which ‘set the stage for a more 
challenging attitude’ by the Western Europeans. The Berlin crisis, in fact, 
sparked the subsequent Ostpolitik as West Berlin’s mayor Willy Brandt 
realized that although Kennedys’ famous speech in June, 1963, was an 
unconditional security guarantee, the American’s could not remove the 
wall. Instead Brandt conceived the idea that ‘West Germans had to develop 
their own political concepts and contacts with the East, if necessary without US 
support’.95 The Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962, and the bilateral 
handling of it made the Western Europeans realize that they had no 
impact or influence on questions of war and peace in Washington. 
Moreover, according to the authors, the Western European leaders 
realized in the wake of the Missile Crisis, that the Americans considered 
missiles within the Western hemisphere ‘casus belli, while it [the US] routinely 
consented to huge numbers of Soviet missiles on the borders of Western Europe. 
American vulnerability was unacceptable, but threats against Europe habitual’.96 
Despite these rather dramatic realizations, the authors argue that most 
Western Europeans went back to NATO as the sole provider of security, 
mostly because there were no real alternative.  
 Except for de Gaulle. Much in line with Lundestad, the authors 
identify the French veto of British membership of the EEC (1963) and 
the Elysee Treaty (1963) as the cause of the crisis, the latter throwing the 
Kennedy administration into a state of ‘shock’.97 They also claim that the 
1963 crisis, in fact, was the ‘showdown’ between the US and France over 
their influence on Germany and it was ‘decisive’, because for de Gaulle 
to succeed with his European scheme, a strong Franco-German relation 
was necessary, but after Adenauer left office in October, 1963, there was 
never really any question about the Atlanticist orientation of the 
subsequent Western German governments.98 In this light, de Gaulle’s 
withdrawal of France from the Integrated Command in March, 1966, did 
not amount to a real crisis. Hanhimäki et al. argue that the French 
withdrawal did not come as a surprise to the administration, although 
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some US policy makers ‘dreaded’ the breakdown of NATO and feared a 
nationalist resurgence. Much in line with the rehabilitative literature 
Johnson is ascribed a certain foreign policy capability when the authors 
state: ‘Wisely he refrained from a reaction that would further divide Europeans and 
explicitly kept the door open for a French return to NATO’s command structure in 
the future’.99 Furthermore, they continue arguing that de Gaulle’s 
withdrawal paved the way for the adoption of flexible response and the 
Harmel report.  
 In their conclusion on the Gaullist challenge, the authors state that 
the challenge during the 1960s, in fact, was a challenge within limits, 
because de Gaulle never ‘questioned the basic usefulness of the Atlantic Alliance 
as long as the totalitarian system in the Soviet union persisted’100 – thus, the 
authors appears to overlook, that exactly during the 1960s, before the 
Soviet clamp down on Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, the Western 
Europeans considered the Soviet threat greatly diminished, and some 
even argued the Cold War was over. Furthermore, they conclude that the 
US ‘effectively countered the Gaullist challenge, with a sharp reaction in 1963 and a 
forbearing attitude thereafter’.101 The literature on the transatlantic relation in 
the 1960s exclusively concentrate on de Gaulle’s challenge, perhaps as a 
consequence thereof the scholars at the same time paint a picture of a 
rather Atlanticist Western Europe. Apparently, according to these two 
books the rest of the allies never really challenged American leadership in 
the 1960s, although Hanhimäki et al., recognize that one reason for 
Western Europe’s apparent refusal of Gaullism was due to French 
weakness and inability to keep the Germans down,102 thus implying there 
were some Western European alignment with de Gaulle.  
Brief conclusion 
If the literature on the 1960s’ transatlantic relation is combined a rather 
murky picture emerges. However, across fields of study, scholars agree 
that in the 1960s the tides were changing mostly because Western 
Europe had recovered from the post-war condition. The disagreements 
emerges on how well the Johnson administration handled this, and how 
big a role the other (than France) Western European states had in this 
change. 
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Chapter 3 Western Europe, Germany, and 
France in the 1960s 
The Setting 
In the 1960s, Western Europe’s foreign policy thinking evolved around 
two interrelated concepts namely détente and realignment. With the 
crisis year 1961-1962 Western Europe realized the extent to which their 
destinies were intrinsically linked to the overall state of the super power 
relation. Indeed, if the balance of power should break down, Europe was 
the theater of a nuclear war, which both super powers were able to 
conduct. One outcome of this realization was that Western Europe 
sought to overcome the Cold War in Europe and the so-called Euro-
détente emerged. Although the European détente movement was 
reciprocal a policy of reaching out to the ‘other half’ of Europe was 
easier conducted in Western than Eastern Europe. The Western 
European détente had many forms from de Gaulle’s Eastern policy and 
the German Ostpolitik’s bilateral approach to the British calls for a 
multilateral outreach as the Harmel exercise was a token of.103  
 Another outcome of the dual crisis was the realization that Western 
Europe’s reduced status in global affairs could be countered by 
successful European integration, which promised to rehabilitate Western 
Europe vis-à-vis the super powers. The formative phase of European 
integration would however reach a state of crisis during the 1960s 
beginning in 1963. This was perhaps not surprisingly as fundamental 
Community issues such as what policy areas should integration focus on 
and the institutional construction of the Community was still undecided 
upon. In fact, there was still room to maneuver the Community into a 
completely federated Western Europe in the early 1960s.104 
 The crisis year also sparked another movement in Western Europe, 
namely a movement of realigning Western Europe vis-à-vis America. 
There were different national motivations for the different Western 
Europe states’ wishes for realigning the status quo in the transatlantic 
relation however, the core of this movement was the realization that as 
Western Europe had recovered from the war, both politically and 
economically, Western Europe’s position in the Atlantic alliance and the 
Atlantic partnership did not correspond to this recovery. The lack of 
‘real’ partnership and political influence on alliance matters, especially 
nuclear decision making, was tokens thereof, as well as the realization 
that the partnership with the US did not deliver the necessary effort to 
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secure and obtain the objectives different Western European states’ 
national interests called for. The German unification quest was one such 
example.105 The realignment was closely associated with a ‘lesson’ of the 
crisis year. As Hanhimäki et al. argue it ‘dawned’ on the European allies 
that ‘the United States considered nuclear missiles on Cuba a casus belli, while it 
routinely consented to huge numbers of Soviet missiles on the borders of Western 
Europe. An American vulnerability was unacceptable, but threats against Europe 
were habitual’.106  Although Hanhimäki et al. argues that the shock of this 
lesson quickly passed as the European allies realized that the alliance 
with the US was the only available option for protection against the 
Soviet menace, a certain drive for reassertion of Western Europe vis-à-
vis the US in general and in the alliance was as 1960s progressed on the 
agenda in other Western European states than just de Gaulle’s France.107 
 Despite these political developments in Western Europe, the 
Western European governments did not question the necessity of an 
Atlantic alliance and partnership, only the modus operandi of it, and 
although the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 to a large extent diminished the 
fear of nuclear war in Western Europe’s governments,108 the impact of 
the crises in 1961 and 1962 was already in motion. 
 Although the European allies to a large extent shared Washington’s 
perception of the Soviet Union and Soviet communism during the 1950s 
and in the beginning of the 1960s, the colonial powers in Western 
Europe was in the 1950s and early 1960s strategically and financially 
preoccupied with their respective colonies and the different struggles 
they had with demands for independence..109 Thus, Western Europe had 
broad political and strategic interests, which extended beyond the Soviet 
Union and the struggle against communism to encompass geographically 
the entire globe, and politically specific national interest.  
 In the 1950s Western Europe continued the Post-war economic 
boom. The reason for the economic boom was among other things the 
ever increasing overseas trade, and in the 1950s Germany benefitted 
comparatively most from this trade. This improved financial situation in 
most Western European states was the point of departure for the 
establishment of the welfare state in Western Europe. The Western 
European social democracies would flourish in the 1960s, and in the 
general Western Europe’s right wing parties came to accept the more 
egalitarian approach to society.110 This economic recovery also 
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contributed to the general reckoning of Western Europe vis-à-vis the 
US. 
France 
As de Gaulle (1958-1969) assumed power in France in 1958 and founded 
the Fifth Republic a process of reasserting France in the world began. In 
general, de Gaulle is a prime example of the dual process of détente and 
realignment in Western Europe Although de Gaulle was the most 
prominent and ‘outspoken’ leader of France during the Cold War, de 
Gaulle’s ideas about overcoming the Cold War by the emergence of a 
more independent Europe, and the notion that it was necessary to 
maintain contacts with the Soviet Union for reasons of security, which to 
a large extent constituted Gaullist foreign policy, were not completely 
foreign in French foreign policy thinking. In the 1950s especially Jean 
Monnet was the foremost proponent of an independent Europe.111  
 De Gaulle was determined to reassert France and overcome the 
‘serial humiliation’ of the 20th century, and Judt argues, post-War France 
was lesser humiliated by the Germans than by the Anglo-American allies, 
and  between the two, de Gaulle was particularly reluctant towards 
Washington for reasons of national pride and humiliation that traced 
back to France’s colonial war in Indochina.112The French was, like most 
other Western European colonial powers, faced with stirrings in their 
respective colonies in 1950s. In Indochina France faced guerilla warfare, 
with the first Indochina War 1946-1954, and Ho Chi Min’s guerilla 
forces were a serious challenge to the French forces. America stepped in 
with loans and aid to France, which contributed to make the French 
economy able to bear the war expenditures, and with the outbreak of 
war in Korea (1950-1954), the US increased the assistance to France, 
which in turn agreed to let Germany become member of NATO. In the 
end, the US withdrew its support to the French war effort in Indochina, 
which did result more or less directly to the French loss of the colony 
and loss of prestige in the international society.  
 The apparent American meddling in the strictly European affair in 
Suez in 1956 was another reason for French and in particular de Gaulle’s 
ambivalence towards the US, indeed it demonstrated to France that the 
alliance with America inhibited, to some extent at least, the French 
freedom of action in foreign policy, including the policies towards the 
colonial empire.113 It was against this background de Gaulle formulated 
his anti-American foreign policy.  
 The assumption that Great Britain would continue to strive for the 
special relationship with the US was inherent in de Gaulle’s perception 
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of the world order moreover, de Gaulle believed that Britain would opt 
for the Atlantic bond if forced to choose between Western Europe and 
the US. In 1962 de Gaulle was confirmed in his assumption that France 
and indeed Western Europe was locked in an Anglo-American grip. The 
British led by the conservative Prime Minister Macmillan made a deal 
with the Kennedy administration at Nassau to, in effect, subordinate the 
national British nuclear deterrent to US control by accepting an 
arrangement, with which the US would provide the British with Polaris 
sub-marine missiles in return for pooling British nuclear weapons.114 De 
Gaulle’s perception of the Anglo-American partnership was reinforced 
when the Kennedy administration offered the French the same deal as 
the British without inviting de Gaulle to negotiate the terms. De Gaulle 
rejected this fait accompli. 
 The apparent strong Anglo-American alliance, and de Gaulle’s 
emerging anti-Americanism was one reason why de Gaulle in January 
1963 at a press conference announced the French veto against British 
entry into the EEC, and at the same time opted for the European 
solution to this apparent Anglo-American preponderance, which stood 
in the way for the anticipated French reassertion. The subsequent treaty 
of friendship between France and Germany, the so-called Elysee Treaty 
(1963), which among other thing promised coordination of foreign 
policy between France and West Germany, marked this clear and 
decisive turn of France towards Europe against the Anglo-American 
preponderance.115 Although de Gaulle with the Elysee Treaty signaled 
certain friendliness towards West Germany, Germany remained a 
problem in French political thinking de Gaulle successively sought to 
contain West Germany. One means to contain Germany was a détente 
with the Soviet Union, de Gaulle shared an interest with Khrushchev 
(1953-1964) and Brezhnev (1964-1982) in containing German 
‘militarism’. De Gaulle also had a clear cut opinion on the German 
border issue, which was in contrast with both the Adenauer and Erhard 
administration’s, as he believed West Germany should accept the 
Potsdam agreement, and therefore the Oder-Neisse border. 
 
Cold War Revisionism 
One means for de Gaulle to reestablish France as a power in the 
international system was to increase France’s power both economically  
and militarily, and the ambition to reassert France in the world was also 
connected with, indeed inseparable from, de Gaulle’s quest to transform 
the Cold War order, and thereby resurrect France.116 France’s economic 
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growth in the early 1960s, the end of France’s last colonial war in Algeria 
in 1962, and the establishment of a national, nuclear deterrent the so-
called Force de Frappe in 1964 was the basis for de Gaulle’s challenge of 
the Cold War order.  
 De Gaulle’s vision for the end of the Cold War, the so-called Cold 
War revisionism, aimed at transcending the bloc system. De Gaulle 
believed in transcendence, and he argued that Soviet communism would 
not persist eternally, and that the Eastern European states inevitably 
would free them from the Soviet grip. He also believed that the US 
would not persist as a European power, because as the threat from 
Soviet communism would cease as de Gaulle, in fact, came to believe in 
the mid-1960s, the American presence in Europe would be obsolete. 
Thus, de Gaulle claimed that sooner or later the bloc to bloc system 
would end its existence, and thereby could and would a French lead 
Europe ‘from the Atlantic to the Urals’ emerge.117 
 During the first four years (1958-1962) of de Gaulle’s presidency, the 
French president mostly focused on reasserting France in the Western 
bloc, thus reflecting exactly how dissatisfied de Gaulle was with the 
existing Atlantic order. In 1958 de Gaulle proposed a three power 
directorate within NATO consisting of France, Great Britain and the 
US, a directorate which would function as a coordinating and decision-
making body of the Western world’s foreign policies. De Gaulle was 
motivated primarily by the fact that France had little influence on the 
nuclear decision-making in the alliance, while at the same time the 
French membership of the alliance was associated with a lot of risks, 
including being destroyed in a nuclear war. Thus, by proposing a 
directorate, France would gain influence on decisions that pertained to 
France and French security in the nuclear age, in addition to establishing 
France on equal footing in the international society and in the Western 
alliance with the US and UK. As the incoming Kennedy administration 
and the British Macmillan government dismissed the French proposal, 
de Gaulle instead moved to strengthen the Franco-German cooperation 
and strengthen European integration with the Fouchet plan of 1961-
1962. The Fouchet plan envisioned building the EEC into a ‘union of 
states’118 which was quite independent from the US. This plan also 
faltered, however, it reflected upon de Gaulle’s drive for reform of the 
transatlantic relation.  
 In the wake of the dual crisis in 1961-1962 de Gaulle launched his 
policy towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1964. This shift 
in French foreign policy was not, however, an expression of a Gaullist 
retreat from reasserting France in the Western alliance, but a reflection 
                                                 
117 Bozo in Leffler & Westad (2010), p. 164; Costigliola (1992), p. 119. 
118 Quoted from Bozo in Leffler & Westad (2010), p. 166. 
43 
 
upon the changing circumstances in Europe and a changing French 
perception of the Soviet Union’s intentions.  
 Indeed, the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, had facilitated a 
super power rapprochement according to de Gaulle, and this 
rapprochement would only strengthen the super power dominion in 
Europe, which the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 was a token of. De 
Gaulle furthermore believed that the Brezhnev leadership (1964-1982) 
and the emerging Sino-Soviet rife would demand a far more pacific 
Soviet approach to the West.119 Indeed, de Gaulle appeared to have 
reassessed his initial suspicions about Khrushchev’s peaceful co-
existence concept. Moreover, de Gaulle’s initial assumption about 
Eastern European desires for independence from the Kremlin appeared 
to be materializing, at least on the horizon in the wake of the Missile 
Crisis. The Franco-German rapprochement signified by the Elysee 
Treaty also suffered a severe blow, which further moved de Gaulle 
towards the East. In May, 1963, American pressure upon the new West 
German leadership under Ludwig Erhard (CDU), resulted in a preamble 
to the Elysee Treaty declaring German loyalty to the US and NATO.120 
De Gaulle also considered the US proposal to set up the American lead 
and controlled multilateral nuclear force (MLF) within NATO as another 
evidence of an American policy of both the rapprochement with the 
Soviet Union and a simultaneous maintenance of American hegemony in 
the Western alliance. De Gaulle believed he could counter this by 
reaching out to Eastern Europe.121  
 De Gaulle’s Eastern policy was however, more than just a policy that 
aimed at countering American hegemony and reasserting France. After 
1964 de Gaulle presented an alternative to the existing bloc-to-bloc 
system in Europe and a recipe to overcome the Cold War. According to 
de Gaulle a transformation of the Soviet Union into a cooperative 
power, the gradual emancipation of Eastern Europe, the emergence of 
Western Europe as an independent power would create a dialectical 
process, which in the end would transform the bloc-to-bloc system.122 
De Gaulle presented his scheme for overcoming the Cold War at a press 
conference in February, 1965, but neither the Soviet Union nor the US 
was taken by de Gaulle’s scheme.  
 Throughout the latter half of the 1960s de Gaulle continued his 
Eastern policy and the policy of reasserting France in the alliance. These 
two correlated in March, 1966, when de Gaulle withdrew France from 
NATOs integrated command. Indeed, as the threat from the Soviet 
Union diminished, there was a need to transform NATO into a less 
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bellicose and American dominated alliance. In fact, Paris came to believe 
that the French withdrawal from the strains in the Western bloc would 
inspire the Eastern European states to break free from Soviet 
dominion.123 The French withdrawal from the integrated command in 
1966 did have an impact on the alliance, as will be discussed in detail in 
Chapters 5 and 6, however not as de Gaulle had hoped for. The Soviet 
clamp down in Prague in October 1968 proved, to some at least, that the 
Gaullist concept was flawed. The 1968 student revolt in Paris and the 
Soviet clamp down on Czechoslovakia brought de Gaulle to his fall.  
West Germany 
The overall trend in German politics in the 1960s was that the direction 
(either Atlantic or European) of foreign policy and the reunification 
question brought governments down.  In West Germany the rise of 
social democratism was evident and the eventual success of 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) was indeed, based on a 
decisive new approach to foreign policy in general, and the reunification 
question in particular.  The erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961, 
had created a new status quo in Europe and West Gerrmnay, which also 
fed the increasingly more prevalent critique of the West German post-
War policy on these matters of foreign policy and reunification. 
 
The Setting 
In 1957 the Christian-conservative Christlich Demokratische Union 
Deutschlands  (CDU) led by Konrad Adenauer won the absolute majority 
in West Germany. The CDU had benefitted from the economic boom in 
1950s, which in a German context was largely ascribed to the genius of 
CDU’s Finance Minister and the later Chancellor Ludwig Erhard. The 
CDU enjoyed not least because of the economic miracle immense 
popular support, and CDU’s concept on German unification benefitted 
equally from this popular support.124 West German foreign policy was 
largely bound up with the unification question, to which the Hallstein 
Doctrine served. The Hallstein Doctrine of 1955 stipulated that West 
Germany denied diplomatic relations with any state, which recognized 
East Germany except from the Soviet Union, and the doctrine 
incorporated non-recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. Indeed, West 
Germany had no diplomatic relations with any Eastern European states 
as a function of the Hallstein Doctrine. Some scholars argue that the 
doctrine, in fact, facilitated the later rapprochement with the Eastern 
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bloc, which the Kiesinger administration began in 1966 and which 
flourished with the Brandt administration’s Ostpolitik in 1969.  
 While the Hallstein Doctrine tied West Germany to the West and 
signaled to the Eastern bloc a clear Atlanticist adherence, the CDU 
pursued a policy of Westbindung, which aimed at rehabilitating West 
Germnay in the West. Adenauer and the CDU reasoned that by binding 
West Germany into the West through its political institutions, most 
notably the European integration scheme, West Germany would be 
politically rehabilitated, and given sovereignty and political influence in 
the West.  
 The so-called client-state relation West Germany had with the US 
would become increasingly strained as West Germany was, as a result of 
the policy of Westbindung, politically rehabilitated in the 1960s. In general, 
CDU’s Atlanticist orientation mainly served the purpose of rehabilitating 
West Germany politically.125  
 The policy of Westbindung made West Germany, and the CDU, 
among the foremost proponents of European integration,126 and 
Westbindung was also one reason for Adenauer’s rapprochement with 
France, which was crowned with the Elysee Treaty of January 1963, 
however the treaty also revealed a not entirely convinced Atlanticist 
CDU leadership. Indeed, Granieri speaks of CDU’s ambivalent alliance 
with the US,127 and Adenauer would after he resigned as head of the 
CDU in 1963 become even more Gaullist. Although the Bundestag was 
forced to commit to a preamble to the Elysee Treaty stating German 
Atlantic adherence by the US, the Franco-German rapprochement was a 
reality by the early 1960s. Despite Adenauer and with him a group of 
Gaullists did not fully share de Gaulle’s visions of a Europe from the 
Atlantic to the Urals, Adenauer saw a strong Franco-German relation as 
the central part of the EEC, the very same structure that would 
rehabilitate the Federal Republic. The German adherence to the 
European integration was also a means for Adenauer to accommodate 
French security interests.128  
 Arguably the Hallstein Doctrine was the only viable position on the 
reunification question at the time and it made an actual reunification 
more remote, SPD’s alternative approach in the early 1960s was to seek 
reunification on the basis of neutrality. Adenauer withdrew as Chancellor 
in 1963 and left CDU without a strong leadership. Erhard took over, and 
the Erhard government (1963-1966) parted on a number of questions 
including whether West Germany should prioritize the Atlantic relations 
higher than the relation with France, and the question about 
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reunification and Berlin. The struggle in the party between the Gaullists 
and Atlanticists would in the end bring Erhard down.  
 
The SPD 
In the 1960s social democrats throughout Western Europe were rising to 
prominence. In West Germany SPD paved the way for the rise to a 
potential coalition partner at the Bad Godesberg Convention in 1959, at 
which the party denounced Marxist economic models and adhered to 
social market economy, and abandoned their opposition to NATO.129 
With this move, the CDU was deprived of its position as the primary 
opponent of Marxist ideology.  
 Willy Brandt took over leadership of the SPD in 1964, and his and 
his close advisor Egon Bahr’s leadership of an Atlanticist SPD signified 
the beginning of a movement away from the Hallstein Doctrine, a 
movement which had been under way since the construction of the 
Berlin Wall Whereas the Adenauer administration had seen the Wall as a 
confirmation of the Hallstein Doctrine’s prudency, Brandt and Bahr 
thought otherwise.130 The new leadership also signified the  beginning of 
a movement away from the client state relationship with the US. 
 To begin with Brandt and Bahr created the Politik der Kleinen Schritten 
to make the wall somewhat more permeable, and thereby relieve West 
Berliner’s access to families and friends on the other side. The policy of 
small steps was, despite the ‘small’ scale character, a clear breach with the 
Hallstein Doctrine’s ban against recognizing East Germany. Indeed, the 
matter of Christmas Passes established a precedence for a far more 
pragmatic and flexible approach to East Germany.131  Brandt and Bahr 
continued introducing new political thinking in the first half of the 
1960s, Brandt mostly in international settings, and by 1963 the new 
approach to reunification the concept of Wandel durch Annäherung was 
introduced. With the approach Brandt stressed the adherence to 
Westbindung and argued that German unification would only be possible 
if Germany continued being tied into the West, however, a reunification 
would also only be possible if changes in the East was set in motion, and 
from the point of departure of a recognition of the status quo including 
a recognition of East Germany.132 Reconciliation with the East was as 
important as the reconciliation with the West, and Brandt and Bahr was 
along with de Gaulle among the first proponents of a détente with the 
East. Brandt and Bahr in effect argued for both NATO and an opening 
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to the East, a foreign policy dualism, which Gress and Bark claim was 
inherent in SPD’s thinking before the Harmel study formalized it.133  
 However, not only SPD but also the West German public, elite, and 
industry argued for an opening of relations with Eastern Europe, 
Eastern Europe had traditionally been the primary buyers of German 
industrial production. The Hallstein doctrine was increasingly seen as an 
obstacle rather than a viable strategy towards reunification.134  
 
The Erhard Administration (1963-1966) 
The Erhard administration’s foreign policy was in the words of Gress 
and Bark ‘Janus-faced’,135 indeed the struggle over the direction of West 
German foreign policy came to fore in the CDU.   
 The Erhard government attempted a middle way on the German 
question with the so-called policy of movement, reflecting both the 
strains in CDU and that CDU’s foreign policy thinking, especially 
towards the German question, was at a wathershed.  The policy of 
movement aimed at opening for cultural and economic exchange with 
Eastern Europe without establishing diplomatic relations; while at the 
same time uphold the non-recognition and isolation of East Germany.136 
The policy of movement was led by foreign minister Schroeder, who 
along with Erhard was a declared Atlanticist. They both believed that 
German foreign policy must aim at alignment with the US and European 
integration, while at the same time balancing the French. The Atlanticists 
was adamantly opposed to de Gaulle’s scheme for Europe, and 
supported the British entry into the EEC. However, the Atlanticists were 
also keenly aware of the need to continue the rapprochement and 
reconciliation with France. 137  
 As Adenauer left the seat as head of the CDU to Erhard in 1962, the 
conflict between the Atlanticist and the Gaullists within the CDU came 
to the fore. In the end, this conflict of orientation in foreign policy 
undermined the Erhard leadership and was a significant reason for the 
fall of Erhard in 1966, despite the CDU had ‘stunning electoral landslide 
victory’ at the elections in 1965, indeed, the conflict played into the 
hands of SPD, which consistently showed Atlanticist adherence.138  
 Although the Gaullists such as Guttenberg, Strauss, and Adenauer 
within the CDU/CSU clearly sided with de Gaulle in his opposition to 
Americanization and to Anglo-Saxon dominance of Europe, the German 
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Gaullists, in fact, feared a certain Gaullist backlash in West Germany. 
The Gaullists worried that CDU/CSU would become associated with de 
Gaulle’s domestic and constitutional ideas, which they indeed did not 
share. Thus, the German Gaullists were selective Gaullists in that they 
exclusively shared a certain opposition to American dominance in 
Western Europe and preferred a ‘Europe of Fatherlands’ instead , the 
Gaullists within the CDU/CSU adhered strictly to a supranational 
Europe, which in the end collided with de Gaulle’s concept especially 
after the Empty Chair Crisis in 1966.  By the late 1960s the German-
Franco Gaullist relation was strained because of the divergence of 
opinion on European integration, but also because of the apparent lack 
of Christianity in French Gaullist thinking, after all the CDU was a 
Christian-conservative party.139  
 The conflict between the Gaullists and Atlanticists in German 
politics should however, not be seen as a conflict between adherence to 
either Paris or Washington, the struggle should be seen as a continuum, 
because it essentially was a struggle of opinion on  the extent to which 
West Germany should adhere to either Paris or Washington. By the time 
Erhard took over as Chancellor in 1963 West Germany was a part of the 
Western world, and the division of Europe and Germany was a fact of 
life, therefore the real question was, seen from Bonn at least, what kind 
of Western organization served West German interests best? Both 
fractions agreed on Westbindung, European integration, and the necessity 
of the alliance with the US.  
 The Gaullists led by Adenauer, Strauss, and Guttenberg argued that a 
strong European organization served German interest best as a check on 
American dominance in European affairs, whereas the Atlanticist led by 
Erhard and Schröeder tipped to a strong European organization without 
it being at the expense of the close alliance with the US.140 This division 
took on different forms depending on the issue, however, the Gaullists 
were in general, against the American policy of détente (the petite 
détente) or any policy the US followed, that involved an American 
impact on the organization of Europe, a US policy which they 
contracted was about recognizing the status quo in Europe, and creating 
a super power condominium at the expense of West German interests. 
The German Gaullists were for that matter also weary of the Soviet 
Union, and suspected the other super power had similar intentions as the 
US. The Atlanticists were far more accommodating towards the US and 
US policies mostly as a result of a reluctance to jeopardize a close 
relation with the US, which they believed were essential to German 
interests. 
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 By the summer of 1964 a principal decision of making Germany 
America’s strongest ally in Europe was taken in Bonn directly opposing 
the Gaullist position. Indeed, de Gaulle was complaining that the Erhard 
administration did not fulfill the pledge of the Elysee Treaty to 
coordinate  French and German foreign policy, and de Gaulle argued 
that if Erhard was not willing to pursue a common policy, especially as 
the US was on the verge of overextension in Vietnam, France would 
seek and explore an independent French European policy, which would 
involve agreement with the Soviet Union on European security that did 
not necessarily accommodate German interest including reunification. 
This led Erhard to conclude that Germany must follow the US. the 
Erhard administration reasoned that by making Germany the most 
committed ally in Europe, Bonn would give the Johnson administration 
‘justifiable’ reasons for staying in Europe despite the assumed 
overextension. To the contrary the Gaullists argued that the Vietnam 
War exactly was the reason why the Johnson administration would seek 
‘easy’ agreements with the Soviet Union at the expense of German 
interests, and therefore, to counter this trend, Germany should move 
closer to France.  
 This choice of becoming America’s strongest ally in Europe proved 
to be decisive for West Germany’s position on several issues including 
Vietnam and the MLF.141 The Gaullists were against the MLF, and 
instead argued for an independent European nuclear force. This would 
make Europe an independent power in the world; although they 
contemplated it should be in close alliance with the US. 142 But more 
importantly, by making Germany the strongest ally of the US in Europe, 
Germany’s foreign policy was also subjected to the shifts and turns in US 
policy.143  
 The policy of movement sought to strike a balance between the two 
fractions on the most central issue in German foreign policy, namely 
reunification. On one hand Erhard and Schroeder opened up to the 
Eastern Europe, and on the other hand the Gaullists were granted the 
continuance of the Hallstein Doctrine whereby German interests of not 
conceding anything to the Soviet Union and East Germany was 
protected. However, the Hallstein Doctrine was under severe pressure as 
the 1960s progressed. Nasser had recognized the East German regime 
without Bonn breaking of diplomatic ties with Egypt, in effect reflecting 
that Bonn (at least the Atlanticist fraction) did not want to break off 
diplomatic relations with states that recognized East Germany if it was 
against West German interests. Egypt had recognized East Germany and 
accepted bilateral aid program however, Bonn wanted to stay close to the 
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Arab countries especially as the weapons sales to Israel had become 
public. Moreover, the crisis in the Middle East, which emerged as a 
consequence of the weapons sales to Israel, also led to a recognition in 
Bonn, that German interests, in fact, was the Federal Republics interest 
and therefore, the Federal Republic should act as a state in its own right 
based on its own interest and not as a part of a bigger whole.144  
 The election in September 1965 only intensified the conflict between 
the Gaullists and Atlanticist in CDU; indeed, the Gaullists pursued an 
anti-American and anti-Schroeder campaign throughout the election 
period,145 which was in part motivated by the internal CDU struggle for 
the chair of the party, and in part by Adenauer’s contempt and distrust 
of Erhard and the Atlanticist leadership.146 The Atlanticists won a 
convincing victory, and German foreign policy was manifested as 
essentially Atlanticist, and the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition continued 
under Erhard’s leadership. However, despite this victory the Gaullists 
initiated a campaign against foreign minister Schroeder, and despite an 
increasingly more assertive France vis-à-vis West Germany, the German 
Gaullists continued to campaign against the Atlanticist foreign policy 
even after this Atlanticist 1965 landslide victory.147 
 The foreign policy after the 1965 election was still inhibited by the 
Hallstein Doctrine. On one hand, the Erhard leadership was committed 
to détente with Eastern Europe, but on the other hand, the doctrine 
inhibited a genuine commitment to the very détente. The Erhard 
administration issued the so-called Peace Note on March, 1966 to the 
governments of Europe and the superpowers to overcome this apparent 
deadlock in German foreign policy. The note contained a declaration of 
policy but also reflected the strains the Hallstein Doctrine put on 
German foreign policy. The Note was also dispatched to overcome the 
American pressure on the administration to sign the nonproliferation 
treaty – when the US and the USSR had come to an agreement on the 
matter.  
 On the question of nuclear weapons, the Erhard administration, 
Gaullists and Atlanticists alike, feared that by renouncing German rights 
to develop a national nuclear deterrent, West Germany would find itself 
in an isolated position on the European continent flanked by the nuclear 
powers; France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The Erhard 
administration therefore proposed with the Note a series of non-
aggression treaties with the Soviet Union and Eastern European states, 
which would also limit and reduce the number of nuclear weapons in 
Europe. Although the effort produced no results, it signaled a German 
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frustration with the strains of the Hallstein doctrine, but also a certain 
reluctance to ‘blindly’ accommodate the Johnson administration. Indeed, 
by the mid-1960s a beginning of assertion of West Germany was well on 
its way.  The Note also revealed the Soviet Union’s hard bargaining 
position. In the reply form the Kremlin, the Soviets demanded 
recognition of East Germany, the Oder-Neisse line, and a complete 
withdrawal of West Germany from NATO, and called for a common 
conference on security in Europe.148  
 The campaign against a future nonproliferation scheme was however, 
caught up with by the offset negotiations in the fall of 1966. The 
Johnson administration demanded an increased offset payment from 
Germany, which Erhard reluctantly agreed to. This sparked yet another 
Gaullist campaign against Erhard, this time claiming that the US had 
moved focus to their own economic problems, and therefore had lost 
interest in German reunification or European unification. Therefore, the 
Gaullists argued, Franco-German cooperation and a strong independent 
Europe were indeed most needed. In the end, the Gaullists in fact 
managed to discredit Erhard’s budget of 1967 to the extent that the 
coalition partner FDP and the Bundestag rejected it, and Erhard 
withdrew from the post as Chancellor.149 With the fall of Erhard the 
determinant struggle between Atlanticism and Gaullism in West German 
foreign policy faded, mostly because CDU lost its position of dominance 
in the new coalition of CDU and SPD.  
 
The Grand Coalition 
The new Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) formed a coalition 
with the SPD making Brandt Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor. The 
former foreign minister Schröder took up the position as defense 
minister, and the Gaullist Guttenberg was appointed parliamentary state 
secretary on the recommendation of Adenauer.150 Although the Grand 
Coalition has been termed ‘the forgotten government’, this was the first 
government in post-War Germany, which the SPD was member of, 
signifying a larger Western European trend of Social Democracies – the 
new left -- entering Western European governments.151 Moreover, 
Brandt laid the groundwork for the 1969 Ostpolitik during his years as 
foreign minister in the Grand Coalition.152 
 The Grand Coalition’s foreign policy and position on the 
reunification issue was a divisive matter, which in the end undermined 
                                                 
148 Bark & Gress (1989), pp. 41-45. 
149 Granieri (2003), p. 219-220; Bark & Gress (1989), pp. 56-57.. 
150 Kleuters (2012), p.132. 
151 Fulbrook (2009), p. 170. 
152 Fulbrook (2009), p. 175. 
52 
 
Kiesinger’s leadership. Although Brandt and Bahr’s rapprochement 
concept had the support of Kiesinger, Kiesinger maintained that East 
Germany should not be recognized. Although the non-recognition 
principle was against SPD’s thinking, the Grand Coalition only signed 
non-aggression pacts with Eastern Europe excluding East Germany. 
This signified the extent to which the coalition abolished The Hallstein 
Doctrine’s prohibition of having diplomatic relations with states that 
recognized East Germany, indeed the very first nonaggression pact was 
signed with Tito’s Yugoslavia, which had been the first Eastern 
European state to recognize East Germany.  
 The SPD and CDU/CSU also departed on the question of the Oder-
Neisse border. Brandt went beyond the agreed government position on 
the question, when he in Nuremberg in March 1968 declared readiness 
to accept and recognize the Oder-Neisse as the legitimate border. 
Although Brandt was forced to retreat from the statement, the 
unification question was increasingly dividing the Grand Coalition. 
Indeed when the Soviet Union intervened in Prague in August 1968, the 
difference of interpretation between Brandt and Bahr on one side and 
Kiesinger on the other could not have been greater. Brandt and Bahr 
argued that the Soviet invasion indeed highlighted the necessity of 
bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table to effectively achieve 
reconciliation with the East, which was central for a reunification. 
Kiesinger and CDU/CSU interpreted the events in Prague in completely 
different terms, and concluded that a policy of strength was necessary, 
and that the rapprochement had failed. This did not keep Brandt from 
initiating talks with the Soviets, to explore the possibilities for a 
negotiation. During these talks the Soviets put forward their wishes for a 
summit meeting discussing European security.153  During the election 
campaign in 1969 – and even before – representatives from the CDU 
accused the coalition partners in the SPD for being an annerkennungspartei 
claiming this was an irresponsible position. This highlights the 
divergence of perception on the most central issue in post-war West 
German foreign policy.    
 While the Grand Coalition was gradually deteriorating, the liberal 
party the Freie Demokratischer Partei (FDP) headed by the liberal Erich 
Mende, who lost to a group a left-leaning pragmatists during the 1966-
1969 period of opposition gained political strength. The left-leaning 
group, the so-called Saxon guard, consisted of among others of Scheel, 
who would become party leader in 1967, and Genscher, who had 
opposed Erhard’s 1967 budget and would become foreign minister in 
1974, and gained power in the party on a new Ostpolitik. The group 
argued that recognition of East Germany and the Oder-Neisse border, in 
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fact, was a reasonable price to pay for an eventual reunification. In many 
ways this was complete in line with the SPD’s position.154  
 By the time of the elections in 1969, the SPD in coalition with the 
FDP presented an entirely new approach to both the German 
reunification question and German foreign policy at large. The coalition 
negotiated draft treaties in 1970 with the Soviet Union and Poland, the 
latter recognizing the Oder-Neisse border, and Bonn normalized 
relations with Czechoslovakia in 1973. Most important, the Brandt 
administration initiated talks with East Germany, and in 1972 the two 
Germanies concluded the so-called Basic Treaty, which formalized 
exchange of representatives though without a full diplomatic recognition. 
Through this sweeping process of Ostpolitik, most of the opposition to 
SPD’s Ostpolitik came from CDU.155  
European Integration  
The European Community was throughout the 1960s marked by crisis 
and cooperation. Hardly surprising de Gaulle was at the center of 
conflict, along with West Germany. In 1960s West Germany had risen to 
leadership during EEC crises, and perhaps marked that the policy of 
Westbindung indeed was a success. 
The 1963 crisis 
De Gaulle’s concept of Europe broke with the anticipations of the post-
War concept of European integration. De Gaulle favored an organized 
Europe without a supranational element. Indeed, a ‘Europe of States’ 
organized through interstate cooperation, served the purpose of 
reestablishing France as a great power and containing Germany.156 
European integration was largely seen as inhibiting French freedom of 
action in foreign policy in essence integration inhibited the reassertion of 
France as a great power. The crisis the Community was brought into as a 
result of the French veto of British entry into the community in 1963 
marked the end the period of Gaullist restraint in Paris’ dealings with the 
European partners. In general, the French veto signaled along with the 
French rejection of the MLF scheme and the conclusion of the Elysee 
treaty the beginning of an attack on both the Atlantic partnership and 
European integration. The European partners saw the French dual attack 
on the status quo as an attempt to replace integration and cooperation 
with nationalism and power politics.157  Indeed, de Gaulle’s veto had 
demonstrated that de Gaulle was not willing to commit France and 
French foreign policy to the principles which the multilateral institution 
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embodied. The French veto had, so to speak, appeared outside the 
Community’s structures, as de Gaulle had announced the veto in a 
radiobroadcast.  
 The remaining five, once the shock of de Gaulle’s action had settled, 
agreed that the only possible response was to rehabilitate the Community 
in fact; the best response to de Gaulle’s line of thinking was a further 
commitment to the principles of integration and cooperation in Europe. 
Although there was dissent among the five as to whether the 
Community and the individual member states should respond to de 
Gaulle’s action with caution or the opposite, the Community led by the 
Germans and Italians chose the cautious approach. This was indeed the 
only approach in the light of the decision to continue and rehabilitate the 
community. Interestingly, this pattern of cautious response to de 
Gaulle’s divergent actions would repeat itself throughout the 1960s and 
not just among the community members but also across the Atlantic.  
 The task of rebuilding the Community after the French veto was led 
by the German government that was guided by the policy of Westbindung. 
West Germany had numerous interests in the rehabilitation of the 
Community, among the most basic the commitment to European 
integration along with the equally important commitment to the Atlantic 
partnership.158 However, the motivation for FRG’s drive to orchestrate 
the reconstruction of the community was a political choice based on the 
assessment of German national interest at that particular moment in 
time.159 Moreover, the German quest to reconstruct also reflected the 
internal struggle within the CDU among the Gaullists and Atlanticists.160  
Indeed, an active German leadership of the reconstruction of the 
community would both justify the Elysee Treaty and rescue it at the 
same time. The Treaty would be justified if the Germans used the 
cooperative measures of the treaty, in fact German pressure through the 
treaty mechanisms, could induce de Gaulle to put on more cooperative 
manners in Paris’ dealings with the five. At the same time, this active use 
of the treaty’s cooperative measures would further the Franco-German 
rapprochement. Moreover, and perhaps more important, Germany 
would demonstrate to both sides of the Atlantic the continued adherence 
of Germany to European integration, despite the conclusion of the 
Elysee treaty. Lastly, the German leadership was driven by certain 
worries about the yet unfolded Common Market, the CAP, and the 
unequal distribution of benefits of the integration among the members, 
all of which could be addressed by the German leadership in this new 
phase. The Erhard administration also deemed it equally important to 
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maintain the British interest in membership of the alliance, and the 
Community shared a fear thatthe British would drift from the continent.  
 The European Community survived the crisis of 1963 because the 
five remained as committed to the embodying principles. Indeed, in 
December, 1963, the Community concluded a deal on a reform of the 
CAP, and signaled that the EEC had overcome the crisis and returned to 
good multilateralist behavior with all members committing themselves to 
the guiding principles for the community’s negotiation.161    
 Despite the crisis of 1963 was overcome, beneath the surface several 
problems still lured, all of which would haunt the community throughout 
the 1960s. Among these were the unresolved questions about the 
Commission’s role vis-à-vis the Council, i.e., the level of 
supranationalism. West Germany had in fact signaled by the ‘agenda 
setting role’ in connection with the French veto that West Germany too 
favored less supranationalism and more nation-state. Moreover, the 
British position had not been resolved either.162   
The Empty Chair Crisis 
The Community succeeded with important reform in 1964 and 1965, 
especially the agreement on cereal prices was a token of a Community, 
which was fully on tracks. However, there were some cracks and 
important issues within the Community that had to be resolved.  
 Among these was UK entry into the community. Although the 
British Labour government was lukewarm of EEC membership, Wilson 
at least formally never declared a non-interest in the community after 
1963. There were also a drift away from federalism, which the integration 
concept originally had been contemplated on. The French were not 
alone; indeed, the Germans and the Dutch were reluctant towards 
federalism as well, and by the end of 1964 a majority of the members 
warned against leaving the future direction of the political union in the 
hands of the Commission, but rather the national governments should 
direct the matter.163 This did not mean however, that political 
coordination was not a Community objective. Germany, led by Erhard, 
was pushing for a political coordination in the community in the foreign 
policy area, arguing for a need to discuss the East-West conflict among 
the European partners.164 By 1965 de Gaulle launched a campaign to 
force the European partners to commit to a ‘Europe of States’ that 
culminated in the so-called Empty Chair Crisis, which lasted for six 
months. France boycotted Brussels in the middle of negotiation on a 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).   
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 Ludlow argues that the crisis came about as especially Germany, Italy 
and the Netherlands rebelled against France’s relative dominance in the 
community matters.165 France had gained this position of relative 
strength vis-à-vis the European partners as a result of the ‘destructive 
potential’166 France had demonstrated it had with the rejection of the 
European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954. The lesson drawn from 
this among the European partners was, according to Ludlow, twofold. 
On one hand, the five believed that without France there could be no 
integration,  and on the other hand, that French support to various 
political schemes was not given beforehand. Accordingly the European 
partners sought to accommodate the French views and national interests 
during the negotiations on the Treaty of Rome, which indeed bore the 
print of French national interests.167 This line of thinking was confirmed 
with the French unilateralism of 1963. 
 Despite the successes the community had had with reforming the 
CAP it was still an area that was highly advantageous to France. During 
the early 1960s a certain modus operandi or pattern in the EEC 
negotiations arose. Germany and Italy, along with the rest of the EEC 
partners found themselves in a situation, in which hindering a French 
withdrawal from the Community had a prime place in the  negotiations 
resulting in a somewhat over-accommodating Community towards 
French interests, which this favorable CAP was a result of. However de 
Gaulle’s success with this negotiating strategy caught up with France in 
the mid-1960s. In both Italy and Germany the relative high cost of the 
CAP was deemed too much, and it became government priority to 
reform the CAP, and coupled with a French recognition that France in 
fact benefitted enormously from the EEC the balance between the 
partners switched. The French leaving the Community was no longer a 
believable scenario, because France benefitted so greatly from the 
Community. Ludlow even argue that the occasionally but continuously 
outbursts from de Gaulle against the Community was nothing but empty 
threats.168  
 The Empty Chair Crisis was therefore, according to Ludlow, brought 
on by partly a recognition in Germany and Italy that they indeed 
contributed more to the CAP than was reasonable, and partly that 
France’s threats of leaving the Community, which was veiled in de 
Gaulle’s anti-integration outbursts, in fact was an empty threat. The 
showdown between the partners led by West Germany was the CAP 
negotiations in July, 1965, in which Germany and Italy set out to reform 
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the CAP, and change the distribution of costs and benefits within the 
Community. France left the negotiations – thus the crisis emerged. 
 The Luxembourg compromise of January, 1966, ended the crisis and 
resolved the differences between the partners. De Gaulle succeeded to 
some extent as the compromise established the intergovernmental 
character of the EEC.169 In addition the Empty Chair Crisis can also be 
seen as a crisis fed by the current state of affairs in the relations between 
the six and not just a crisis of constitutionalism. This apparent turn in 
the internal EEC balance also signified another developing trend in 
Western Europe during the 1960s, namely that of German -- and Italian 
– political rehabilitation, which contributed to a certain isolation of 
France – at least in EEC matters, as the Empty Chair Crisis was a token 
of. However, despite the relative isolation of France in the Community 
France was still a member of the EEC, and as such de Gaulle’s potential 
and sometimes real obstructionist behavior had an impact on the 
Community and the development of it throughout the 1960s. 
British Membership of Europe  
The Wilson government once more made a bit for the continent, as 
Britain decided on a second application in 1967. Labour who 
traditionally had been against British membership of the EEC, reversed 
its position much of the same reasons as the Conservative MacMillan 
government had in 1961, namely trade. As the EEC had demonstrated 
its viability and increasingly organized trade, coupled with a forecast of a 
decreasing Commonwealth trade, the Wilson government had a very 
good reason for applying again. However, as with the first application de 
Gaulle blocked it, although this time the application was not withdrawn, 
and as de Gaulle left government in 1969, the path for British entry was 
cleared.170 The Wilson government’s decision to apply once again largely 
reflected an overall tendency in the UK’s declining status as a global 
power. 
 The Wilson government (1964-1970) came to preside over a period 
of imperial overstretch. While the Labour government followed the 
Conservative MacMillan government’s policy of preserving Great 
Britain’s status as a global power, the 1960s saw the overstretch of 
British armed forces. The UK was committed to no less than three 
different alliances, namely NATO, the South East Asian Treaty 
Organization (SEATO), and the Central Eastern Treaty Organization 
(CENTO), which taken together committed the UK globally. Moreover, 
by the time Wilson came into office, two wars were being fought, a 
confrontation in Indonesia (1960 -1966) and a fight against insurgents in 
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Aden (1957-1967) and South Arabia (1968), and at the same time the 
East of Suez remained a top priority in British defense thinking.171 
 Despite the fact that the USSR continued its arms buildup during the 
1960s, the Labour government downscaled the threat perception. In 
general, the USSR was considered a moderate, and somewhat rational 
actor on the global stage, and in terms of the threat towards Western 
Europe and the UK the threat was latent, and the same which had 
existed ever since the late 1940s.172 In many ways, the Wilson 
government had the same perception of the Soviet threat as de Gaulle.  
 The Labour government decided early on that British nuclear 
weapons should be retained, although Labour traditionally was against 
the national nuclear deterrent, and even had pledged during the election 
campaign in 1964, to renegotiate the Nassau agreement and place the 
British nuclear deterrent under NATO control. However, the Wilson 
administration instead decided upon retaining the Polaris missiles in late 
1965. In general, Labour saw the retaining of the nuclear missiles as a 
guarantee against renewed nuclear threats against East of Suez, and an 
American retreat into isolationism.173  In this light, the British proposal 
to an ANF was probably not genuine, but rather a tactical ploy to hinder 
the creation of a multilateral scheme within NATO. Indeed, the British 
along with the French, Soviets, and Americans were adamantly opposed 
to the idea that West Germany would gain a finger on the nuclear trigger. 
Instead the British supported both a consultation arrangement in NATO 
on nuclear questions, which eventually would turn into the Nuclear 
Planning Group (NPG), and British support for the non-proliferation 
treaty (NPT) without a European clause.174 In general, the Labour 
government feared like most of the other European states a resurgent 
Germany.  
 In a March, 1966, defense review announced that the British forces 
in the Mediterranean, Aden, and South Arabia would be withdrawn by 
1968 mostly as an outcome of financial strains. Indeed, this marked shift 
in British defense thinking from a global commitment to a Eurocentric 
focus. The Sterling Crisis of 1967 put the already strained British 
economy into an even worse position, and sparked the beginning of a 
debate resulting in the withdrawal of British forces from East of the 
Suez.175  
 While the economic problems caused by the global commitment, the 
Labour leadership was also driven by certain disillusionment with the 
                                                 
171 Hughes (2009), pp. 85-87. 
172 Hughes (2009), pp. 90-93. 
173 Hughes (2009), pp.92-94. 
174 Hughes (2009), p. 95. The European Clause would not bar Europe from obtaining a 
nuclear deterrent. 
175 Hughes (2009), p. 106. 
59 
 
Commonwealth. The post-imperial world was not uncritically supportive 
of the former Empire, if supportive at all. Moreover, the ‘special 
relationship’ had turned sour, as the Johnson administration had largely 
overlooked the British in both NPT negotiations and more importantly, 
overlooked the by treaty pledged British influence in South East Asian 
matters. By joining the EEC the British would avoid being isolated in 
global politics, and instead have a platform (the EEC) from which 
British influence could be extended. The EEC was also a protective 
means against too much influence and pressure from the US on British 
foreign policy.176 
 
British détente  
Although the Wilson government considered the Soviet Union as a 
moderate actor, de Gaulle’s witdrawal from the integrated command in 
March, 1966, gave rise to fears in London that it would complement the 
ever existing Soviet efforts to undermine the Western alliance. Moreover, 
the British believed that the French-Soviet rapprochement and de 
Gaulle’s critique of the alliance could somehow drive a wedge in between 
the European allies and the US. The Wilson government also feared that 
the French withdrawal could inspire other allies to withdraw too, at 
expense of immense political and strategic costs to the entire Western 
world. 
 The French withdrawal was in other words, considered a threat to 
alliance cohesion, and the Labour leadership saw the French variant of 
détente as threat to the very same alliance cohesion. The British 
therefore took it upon themselves to on one hand, rally the allies around 
the alliance, and on the other hand, promote a détente, rival to de 
Gaulle’s variant. The British believed along with de Gaulle that the time 
indeed had come for a détente with the Eastern bloc, the question was 
exclusively about means and ways, and not the objective. The perception 
that the threat from the Soviet Union had largely diminished was indeed, 
no longer an exclusive Gaullist viewpoint but a common position 
throughout Western Europe including in the UK.177 Kosygin, the 
chairman of the Council of Ministers, visited London twice during 1967, 
and Wilson visited Moscow no less than three times. These visits had a 
beneficial impact on the bilateral relation, and in the end it resulted in the 
establishment of a London-Moscow hotline.  
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 The Labour government maintained that NATO was about collective 
deterrence against the USSR, maintenance of the US in Western Europe, 
and keeping the Germans down, however, Labour also argued that 
NATO should have a détente agenda, which was opposing the means of 
de Gaulle’s variant.  
 Despite these intentions Wilson only produced a single initiative, if 
trade is excluded as a means of détente, which in fact had originated at 
the Czechoslovak embassy. The Czechoslovaks had presented Foreign 
Minister Stewart a document that stated that European states should 
respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial rights, and avoid taking 
steps ‘which might result in aggravating international tensions’,178 followed by 
statements on renunciation of the use of force, and cooperation in trade 
and culture. The British presented a British draft to the North Atlantic 
Council (NAC), and although it was criticized by the Johnson 
administration for excluding America from the negotiations on a 
European settlement, and the Germans criticized it for not containing a 
reference to German unification, the NAC approved the British 
presented their draft to the Czechoslovak foreign ministry, which 
however turned it down.179  
 Despite this lack of success, the British in the wake of the French 
withdrawal from the integrated command did represent a third way 
distinct from both the US and de Gaulle. Indeed, in the Foreign Office 
the idea that trade with the Eastern bloc would foster détente was 
common sense. In January, 1968, the Labour government concluded a 
trade agreement with the Soviets on technology, and throughout the late 
1960s the British sought to liberalize the strategic embargo within the 
Co-coordinating Committee (COCOM), which proscribed export to the 
communist countries including China, much to the Johnson 
administration’s anger.180 In the field of trade the British détente was 
bilateral, as opposed to the multilateral approach Labour proposed the 
political détente within NATO should have. As such, the UK was a 
typical Western European state.  
 
The Soviet Experience 
Much in the same way as with de Gaulle Wilson’s opening to the Soviet 
Union ended with a somewhat cold shoulder from Moscow. In the 
course of 1968 the Soviets presented the Wilson government with what 
the Wilson administration conceived as unreasonable demands to 
conclude a friendship treaty. Indeed, the Soviets argued that not without 
                                                 
178 Cited from Hughes (2009) p. 117. 
179 Hughes (2009), p 117-118. 
180 Hughes (2009), pp. 121-124. 
61 
 
a formal British denunciation of NATO would a friendship treaty be 
concluded.181   
Brief conclusion 
Western Europe in the 1960s was indeed about realignments. In 
domestic politics, intra-European relations, and foreign policy Western 
Europe overcame barriers, developed new policies, and shifted the 
balances. Naturally all of this pushed the Johnson administration to 
actively respond.  
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Chapter 4 Beginnings, 1963-1964 
Introduction 
In 1963 and 1964, policy makers in Washington in general interpreted 
Western Europe’s policies in terms of the impact these could have on 
the alliance, alliance cohesion, and therefore also America’s security and 
position in the world. The different branches within the Johnson 
administration did not differ in their interpretations of the beginning of 
the Western European realignments. It was seen as a forecast of a return 
to the traditional European power politics. The administration, in other 
words, upheld the traditional understanding of Western Europe’s reason 
of state in the foreign policy realm.   
 Based on the economic recovery in Western Europe, Western 
European governments responded to the crisis year, and increasingly 
sought to realign the status quo in the transatlantic relations during 1963 
and 1964, French President de Gaulle in particular, although Gaullist 
ideas gained momentum in Western Europe in the early 1960s. In 1963 
and 1964, the contours of a Gaullist alternative to the status quo, which 
largely had been designed by the US, emerged. For instance, de Gaulle 
withdrew the French fleet from NATO, and in the process rejected the 
principle of integration, which Rusk characterized as an attack on the 
very heart of NATO and a promise to a return of power politics in 
Europe -- if de Gaulle’s example was followed by the other allies. De 
Gaulle also launched a détente with the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. 
 Although Chancellor Erhard was a declared Atlanticist, the Gaullist 
wing in Christian-Conservative CDU was quite strong, and the Gaullists 
managed to put the German unification question firmly on the political 
agenda in Western Germany and therefore Washington. The German 
question was largely interpreted in Washington as a subject that 
potentially could unravel the Western alliance. In addition, it posed an 
immediate problem for Washington. Indeed, Secretary of State Rusk 
found it difficult to reconcile the irreconcilable objectives of 
accommodating the German wishes for some sort of initiative and the 
administration’s policy towards the Soviet Union. In fact, the German 
whish for an initiative could collide with US policies towards the Soviet 
Union.182  
 The core in both the French and German critique of the status quo 
in the transatlantic relations was a critique of inequality in the Atlantic 
partnership. De Gaulle and the German nationalists argued that an 
American preponderance of power had resulted in an Atlantic 
partnership completely dominated by America in all its aspects. 
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Essentially, the Franco-German Gaullist critique was a critique of 
America’s historically held position of unilateralism in the Western 
alliance.  
 One of the Johnson administration’s answers to the different 
Western European challenges, which arguably had different levels of 
urgency, was the Bridge Building policy of 1964, with which the 
administration essentially sought to gain control over the allies’ diverging 
policies and wishes, including the German unity question, and place the 
Western allies in line with America’s new objectives in Eastern Europe. 
The State Department suggested an institutionalizing scheme, which 
reflected the traditional American thinking of creating structures within 
which the US could have a privileged position.  
Setting the Stage the Petite Détente  
On January 2, 1964, President Johnson complained to his National 
Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy that: ‘I am tired, by God, of having him 
[Khrushchev] be the man who wants peace and I am the guy who wants war.’183 Prior to 
this statement, Khrushchev had issued a letter to the world’s 
governments, in which, he had spoken of American imperialism. This led 
to Johnson’s call for ‘some imaginative proposal or some initiative that we can 
take besides just reacting to [Khrushchev’s] actions’.184 Johnson’s discontent with 
the situation also reflected the mess the Kennedy administration and also 
the Johnson administration believed America had been in ever since the 
crisis year 1961-1962, namely that on one hand Khrushchev promoted 
peaceful coexistence to the liking of many Western Europeans, and on 
the other hand that peaceful coexistence was a crafty tactic to break up 
the Western alliance. Indeed it was argued concurrently in the 
administration in the early 1960s that the Soviet outlook had not 
changed.185 And even though the Johnson administration aspired to 
continue Kennedy’s petite détente,186 the administration believed that the 
emerging Sino-Soviet rife prevented the Soviet Union from concluding 
any formal agreements with the US, thus a sustained détente, not that 
that the administration believed that a relaxation of tensions would 
produce any change in Soviet outlook.187 This perception was upheld 
throughout these early years of the Johnson administration.  
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 The Johnson administration was determined, like all other 
administrations, to reduce the risk of nuclear war,188 and shortly after 
Johnson took over the presidency his administration recommended 
continuing Kennedy’s dual track policy of probing into Soviet interests 
in an effort to uncover possible areas of mutual interests, and deterring 
the USSR.189 This immediately resulted in mutual cutbacks in uranium 
production and an attempt to increase US wheat sales to the Soviet 
Union, while maintaining a proper deterrence.190  
 Johnson did aspire to somehow move the relations closer. Indeed, in 
his State of the Union Address in January, 1964, he announced ‘ten ways’ 
to make the world ‘safe for diversity, in which all men, goods, and ideas can freely 
move across every border and every boundary’. The ways that included the Soviet 
Union, such as cutting defense expenditures and uranium production 
were all informal; the US hoped that the USSR would follow by example.  
Only Geneva would be the venue for formal proposals.  All these ways 
were suggested in a February, 1964, National Intelligence Estimate 
(NIE), which arrived at these conclusions on the premise that the Soviet 
Union had not changed in any fundamental way, nor was about to. Even 
though this hindered a formal détente and a European settlement the 
administration clearly intended to seek some kind of accommodation 
with the Soviet Union.   
 The administration also agreed that Khrushchev’s ‘tactics of détente’ 
appealed to Western Europe, and that Khrushchev may succeed in 
breaking up the Western alliance if the US did not do something to 
counter this.191 In fact, as long as Khrushchev continued to relax 
tensions the already existing differences within the alliance would only be 
aggravated, and the administration argued that the need for the US to 
counter a break up in the Western alliance was more urgent than ever, 
because ‘frictions in the West … are limited during periods of tension’.192 In other 
words tension produced alliance loyalty, or a relaxation of tensions 
produced ‘frictions’ in the Western alliance. Khrushchev furthermore 
would forego any pressure tactics, which offered little promise for any 
gains. Khrushchev would instead continue to seek a reduction in tension 
since he probably believed that ‘existing differences in the West can be greatly 
aggravated’.193  
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 When Brezhnev took over as General Secretary in October, 1964, it 
only took the administration a few moments to recognize that Brezhnev 
portended some change that would bring the USSR further away from 
Washington. Indeed, the new leadership would revive support for Hanoi 
as an asset in the Sino-Soviet rivalry, a rivalry, which endangered the 
superpower rapprochement. The State Department argued that ‘peaceful 
coexistence’ had only been a remedy to enhance communist power 
throughout the world in times when the ‘relations of forces turned unfavorable’ 
to the Soviet Union such as the time immediately following the crisis 
year, which was, however, over according to the new Soviet leadership.194 
Nonetheless the Johnson administration was somewhat optimistic and 
pursued the two track policy of probing and deterring Moscow 
throughout 1964. 
 In American thinking in these early years there was no qualitative 
shift in the perception of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the administration 
still believed that a formidable nuclear deterrent was decisive, and 
Johnson’s probing and accommodating line in policy was more a 
reaction to Khrushchev’s policy than new thinking. This traditional look 
upon the Soviet Union reflected that the USSR was still considered a 
formidable enemy, which potentially could win the Cold War 
competition. Although the USSR was stockpiling nuclear weapons in the 
1960s the administration knew that the US enjoyed a superior position 
militarily and economically in these early years. It was not until 1968 the 
administration faced the prospect of nuclear parity.195 
Tracing Bridge Building 
The French Challenge 
No one was more eager to reassert Europe and France, in particular, vis-
à-vis the US and the USSR than de Gaulle. De Gaulle had challenged 
American leadership in Europe – or at least the status quo in the 
transatlantic relations ever since he came into power in 1958, and de 
Gaulle was determined to reassert France and overcome the loss of 
power and prestige of the 20th century. As Judt argues, France was lesser 
humiliated by the Germans than by the Anglo-American allies during 
and in the aftermath of the Second World War,196 and de Gaulle  was 
particularly reluctant towards Washington because of the apparent 
American meddling in European affairs such as the 1956 Suez crisis.197  
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 In the fall 1958 de Gaulle proposed the Americans and the British to 
set up the directorate to make common decisions of military and political 
nature on a global scale. De Gaulle argued for a directorate because at 
the time the French membership of the Western alliance was associated 
with a lot of risks; however, France had no influence on the decision 
making in the alliance, decisions regarding the use of nuclear weapons in 
particular. Thus, France did not have a proportionate part of the decision 
making in Alliance matters. In 1958 de Gaulle had threatened to leave 
the alliance if the directorate was not set up.198  In 1958 de Gaulle had 
also begun the French rapprochement with Germany to establish the 
French led Western Europe. It culminated with the Franco-German 
treaty of friendship in January, 1963, the so-called Elysee Treaty, in 
which Germany and France promised each other, among other things, 
political consultation in foreign policy matters. The Elysee Treaty 
marked France’s decisive turn towards Europe.199  
 In de Gaulle’s scheme for Europe, the United Kingdom was 
considered an Atlantic pariah, which would function as a tie to America, 
thus would an admission of the UK into the EEC obstruct de Gaulle’s 
ideas about an independent Western European bloc and eventually a 
‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals’. The Kennedy administration 
considered de Gaulle’s rejection of the British entry into the EEC and 
the Franco-German rapprochement a direct challenge to American 
leadership in Western Europe, and de Gaulle’s ‘European’ Europe 
scheme as challenge to Kennedy’s Grand Design. Kennedy had launched 
the Grand Design for the Western Alliance in 1962, and with it, the 
Kennedy administration aimed at establishing ‘a solid political, economic 
and military bloc’200 based on a unified Western Europe in a strong 
partnership with the US, thus a ‘truly’ Atlantic partnership.  The question 
of UK’s entry into the EEC was therefore, in American thinking, 
connected to the state of the NATO alliance. Indeed, the Kennedy 
administration often referred to the alliance’s ‘inner cohesion’, i.e., 
European integration.201 Thus, European political integration and the 
NATO alliance were in America’s objective component parts. As de 
Gaulle rejected the British entry into the EEC in 1963 it also obstructed 
the possibility of joint efforts in NATO,202 at least in the eyes of the 
Kennedy administration’s Grand Designers. Although Schwartz argues 
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that the Johnson administration ‘retreated’ from the Grand Design,203 the 
very principles of Western European integration and Atlantic partnership 
was maintained throughout the Johnson presidency. Indeed, in March 
1964, Rusk argued at a meeting with representatives from the EEC that, 
the extent to which ‘disarray’ in the alliance ‘seemed to be due to unsolved intra-
European problems‘204 and went on arguing that European integration and 
Atlantic partnership ‘would be real strength‘ in the struggle against Soviet 
communism.205 
 Thus, in the early 1960s Gaullist ideas were not new to the 
administration, and neither was the French critique of US Vietnam 
policy. De Gaulle was the fiercest Western European critic of America’s 
conduct in Vietnam, and the critique escalated as the Johnson 
administration moved to ‘Americanize’ the war in 1963-1964, 
culminating with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in August, 1964. De Gaulle 
represented, in fact, a dual threat to the administration’s policies; one in 
Europe and one in Asia. Perhaps it could even be argued that de Gaulle 
was a triple threat, as he moved into Latin America in 1964.  
 In the literature, scholars argue that the French-American crisis of 
1963 was the primary and most dramatic crisis of the numerous crises de 
Gaulle initiated between the US and France. The Kennedy 
administration resolved the 1963 crisis by re-launching the Multilateral 
Force (MLF), and opting for the Atlantic orientated Ludwig Erhard as 
German Chancellor to follow Adenauer. Adenauer who had chosen the 
French connection for Germany over the Atlantic relations by 
concluding the Elysee Treaty with de Gaulle.206 However, the French 
crisis was not over by 1963. The crisis was not contained nor moved US 
policy towards France and US perception of France into a state of 
forbearance as Hanhimäki et al. argue.207 
 In late 1963 and early 1964, the administration’s different branches 
continued to report on de Gaulle’s criticisms of NATO. Even though de 
Gaulle criticized the American preponderance of power in the alliance, 
the French president nevertheless maintained French loyalty to the 
alliance, and the administration did not see any drastic French moves 
towards NATO on the horizon until the fall of 1964. This may be the 
primary reason why the different foreign policy branches in the Johnson 
administration concurrently maintained in 1963 and 1964, that there was 
nothing to do about the French critique in 1963 and 1964, indeed, if the 
US should respond it would demand ‘major modifications in the policies of both 
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countries’,208modifications, which the US appeared quite reluctant to do. In 
reply to NATO Secretary General Stikker’s concerns over the spread of 
Gaullist ideas within the alliance in February, 1964, Rusk, the Secretary 
of State, replied that perhaps the US should present the allies with a 
paper, which assessed the ‘erosion’ of public support in America of 
NATO if the French continued their current behavior. The suggested 
approach to the Gaullist challenge was, in fact, intimidation.209 
 Although de Gaulle did not propose or present a plan to a reform of 
NATO in 1963 and 1964, de Gaulle’s specific critique of certain issues in 
the alliance all related to America’s unilateralism within the alliance. This 
unilateralism was most evident in the nuclear decision-making in the 
alliance, and the formulation of the alliance’s grand strategy; in fact, in 
these two policy areas America had remained detached in the alliance 
with Western Europe. Indeed, the European allies had had no influence 
on NATO’s strategy and had no formal influence on the nuclear 
decision-making, the US national strategy and interests as embedded 
within these areas was protected through the institutional structures in 
the alliance from interference from Western Europe.210  
 The issue of national nuclear deterrents in Western Europe touched 
upon the entire issue the European reason of state in the foreign policy 
realm and the American rejection of thereof.  The European allies could, 
perhaps as an outcome of the security dilemma, or faulty European 
diplomacy, initiate a nuclear war, which the US would be dragged into as 
a consequence of their national interest of keeping Western Europe 
within the Western bloc and the membership of the alliance.  The 
exclusive American control with the nuclear weapons and the alliances 
grand strategy could therefore, be seen as a protective unilateralism 
against Western Europe’s reason of state.  Conversely nuclear 
consultation or nuclear sharing and multilateral decision-making in the 
nuclear field would institutionalize the European allies’ political influence 
on America’s policy in the nuclear area, and perhaps inflict by institution 
the faulty reason of state in America’s foreign policies.  
 In the early 1960s de Gaulle continuously criticized (among other 
things) the Multilateral Force (MLF) scheme, which envisioned a nuclear 
force within NATO. The Eisenhower administration had proposed the 
MLF to on one hand give Western Germany as sense of equality within 
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the alliance, and on the other hand, to prevent the Germans from 
obtaining a national nuclear deterrent. In the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations a group of MLF theologians argued that the multilateral 
nuclear force would further European integration, and before the French 
veto of UK entry into the EEC, they had argued that the MLF would 
prevent this very veto. The theologians’ enthusiasm for the MLF 
stemmed from their belief in the Grand Design, in which the MLF was 
one means to further European integration and turn the Western bloc 
into a solid military bloc.  The theologians believed that national nuclear 
striking forces, such as the French Force de Frappe, looked like a return to 
European power politics, and conversely not an integrated Western 
Europe.  
 However, the MLF had been stranded on how the US could model 
it, so that nuclear decision-making were kept on American hands, in 
other words, an ideational argument of how the US maintained their 
protective unilateralist position within the alliance in the nuclear area. 
The ‘practical’ argument against multilateral decision-making was that in 
a crisis situation the question of whether or not to deploy nuclear 
weapons would be urgent, and therefore there would be no time for the 
entire alliance to reach agreement on the issue. The qualms over the 
MLF centered on the American protective unilateralism in nuclear 
decision making, which de Gaulle challenged as he advocated for a 
‘‘European finger’’ on the trigger, i.e., an independent European nuclear 
force.211   
 Closely associated with de Gaulle’s criticism of the form of NATO, 
were the French president’s overtures to both Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union, overtures which were subject to scrutiny in Washington. 
Did de Gaulle argue for a détente with the USSR? And how did a 
détente with the Soviet ‘menace’ comply with French adherence to the 
alliance? 
 In an analysis of de Gaulle’s New Year’s broadcast 1963/1964 from 
State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) sent to 
McGeorge Bundy, Johnson’s National Security Advisor, INR’s director 
Thomas Hughes pondered whether a shift in de Gaulle’s foreign policy 
was in the making. Indeed, Hughes carefully speculated if de Gaulle had 
recognized East Germany, when he had stated: ‘envisage the day when, 
perhaps, in Warzaw, Prague, Pankow … the totalitarian Communist regime … 
will little by little arrive at an evolution reconcilable with our own transformation. 
Then, prospects will be opened to all Europe commensurate with its resources and its 
capabilities’.212 Even though Hughes argued that this was in many ways 
just a repetition of de Gaulle’s notion of a ‘Europe from the Atlantic to 
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the Urals’, a recognition of the GDR would be a substantial addition the 
French policies, and a clear signal to ‘a wider group in West Germany and 
elsewhere’, i.e., the Gaullists within the CDU and Gaullist sympathizers in 
the rest of Western Europe.213  
 However, a ‘profound shift’ in French foreign policy was perhaps in 
the making according to Hughes, who asked if de Gaulle, in fact, did 
intend a détente with the Soviet Union. At a January 1, 1964 press 
conference de Gaulle had spoken of a ‘spirit of détente among peoples…which 
has recently risen over the world’,214 and since de Gaulle until then had seen 
Soviet policy lacking any real prospect of détente and therefore had 
rejected any negotiations between France and the USSR, and warned 
against the dangers in believing the USSR had significantly changed their 
policies, de Gaulle’s new language marked this possible ‘profound shift’. 
Hughes speculated if this new lingo marked more than a shift in French 
attitude towards the German question, and pondered whether de Gaulle 
virtually proclaimed that the time had come for a settlement of the 
European problem, and that Western Europe therefore had to organize 
itself politically in order to negotiate with the Soviet Union and by the 
same token exclude the U.S. from these negotiations. Hughes analysis 
marked the beginning of a realization in the State Department that de 
Gaulle would present an alternative to the US way in the relations with 
the Soviet Union. 
 Less than a month later INR argued that de Gaulle had made a ‘real 
shift in is public position’ because he had spoken about ‘the already begun 
attenuation of contrast and dramatic oppositions between the camps that divide the 
world’,215 and INR added that de Gaulle’s new perception of the Soviet 
‘menace’ could have profound implications for the Atlantic alliance.216 
Indeed, de Gaulle’s threat perception and French adherence to the 
alliance was closely linked according to INR.217 De Gaulle’s notion on 
alliances, and therefore NATO, was according Hughes that alliances 
should be exclusively directed at one threat, e.g., the Soviet threat, which 
as soon it had passed deemed the alliance redundant. Indeed, this was 
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one reason, according to INR, why de Gaulle opposed alliance 
integration or the ‘idea of an ‘Atlantic community’’, since integration would 
not only bind national foreign policy into multilateralism, but also 
pretend a lasting structure. Furthermore, which in many ways were at the 
heart of Gaullist thinking, would a permanent alliance function as the 
most powerful member’s instrument for furthering national interests.218  
 By April, 1964, Hughes wrote Secretary of State Rusk that ‘it is clear 
that when De Gaulle decides that Soviet policy has changed to the point that 
negotiations with the Soviet Union might produce fruitful results, the basic tie that to 
him justifies the Atlantic alliance will thereby begun to fray. This shift in French 
outlook seems underway though its pace and form are still unclear.’.219 Although de 
Gaulle’s adherence to the alliance was very much dependant on the state 
of the East-West relations, INR also argued that French adherence after 
1969220 also was dependent on the rest of the allies’ willingness to 
accommodate French ideas about the alliance’s ‘nature and structure’.221 
However, INR estimated in the same paper that until 1969 de Gaulle 
would continue his ‘limited policy of dis-integrating France from NATO’.222  
 De Gaulle indeed continued his ‘dis-integration’ of France from the 
alliance, in fact, according to Rusk, de Gaulle did not ‘dis-integrate’ 
France from the alliance but almost ‘dis-integrated’ the alliance. In April, 
1964, just a week after INR’s report, de Gaulle withdrew French naval 
forces from NATO’s command. Rusk responded with a far from 
forbearing estimate of the French move: ‘Broader implications of French 
mover are … profoundly disturbing, because they strike at heart of NATO defense 
system. That system was built up over time on assumption that Alliance could neither 
deter or effectively withstand weight of Soviet military power only if advance 
arrangements were made and commitments undertaken to ensure that NATO forces 
would act under integrated command and in coordinated fashion of the Alliance were 
compelled to fight.’223 De Gaulle’s withdrawal of the French fleet was a clear 
sign that France opposed ‘this philosophy and … the established NATO 
military system’224 as this inhibited French freedom of action in foreign 
policy. Furthermore, according to Rusk, was ‘the scrapping of integrated 
command system … an element in the so far unenunicated French plans for NATO 
reform’.225 Rusk further argued that the loss of the integrated command 
system would bring the alliance into a situation that differed very little 
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from the situation on the continent before the First and Second World 
Wars. To Rusk, the integrated command system was, in other words, 
about bringing Western Europe past the 20th century power politics.   
 Although de Gaulle would not undertake any drastic moves in the 
future, according to Rusk at least, it was possible that other allies would 
follow the French example and denounce the integration principle, with 
the implication that Western Europe would return to traditional power 
politics. Therefore the problem with allied denunciations of the principle 
of integration should be studied and the implications for Atlantic 
interdependence assessed.226 Rusk instructed Robert Bowie, who would 
later be America’s representative at the Harmel study in 1967, 
immediately after de Gaulle’s denunciation to study ‘how the Atlantic 
nations might improve their structures and procedures for concerting policy and 
action’.227  Rusk’s immediate response to de Gaulle’s challenge of the 
integration principle was thus, to pull the alliance together to protect the 
principle. 
 Although INR along with the CIA228 believed that the French 
situation was not urgent, INR also presented, in the report to Rusk , the 
possible implications of a French-Soviet rapprochement in Western 
Europe in the alliance, and in the transatlantic relations. Indeed, 
according to INR, de Gaulle thought (about the current state of affairs) 
that the US and the USSR were moving towards a settlement rather than 
war, especially in the light of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. And that 
meant, according to INR’s interpretation, that de Gaulle was convinced 
that it would lead to a ‘de facto partition of the world’,229 which would mean 
in de Gaulle’s thinking, that Moscow and Washington would continue 
their dominance of Eastern and Western Europe respectively. 
Accordingly, de Gaulle would organize Western Europe under French 
leadership that would negotiate a settlement of Europe with the Soviet 
Union.  
 In this settlement scheme, of a Europe from the Atlantic to the 
Urals, German unification had a significant role to play because, as INR 
argued, Germany was ‘indispensable’ to de Gaulle’s policy’s success. 
However, INR did not believe de Gaulle’s intentions were honest, in 
fact, INR displayed a traditional reading of a European great power’s 
intentions, when claiming that ‘It is obvious that De Gaulle would not relish the 
actual reunification of Germany and the emergence of a powerful nation over 70 
million people to challenge French hegemony in Western Europe’.230 Apparently 
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INR held the opinion that  European politicians, such as de Gaulle, still 
based their policies on assumptions of the pre-War period. As INR 
argued: ‘though a united Germany will outrank France in population and economic 
power, its very emergence might well, in De Gaulle’s calculation, consolidate France’s 
leadership in Europe; for the other continental states – including particularly France’s 
old allies, the Eastern European countries, and even the Soviet Union itself – would 
look to France as a major factor in ‘containing’ Germany’s increased power’.231 INR 
appears unable to interpret de Gaulle’s policies and imagine his political 
calculations in different terms than the traditional European power 
game. This is in particular interesting since, as scholars of the euro-
détente argue, de Gaulle along with the West German governments 
actually initiated the European détente in the early 1960s, indeed, the 
Franco-German rapprochement was a precondition for the euro-
détente,232 a perspective which INR failed to grasp.   
 By the spring 1964, the French challenge was very real, and the 
contours of a Franco-American conceptual rivalry emerged. Indeed, the 
essential implication of de Gaulle’s policy and political concepts was that 
they were competing alternatives to the American concepts for the 
organization of Europe and not least America’s alliance concept.  
 De Gaulle had denounced the principle of integration in the alliance, 
which, according to Rusk, was an attack on the very heart of NATO and 
potentially had profound disturbing consequences, indeed, the alliance 
could unravel and Western Europe could return to old habits. The 
administration feared that Gaullist ideas could spread throughout the 
alliance, and in particular in Germany.  
 De Gaulle’s possible policy shift towards the USSR was considered 
equally disturbing. On one hand, de Gaulle’s rapprochement with the 
Soviet Union would, according to INR, ‘if it is not arrested, … be of major 
importance for France’s relations with its allies’233 and therefore the alliance 
organization, mostly because de Gaulle held the opinion that the alliance 
was less needed as the threat from the Soviet Union diminished, but also 
because de Gaulle, according to INR, contemplated to settle the 
European problem with the USSR at the expense of the US.  On the 
other hand, Gaullism was also criticized for being traditional European 
power politics.  INR commented that ‘It is somewhat paradoxical that such an 
evolution in French policy, while it seemingly would bring De Gaulle … more into 
line with recent developments in American policy [the petite détente], would signify a 
further shift of France away from the basis of its adherence to the Atlantic alliance’.234
 Thus, the perception of Gaullist France in the administration in these 
early years was one of potentiality.  De Gaulle had the potential to a 
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complete game change in Europe and in the transatlantic relations, and 
as 1964 progressed the administration increasingly came to question 
hitherto position of France in the alliance and ultimately French 
adherence to the alliance.  
 
Gaullist ideas and the rest of the allies 
Since de Gaulle’s shift in policy towards the Soviet Union was more or 
less on its way in the spring 1964, at least according to the State 
Department, the rest of Western Europe and the reaction of these states 
to Gaullism, and the French rejection of the principle of integration in 
particular, were of prime importance to the administration. The different 
branches of the administration had different interpretations, and saw a 
variety of problems. The appeal of Gaullist ideas to the West German 
government, which de Gaulle was assumed to be appealing to, was one 
thing; another was Western Europe as an entity.  
 Although not directly commenting on INR’s (long) analysis on de 
Gaulle’s possible policy shift, William Tyler, the Assistant Secretary of 
State for European Affairs,  commented in the spring 1964, to Bundy, 
Johnson’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, on a report 
from Charles Bohlen, US ambassador to France, that it may very well be 
that even though other Western European governments did not directly 
agree with de Gaulle’s policies and philosophy, de Gaulle nevertheless 
gave ‘expression to a certain sentiment’235 in Western Europe.  Tyler carefully 
argued that there was a ‘confused sense’ in Western Europe, and that it 
was both possible and necessary for Europe to have interests  ‘which do 
not in all cases spring from a conception of the world identical with that held by the 
US’.236 Indeed, according to Tyler, as Western Europe moved closer in 
political unity and technical integration, it would result in ‘a permissible 
differentiation between the European and the United States vision of the world and 
definition of interests.’.237 It was ‘permissible’ to Tyler, because ‘Europeans 
consider Europe’s security to be basically dependent on close relations with the United 
States.’  
 Tyler, in other words, provided a somewhat idealist analysis of 
Europe; through the political integration would ‘new’ European policy 
conceptions arise, which were not of the old times, though with the 
proviso that Europe remained dependent on the US for security. Tyler’s 
idealism may also be a reason why he, in conclusion, warned against 
simplifying and thereby underestimating quality and strength of Gaullist 
ideas. According to Tyler someone in State Department had cried at the 
skies in response to de Gaulle’s rejection of UK’s entry into the EC in 
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1963: ‘Tell me, ye Gods, how is it possible for one lonely, elderly, ruler of a small 
country to frustrate the desires and aspirations of 250 million other Europeans’.238 
The answer Tyler provided was that nothing was as simple as that, and 
that de Gaulle’s ‘ascendency rests to some extent on his ability to express sentiments 
which his fellow countrymen and many Europeans recognize and with which they 
associate themselves’.239  The CIA also warned against simplifying Gaullism, 
when the agency in early 1964 underscored that what de Gaulle did, he 
did not do to ‘irritate’ the US, but rather de Gaulle was preoccupied in his 
single-mindedness with advancing French national interest regardless 
‘whose toes are stepped on’.240  
 The CIA argued in July, 1964, in an analysis of de Gaulle’s emerging 
Eastern European policies that the Eastern European states reaction’s to 
de Gaulle’s initiatives241 had been mixed. Nonetheless, the CIA argued 
that de Gaulle intended to reach out to Eastern Europe for a number of 
reasons, among these to place France in a leading role in the West’s 
attempts to reach out to Eastern Europe. The agency argued that de 
Gaulle ‘probably’ anticipated that Eastern Europe would break free from 
Soviet hegemony, and that this would ‘produce a situation similar to that 
which prevailed in Europe before World War II’.242 However, contrary to this 
situation, the competing national interests would be curbed by de 
Gaulle’s French-led loose confederation in Europe, especially the 
German interest. When Eastern Europe saw this development, de Gaulle 
believed – at least according to the CIA – it would attract Eastern 
Europe to Western Europe.243 The egalitarian Western Europe indeed 
emerged as a viable alternative to the either communism or capitalism  in 
CIA’s estimate of de Gaulle’s thinking.244 In the meantime however, de 
Gaulle would probably commence on a program of expanded trade and 
commercial ties to accompany his already existing technical and scientific 
exchange program.  
 However, Eastern Europe was one thing, another the Soviet Union 
and Germany. According to the CIA, de Gaulle now appeared to have 
changed his ‘assessment of the Soviet threat’, and believed that Soviet 
policy have evolved to the point where negotiations on European 
question may be undertaken. Although, according to the CIA, what the 
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French president really worried about was a German-Russian agreement 
from which France would be excluded.245  
 De Gaulle was, in other words, all over Europe and appeared to 
move even closer to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1964, according 
to various branches in the administration. The CIA in effect sketched 
out, what would be a conceptual conflict between the US détente 
concept, which yet had to emerge, and the French variant of détente, a 
conflict, which would play out at the Harmel exercise in 1967, as will be 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. The CIA also put a finger on a more 
immediate problem that, in fact, extended beyond the Franco-American 
relationship to America’s relations with Western Europe, namely the one 
of Western Europe’s bilateral relations with Eastern Europe.  
 Despite Tyler’s estimate that de Gaulle expressed a common Western 
European sentiment, some allies most notably the Belgians interpreted 
de Gaulle’s actions as a threat to the alliance. Belgian foreign minister, 
Paul Henri Spaak, who was a declared Atlanticist and anti-Gaullist, 
proposed in April, 1964, that NATO set up a wise men’s group to study 
the ‘reorganization’ of NATO to smoke out France.246 Although Tyler 
recognized ‘that if the present trend continue, the result might ultimately be 
disastrous for NATO’,247 Tyler held the opinion that a review of NATO 
structure was premature, and indeed, the administration had ‘grave 
reservations’ about a wise men’s group, as elections in both UK and the 
US was upcoming. Instead Tyler suggested a more ‘subtle approach to keep 
NATO moving without French participation’.248 Indeed, Rusk stressed at the 
NATO ministerial meeting in May, 1964, that the US’s ‘basic view’ was 
to find a way to continue NATO business as usual despite the French 
obstructionism.249 Although, the State Department rejected Spaak’s 
proposal, the department was, in fact, ready to discuss ‘NATO in general 
from above’250 with the proviso that it was after the US elections in 
November, 1964. 
 
German Gaullism 
As France began stirring things up in the Atlantic alliance, Western 
Germany and a possible Gaullist turn in German politics increasingly 
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worried the Johnson administration. The Gaullist wing within the 
CDU/CSU was seen as something that could potentially break Germany 
from the West. Despite this was more or less the same situation the 
administration faced with France, the possible loss of Germany was 
unthinkable. Germany was America’s most important ally in Europe, and 
any loss of Germany would have a devastating impact on America’s 
position in the overall East-West conflict.251 The traditional thinking on 
Germany’s importance for American security and European stability was 
still the guiding line for American thinking, and the Johnson 
administration still believed that Germany needed to be contained. 
However, Germany had recovered economically, as the rest of Western 
Europe, and the economic recovery somewhat placed Germany in a 
different position of strength than hitherto to the eyes of the 
administration.  
 The Johnson administration had already had talks with a leading 
German Gaullist, Karl Theodor Guttenberg in November, 1963.  Erhard 
(CDU) had taken over the Chancellorship in October, 1963, from 
Konrad Adenauer (CDU), who had been responsible for the German 
rapprochement with France, and who, by many in the Johnson 
administration at least, was considered a Gaullist. Contrary to Erhard, 
who the administration after a little hesitation252 considered an 
Atlanticist, and therefore an ally in the American struggle against a 
Gaullist turn in CDU and possibly the whole of Western Germany, a 
turn which would mean a complete game change in the Cold War.  
 Chancellor Erhard was not a strong leader as Adenauer had been. 
The CDU was in many ways in a crisis of leadership, which partly 
explains why the Gaullists suddenly gained momentum within the party. 
The Johnson administration detected this leadership crisis, but was 
equally preoccupied with Erhard’s orientation and position on key 
political questions, such as European integration and Atlantic 
partnership.  Even though the Johnson administration did not really 
consider the German Gaullists as de Gaulle replica, but more German 
nationalists, the administration referred to the nationalist turn in German 
politics as both Gaullist and nationalist. In November, 1963, Coburn 
Kidd, a staff member at the American embassy to Germany, reported on 
a conversation with Guttenberg, the contents of which were received in 
the administration as ‘a matter obviously familiar already’,253 however, as 
Guttenberg was considered a leading Gaullist whom others were inclined 
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to follow,254 Guttenberg should meet with LBJ’s national security advisor 
Bundy.255  
 Kidd’s loyal rendering of this particular German Gaullism can be 
summarized as a German criticism of America’s privileged position in 
Western Europe, and the American unilateralist behavior in NATO. 
Guttenberg criticized the Atlantic partnership for not being a 
partnership, in fact: ‘partnership to his mind, implied a certain degree of equality. 
If one partner could call all the shots and the other was obliged to conform, it could 
hardly be called a partnership. Therefore he was for a strong Europe as De Gaulle 
was … He believed that a corollary of this was that military strength these days 
required nuclear weapons, and a strong Europe should have its own nuclear 
weapons’.256 
 The German Gaullists were in other words, completely in line with 
de Gaulle on the MLF question. Apart from criticizing the American 
preponderance of power in Western Europe, Guttenberg also addressed 
the possible super power détente, which to him ‘was bound to give rise to 
misgivings’.257 Accordingly, Guttenberg argued that US détente policy 
towards the USSR ‘would turn out to be a policy of tacit acceptance of the status 
quo … which might later be formalized’.258 Indeed, Guttenberg suspected that 
the US had a policy of ‘deliminating the spheres of power where they are now’, 
which ‘hardly amounts to Atlantic partnership’, and he threatened, while 
referring to Rappello, that Germany and the rest of Western Europe 
might be pushed to cut a deal with the Kremlin in this ‘business in making 
one’s peace with the Soviets.’259 Eventually Guttenberg had a meeting with 
Rostow and Tyler from the State Department.260 
 These two component parts of on one hand, a critique of the 
American preponderance of power and the subsequent lack of equality 
in the decision making the alliance, i.e., American unilateralism in foreign 
policy, and on the other hand, the fear of super power condominium in 
Europe was the core in the German Gaullists’ policies, or, perhaps more 
accurately, the Gaullists’ criticism of the current state of transatlantic 
affairs, which would gain political ground in Western Germany during 
the 1960s. Thus, despite a lack of complete Gaullist concord in Germany 
and France, the Gaullists in France and Germany at least shared the 
critique of US unilateralism and the notion of the need for a strong, 
nuclear armed Europe. The German Gaullists managed to put the 
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question of German reunification on the political agenda in Bonn and 
therefore also Washington.   
 
NATO’s Instrumentality 
The German question, or perhaps more accurately; the problem the 
German problem posed to American policies, generated extensive debate 
in the administration, and there were a wealth of perspectives and 
perceptions of this problem. This reflects both the importance of 
Germany to America, and exactly how difficult it was for the 
administration to find a solution to the problem.  
 Apart from arguing for a strong Europe and turn towards the 
French, the Gaullists in CDU/CSU claimed in early 1964, that the US 
had lost interest in German unification at the expense of the American 
pursuit of a détente with the Soviet Union. The German Gaullists had 
very specific positions on nuclear weapons, and German unity as they 
rejected to recognize the Oder-Neisse border. Chancellor Erhard’s pro-
American policy was consistently criticized by the Gaullists, and even 
though the Chancellor tried to accommodate the criticism with the 
‘policy of movement’, the Gaullists continued to ‘complicate’ German 
politics – at least in the eyes of the State Department.261 The ‘policy of 
movement’ did not however, entail any shift away the Hallstein Doctrine, 
and in American optics, the policy had no real substance. 
 Despite this lack of substance, the Peace Plan, which laid out the 
Erhard administration’s policy of movement, generated debate within 
the State Department. The debate implicitly evolved around protecting 
America’s objectives towards the Soviet Union from German 
obstructionism.262  
 In January, 1964, the Erhard government presented the Peace Plan to 
the 4-power ambassadorial group. The Peace Plan was, according to 
David Klein, a senior NSC Staff member of the White House, essentially 
a ‘non-plan’ put forward for domestic reasons, to please the Gaullists.263 
The Peace Plan proposed the establishment of a permanent four power 
council, which would work towards a reunification of Germany. The 
plan was based on idealist principles, such as the right to national self-
determination, and the establishment of permanent four power council 
anchored in international law was essentially a multilateralist scheme, 
which would subordinate America’s policies towards both the German 
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reunification and the Soviet Union. Later in the spring 1964, Rusk in an 
attempt to overcome this subordination – and make the German 
proposal into something workable, suggested that a four power council 
should exclusively work with a list of subjects that should be decided 
upon beforehand, i.e., controlled by the American administration.264  
 However, because the administration had a ‘deep desire to achieve a 
breakthrough in East-West relations’,265 the German desires and attempts, as 
the ones put forward with the Peace Plan, could collide with the 
administration’s policies towards the Soviet Union. Rusk regarded the 
German Peace Plan or even the German desires for some progress on 
the German question a problem for America’s policies towards the 
Soviet Union; any move the Germans would propose or even take 
regarding German unity affected, according to Rusk, the East–West 
balance, and America’s relationship with the Soviet Union. The problem 
with the German peace plan and desires was therefore, in the eyes of 
Rusk, a problem of how to strike a balance between two essentially 
‘inconsistent objectives’ namely, satisfying a German need for an initiative 
and the American ‘desire’ of ‘not to become too associated with any proposals on 
German problem put forward to Soviets unless these proposals are likely to appear 
convincing as sincere attempt to move forward toward basis for real negotiations with 
the Soviets’.266  Rusk added that the German proposal ‘obviously’ did ‘not 
meet the latter criterion’.267    
 The German quest for unity did therefore have, according to Rusk, a 
potential impact on America’s policies towards the Soviet Union, and 
more accurately America’s standing in its relationship with the Soviet 
Union. The impact the German unity question potentially had on the 
alliance was also alarming. Moreover, the new situation in Eastern 
Europe complicated the West German situation even further in 
American optics.   
 At a recent  Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG) meeting,268 
which Rostow, the Director of State Department’s Policy Planning 
Council, reported from, the Policy Planning Council had presented a 
paper, in which it was argued that the ‘evolutionary developments’ in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union might ‘present perils and opportunities for 
Western policy – particularly in terms of German unification’.269   
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 Although the Western European representatives agreed with the US 
that ‘civilizing currents’ were at work in Eastern Europe, and that these 
should be promoted, the Western concert stopped. The Western 
European representatives generally disagreed with the concept presented 
by the Council at the meeting. They disagreed on the extent to which 
Eastern Europe could be considered separate from the Soviet Union, 
and ‘on the importance for Western policy of current trends (and of Eastern Europe 
itself), and on the degree to which the west can influence events in Eastern Europe’.270 
There was, in fact, a substantial disagreement among the partners in the 
Atlantic partnership about the importance and possibilities of the 
developments in Eastern Europe for the West, including the German 
question. This was a disagreement that NATO’s Secretary General 
Stikker already had reported or confirmed in his meeting with Rusk 
earlier in March, 1964.271 Furthermore, the APAG representatives 
disagreed as to how the German problem fitted in this policy towards 
the Eastern bloc. However, the ‘basic lesson’ from the APAG meeting was, 
according to Rostow, that the future of Eastern Europe was bound to 
questions about German unity. The West German representative at the 
APAG meeting had ‘pointed to the rising German sentiment for unification and 
forecast that the issue would prove a critical test of the NATO alliance’,272 
speculating that in the event of an East German uprising, the Federal 
Republic would leave the alliance if nothing was done to move the 
German cause forward. 273 The West German representative thus 
brought the question of German unity into the broader framework of 
alliance cohesion.  
 In Rostow’s report to Rusk, he argued that the German situation 
could be contained and that it was possible to hinder a ‘nationalist 
explosion if we in the Alliance work out with the Germans a policy that promises to 
move in the direction of unity’.274 The alliance was, according to Rostow, an 
instrument to both contain Germany and somehow disguise the 
American hand.  Rostow argued that, luckily, there was ‘an environment of 
somewhat increased willingness to move forward on an Atlantic basis where progress is 
possible’275 in Western Europe, in fact, Rostow believed that the ‘classic 
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pattern’ of Europe first and then the Atlantic partnership, had diminished 
somewhat in the light of de Gaulle’s excesses. Therefore,  Rostow 
argued, the situation offered the US ‘an opportunity for leadership and forward 
movement in a number of areas’,276 one of which was German unification.  
 The instrumental value of NATO was not something new however; 
Rostow also suggested that the alliance members ‘by orchestrated 
bilateralism’ should enlarge trade and cultural relations with Eastern 
Europe. The concept of coordination of the bilateral relations had been 
discussed at the APAG meeting. Rostow’s proposal to orchestrate 
Western Europe’s bilateralist behavior was a response to the emerging 
trend in Western Europe of individual states seeking and expanding 
trade and cultural relations with the Eastern bloc ‘outside’ the European 
and Atlantic frameworks. The orchestration was eventually decided upon 
with the State Department’s suggestion to the bridge building policy in 
the late summer 1964.  
 Rostow’s proposal to orchestrate Western European dealings with 
Eastern Europe through the alliance moved the alliance into a different, 
essentially political sphere than the traditional sphere of security. The 
orchestration was also  means to promote Western unity because of de 
Gaulle’s blockage of further Western European political integration, and 
the appeal of Gaullism to some Germans and possibly other Western 
Europeans. Indeed, Rusk held the opinion that it was urgent to ‘to get a 
common appreciation of what is going on in the Communist world’,277 and that 
NATO had an active role to play in the matter of Western Europe’s 
relations with the Eastern bloc.278 Rusk, in other words, believed it was 
necessary to replace the temporarily halted European integration scheme 
with an Atlantic framework, reflecting that the US was not willing to give 
up on an instrument to maintain Western European unity, Atlantic 
partnership, and not least give up on the traditional position the US had 
in Western Europe and for the West’s policies as a result of these 
frameworks. Equally important, Rusk no longer cited de Gaulle as the 
only threat to this structure; the bilateral Western European outreach to 
Eastern Europe was cited as another.279   
 Rostow also reported to Johnson on his trip to Western Europe, and 
recommended, as he had to Rusk, that the US moved forward on the 
German question, primarily because if the US did not react to the 
German sentiment of a break away from the Hallstein Doctrine, the 
Germans may move in a different direction that the US interest dictated.  
                                                 
276 Rostow to Rusk, Mar. 25, 1964. LBJL, NSF, European integration, box 162. 
277 Rusk to NATO capitals et al., Oct. 8, 1964. FRUS, Vol. XIII, 1964-1968, Western 
Europe Region, doc. 39. 
278 Rusk to NATO capitals et al., Oct. 8, 1964. FRUS, Vol. XIII, 1964-1968, Western 
Europe Region, doc. 39.  
279 Rusk to NATO capitals et al., Oct. 8, 1964. FRUS, Vol. XIII, 1964-1968, Western 
Europe Region, doc. 39.  
83 
 
 Rostow explained to Johnson that since the European integration 
process had stopped (temporarily) and the ‘thaw’ in Eastern Europe was 
rapidly proceeding, the original idea of tying Germany into the West and 
from there proceed with unification, was expiring. According to Rostow, 
the West was losing its bargaining position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Germany. The European integration therefore needed to be 
replaced with an Atlantic structure.  
 The State Department did, in other words, not believe that the 
German question and Germany could be handled outside a Western 
structure without it being somehow counterproductive or even 
dangerous for America’s interest. According to Rostow, the problem 
with handling Germany outside a ‘structure’ was, that on one hand the 
German political and public opinion’s chief concern was unification, and 
on the other hand the Erhard administration had no ‘ready answer’ to 
the question of unification. Therefore Rostow argued, ‘over time this fact 
may progressively weaken their [the government] hold on German public opinion, 
unless other opportunities for deployment of German energies westward arise and 
unless progress – even modest progress – toward unification is made’.280 Coupled 
with the ‘two political bases for the intensified’ search for unification, namely a 
young generation preoccupied with their fellow Germans, and more 
importantly the entry into a new period, in which ‘German prosperity is 
taken for granted and has ceased to be a satisfactorily outlet for German energies and 
ambitions’,281 the need for the US to somehow contain and bind Germany 
into the Western world was, in fact, urgent.282  
 Although Rostow underlined that he was not describing a political 
crisis in Germany, and that Schroeder’s foreign policy was quite ‘solid’, 
Rostow put forward that ‘anxiety stems from underlying trends, which could 
become dangerous to common Western interests’.283 Rostow therefore urged 
Johnson ‘to press ahead now with such ventures as will help to attract, engage, and 
bind the Germans to the West and stay close to them in all East-West matters.’284 
Rostow did not believe that the current European integration was able to 
tie Germany firmly into the West, in fact, the US ‘should be ready to move 
with those European countries that are willing to proceed on an Atlantic basis … 
leaving the door to a larger European role, when Europe resumes movement toward 
unity’.285  
 The administration still believed in the necessity of European 
integration, however, as the integration process was inhibited by de 
Gaulle’s veto of British entry into the EEC the administration clearly felt 
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a need to replace the European integration machinery with an Atlantic 
scheme to contain Western Germany and probably the rest of Western 
Europe.    
 The State Department’s thoughts on the necessity of European 
integration and a Western structure reflected the traditional Euro-
skepticism. The structures were necessary to guard against the Germans 
drifted off, thus promoting the conception that Europe drifts according 
to narrow national interests without regard for the greater good. Was this 
an expression of an implicit idea that Europe inevitably would fall prey 
to earlier times’ nationalist, power policies? Indeed, Rostow concluded 
on the current Western European political situation that ‘the political raw 
materials are there to move forward in the Atlantic on a modest piecemeal basis. It 
will require steady U.S. leadership and our sense of direction. If we fail to organize 
these new elements of European self-confidence, however, there are dangers of 
fragmentation in the alliance centered on German political life’.286  
National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 304 
The Johnson administration responded to the new circumstances for the 
administration’s European policy with the bridge building policy. On one 
hand, the challenge from de Gaulle, the beginning of a bilateral Western 
European detente, the idea of a strong independent Europe, which Tyler 
had argued was shared by other Europeans, and the (possible) German 
nationalist turn and calls for an approach to unification was new 
developments, which demanded a response if America was to maintain 
the structures of the Western world, including the privileged position the 
US held via these structures. On the other hand, the administration’s 
concurrence on the necessity of replacing the European integration 
structure with an Atlantic structure was already agreed upon. However, 
the developments in Eastern Europe also demanded a response. The 
CIA continued to report on the stirrings in Eastern Europe during the 
spring, and the idea that the German problem was linked to 
developments in Eastern Europe, the political circumstances in Eastern 
and Western Europe came together. The allies’ disagreement about the 
potential of the centrifugal forces in Eastern Europe and what course to 
proceed collided with the administration’s thinking on US objectives in 
Eastern Europe.  
 Although the Johnson administration did not seek a solution to the 
West European challenges exclusively through the bridge building policy, 
the policy was designed to overcome these problems by building an 
Atlantic structure to contain and control the Western European policies 
towards Eastern Europe, and maintain a solid position for America in 
Western Europe.  
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 In NSAM 304 of June 3, 1964, Johnson called for the development 
of a policy based on his recent statement on Eastern Europe: ‘‘We will 
continue to build bridges across the gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe. 
These will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors and of humanitarian aid’. 
The President would like the Department of State to complete … recommendations 
which translates this statement of policy into an action programs for each Eastern 
European state … and, at the same time examine the possibilities of 
multilateralizing these relations in Eastern and Western Europe’.287 With this 
latter addition, the Johnson administration looked for ways to enroll 
Western Europe into the American ‘action program’, essentially looking 
into the possibilities for enacting and streamlining the West European 
policies with the administration’s new Eastern European policy, and 
overcome the current bilateralism. 288 Although Johnson called for ways 
to multilateralize the relations between Eastern and Western Europe, the 
US set out to maintain control with Europe’s reconciliation with and 
policies towards Eastern Europe. Indeed, before handing in their policy 
suggestion, the State Department discussed two essential, conceptual 
issues. First, should the foreseen ‘reconciliation’ with Eastern Europe be 
of Atlantic or European orientation? Should the US ‘trump’ a new 
Eastern European Policy or ‘conform’ US policy with that of Western 
Europe? And second, should the reconciliation also include East 
Germany?289  
 The argument for an Atlantic orientation focused on the weak 
political ‘structure’ in the Western Europe. An association of Eastern 
Europe with Western Europe would only, the argument went, ‘dilute’ the 
political structure in Western Europe further, and Eastern Europe 
should therefore develop closer links with the Atlantic community ‘as a 
whole’.290 Others argued for a middle way, namely that it would be wiser 
before ‘trumpeting’ a new policy toward East Europe to ‘conform’ US 
policy with that of Western Europe, the US should ‘catch up’ with the 
European allies, and then push the new policy.291  
 Underneath the arguments for either ‘orientation’ lured the question 
about what position the US should have in European matters. An 
association of Eastern Europe with Western Europe would reduce 
American influence on Western Europe’s policies and policymaking 
towards Eastern Europe and by proxy towards the Soviet Union, by 
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handling Western Europe control of policies via association. If the goal 
was to present a common Western front, US policies towards the 
Eastern bloc would essentially be subordinated to Western Europe, and 
in principle deprive the US from retaining unilateralism. Whereas the 
Atlantic structure would both grant the US the possibility to closely 
direct the relations between Eastern and Western Europe, and retain the 
unilateralist position through the Atlantic structure, as the US had 
managed to do on certain vital policy areas in NATO so far. In fact, the 
real question was if the US was willing to loosen their control with 
Western Europe’s policies? In the end the State Department proposed 
an Atlantic orientation.  
 The State Department’s proposal for a new policy towards Eastern 
Europe, aimed at ‘evolutionize’ Eastern European communism from 
within by ‘building bridges’ to sustain and facilitate the changes that was 
already going on in the area.292 This would, it was believed, create ‘progress 
toward the realization of our ultimate objective in East Europe’, which was 
establishing societies that enjoyed ‘national independence, security, and a 
normal relationship with all other countries’ (including the Soviet Union), that 
would ‘mean the final dismantling of the Iron Curtain and the free association of 
East Europe and the West.293 This evolutionary Eastern European policy 
should be closely related to the solution of the German problem, to the 
policy toward the Soviet Union, and the Western European policy.  The 
policies for ‘for achieving West European unity’, Eastern European evolution, 
and peace with the Soviet Union ‘should move forward together’.294 This 
naturally left the administration with quite a coordinating task, both 
coordination of US policies towards Eastern and Western Europe, and 
coordination ‘among Western countries in building relationships with East 
Europe’.295  
 According to the Department of State’s proposal, the coordination 
of the Western world’s policies would increase the chances of realizing 
the American objectives in Eastern Europe, and secure that the US was 
not ‘dismantled’ from Europe.296 The department believed that the risk 
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of being excluded in the process of drawing Eastern and Western 
Europe together was already quite advanced, because of the bilateral 
relations between Eastern and Western Euorpe, and the US was far 
behind Western Europe in ‘pushing contacts with the Eastern European 
nations’.297 In fact, already in March, 1964, Rusk had in an apologetic 
manner told representatives from the EEC that ‘for the past fifteen years the 
United States had been a minority of one within the Alliance in East-West trade. 
Perhaps we had been wrong and our allies right, and maybe as the subject is explored 
a compromise can be found’.298 A minority position about which, at the Policy 
Council meeting, it had been claimed that the Europeans was ‘not at 
present unhappy to see the US a minority of one on COCOM’.299 NATO was 
central for streamlining Western Europe’s policies with US policies,300 
and the State Department proposed that NATO should be the forum for 
coordination of trade and credit policies, which were the primary means 
for the administration’s new Eastern European policy. Naturally, 
consultation with Western Europe on other subjects was foreshadowed, 
and that was attempted institutionalized in ‘quadripartite consultations’ 
and periodic meetings with Western officials responsible for dealing with 
Eastern Europe.301   
 The idea of institutionalizing a Western policy towards Eastern 
Europe beyond the NATO structure, which suggests that every aspect of 
an Eastern European policy should be institutionalized, reflects the 
traditional American policy thinking of creating structures within which 
the US have a privileged position based on power, indeed, it appears as if 
‘institutionalizing’ was a default setting in American political thinking 
towards Europe. To create structures and policy schemes, in which the 
US had a position and opportunity to direct and streamline Western 
European policies to that of the US. This idea sprung from the 
immediate post-war period, and was designed to overcome and reject the 
European reason of state, and retain a certain level of protective 
unilateralism in foreign policy.  
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 The administration’s sense of being dismantled from Europe and –
not least – the prospect of an untamed bilateralism in Western Europe 
would be on the agenda throughout the Johnson Presidency.   
 
 Germany and the German question figured prominently in the State 
Department’s proposal to the Bridge Building policy. However, the 
department warned that the close cooperation with the Germans ‘in the 
evolution of Western policies’ towards Eastern Europe should be carried out 
‘without permitting Bonn a veto’.302 The department believed that Germany 
was the key to evolution in Eastern Europe, and therefore to the 
American objectives in Eastern Europe. McGhee, the American 
ambassador to Germany, argued that for a true evolution in Eastern 
Europe, the legitimate security interests of these states had to be 
resolved,303 and, as would be increasingly highlighted during the 1960s, 
the historically based fears of German militarism, which especially 
Poland and Russia harbored, needed to be taken into account. McGhee, 
argued that Germany’s potential to favorably impact on development in 
Eastern Europe was inhibited by the lack of a settlement of the border 
issue. Indeed if the Germans continued the present course it would be ‘a 
drag on German reunification policy’ but also, for the American objectives in 
Eastern Europe. If ‘implications that Germany aims at crippling Poland and 
Czechoslovakia’ could be harbored through the border issue, it would only 
tighten the Soviet grip in these states, and therefore provide a ‘framework 
for continued Soviet predominance’.304  
 Thus, according to McGhee, the expansion of German influence in 
the Eastern bloc, and the isolation of Ulbricht, i.e., a break up in Soviet 
hegemony founded on the historically based fear of Germany, was the 
‘only conceivable basis for unification’.305 Moreover, the State Department’s 
proposal to the Bridge Building policy added that Germany’s peaceful 
intentions (towards Eastern Europe) were important for the envisioned 
‘understanding with East Europe in the field of arms control and disarmament.306 
The Germans should (very carefully) be supported in ‘any disposition shown 
… to modify or by-pass the Hallstein Doctrine insofar as it served to impede the 
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development of Bonn’s relations with East Europe’. 307 The German instrument 
thus appeared quite important for the Johnson administration’s bridge 
building policy.  
Aftermath  
Despite the State Department’s substantial action program, it proved 
quite difficult to multilateralize and streamline Western Europe’s 
policies. Germany was decisive for US aims in Eastern Europe, the 
Soviet Union, and indeed, the Western European integration policy, and 
any developments in Germany had the potential to serious damage US 
policy.  
 Thus, when a Gaullist turn was perceived on the verge in German 
politics in the fall 1964, the administration was concerned. A turn could 
have profound impact on both Western unity and the prospects for an 
East-West détente. As German nationalism was concerned more with 
‘parochial national interests, rather than collective European or Atlantic interests’,308 
it collided with the Atlantic orientation of the bridge building policy, the 
very bridge building policy, and the US policy of replacing (temporarily) 
the European integration structure with an Atlantic framework. Indeed, 
as Germany was a decisive piece in the overall Cold War puzzle, German 
nationalism collided with US policy towards the Soviet Union.  
 According to a September, 1964, memo on the right wing in German 
politics, Gaullism partly occurred as a response to both the very slow 
progress on the unity question and a too conciliatory policy towards the 
East. Therefore if the Atlanticists was to fight of the Gaullists, the 
Erhard leadership had to offer some convincing progress on ‘at least one 
of the areas in which he is under Gaullist attack’, namely German unity, MLF 
or European integration.309 As the MLF question was more than 
complicated, not least because the Johnson administration were vague 
and indecisive themselves, the unity question appeared the most 
promising area of policy where the Gaullists could be fended off, 
according to the memo, and it was also a key area for the bridge building 
policy. Although the German nationalists, such as Strauss, wanted to 
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work ‘closely with De Gaulle partly because of similarity of views, partly as a counter 
to US influence, and partly because they are confident that Germany can dominate a 
future united Europe built on a French-German core’ they were not ‘anti-
American’ and were fully aware of Germany’s dependence on ‘U.S. 
power’.310 Despite this somewhat optimistic notion, the German unity 
question kept entangling the US in German domestic politics throughout 
1965. 
 De Gaulle’s critique of the MLF further continued contest alliance 
cohesion according to the administration. De Gaulle, in general, argued 
that the MLF was an American construction designed to prevent Europe 
from obtaining an independent deterrent free from American control,311 
and there was a substantial French opposition to the MLF scheme. De 
Gaulle was, however, not alone in his critical approach to the MLF, the 
British, who already had an independent nuclear force, were reluctant, 
although not dismissive of some sort of common NATO scheme. The 
Germans, or at least the Atlanticists including Erhard, were the only 
ones to support the MLF initiative. The Johnson staff was divided on the 
issue between the theologians and those who favored abandoning the 
hardware solution. In the late summer, 1964, however, the CIA reported 
if de Gaulle’s ‘indirect threats to take a stringent action against the EEC and 
NATO fail to block the MLF, he is probably prepared to end effect participation in 
both organizations’.312 Later in the year, in December, Bundy, Assistant 
Secretary of State, reported to Johnson on Rusk’s meeting with de 
Gaulle that de Gaulle ‘strongly’ expressed his hostility towards the MLF, 
and ‘he says it will destroy NATO as we know it’.313 According to Bundy ‘as 
this position is dinned into the Germans in the next two months, I think we can 
expect the sentiment for delay in Bonn to increase’.314 Thus, the prospects in 
December, 1964, were that de Gaulle could succeed with obstructing the 
MLF. Or as INR estimated: De Gaulle ‘is probably not bluffing’ when he 
threatened with ‘weakening’ or ‘even to break up the common market and 
NATO’ if the MLF was implemented.315 
The 1964 bridge building policy was not a success.  
Brief Conclusions 
In 1963 and 1964 the Johnson administration recorded the beginnings of 
Western European realignments. De Gaulle was the prime perpetrator as 
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he challenged America’s leadership of the alliance. De Gaulle denounced 
NATO’s integration principle, which was an American invention 
designed to overcome the European power politics, he challenged the 
unilateralist position the US had in nuclear matters, he continued to 
‘obstruct’ the Grand Design as he halted European integration, and he 
also moved to a détente with the Soviet Union. The contours of de 
Gaulle’s political concepts of détente, alliances, and the organization of 
Europe as viable alternative to the status quo emerged. Indeed, other 
Western European states were recorded for sharing some of de Gaulle’s 
ideas, and the administration fostered a fear for the spread of Gaullist 
ideas. Other European allies also realigned somewhat in the eyes of the 
administration. The increasing contact between Western and Eastern 
Europe, and the accompanying realization that the US lagged behind the 
European allies in their dealings with Eastern Europe challenged the 
American leadership of Western Europe. Despite Chancellor Erhard was 
a declared Atlanticist, the Johnson administration feared that the 
German Gaullists would gain in power.  
 The German question was entangled in the internal CDU struggle 
between Gaullism and Atlanticism, and the Johnson administration, 
though recognizing this domestic character, feared the impact the 
German question could have on US policy towards the Soviet Union – 
indeed, America’s unilateralism in the dealings with the Soviet Union was 
threatened by the German question. Moreover, the administration faced 
a common Franco-German Gaullist critique of the American leadership 
in the Alliance. 
 The Johnson administration responded to the beginnings of the 
Western European realignment with the Bridge Building policy, which 
sought to temporarily replace the European integration scheme with an 
Atlantic framework to control the allies’ policies, and streamline the 
allies’ policies towards Eastern Europe.  NATO was the primary 
instrument for the US in this endeavor, which was also to maintain a 
framework in which the US could maintain a certain level of 
unilateralism.   
 In general, the US interpreted de Gaulle’s critique and based their 
fear of a Gaullist turn in German politics on a traditional reading of 
Europe’s reason of state in the foreign policy realm. INR in particular, 
appeared to be captured by the idea that a lack of either an Atlantic or 
European integration structure would result in a return to European 
power politics. Rusk shared this line of thinking, when he estimated that 
de Gaulle’s rejection of the integration principle would lead to a situation 
like the one prior to both world wars if the rest of the allies followed de 
Gaulle’s example, which he believed was a possibility. The rejection of 
the European reason of state was indeed evident in the administration’s 
perceptions of de Gaulle’s and Western Europe’s apparent and potential 
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return to power politics.  In the same line of thinking, the 
administration’s rejection of de Gaulle’s demand that the European allies 
would get a finger on the nuclear trigger was an expression of the 
perceived need to maintain a certain unilateralism in America’s relations 
with the European allies, in fact, to remain detached from the allies. The 
US had been forced forward by the largely realist interpretation of their 
relationship with the Soviet Union, however, the ultimate decision to 
engage in nuclear war was not entangled in the alliance.  
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Chapter 5 The French Challenge, 1964 -
1965 
Introduction 
In March, 1966, the French president de Gaulle withdrew France from 
NATO’s integrated command and demanded that all foreign troops and 
military facilities not under French command left French soil. The 
withdrawal did not catch the Johnson administration by surprise, rather 
before March, 1966, the administration had deliberated on French 
foreign policy and forecasted the French withdrawal. The prospects for 
NATO in the wake of the substantial critique from de Gaulle against 
NATO’s principles and the NATO organization during 1964 and 1965, 
necessitated that the administration took a stand on exactly what 
purpose NATO served for America, the impact and possible 
consequences the French critique could have and did have on the 
alliance, and how to handle the French challenge. During 1964 and 1965, 
the amount of analysis of French foreign policy and the Gaullist impact 
on the alliance almost sky-rocketed, and results of analysis laid the 
groundwork for a ‘new’ formal position on NATO, with which the 
Johnson administration would meet the challenge from the European 
allies in the latter half of the 1960s towards NATO. 
 In general, the Johnson administration saw the French challenge to 
the existing order in Western Europe and the transatlantic relations as 
dangerous to the very same order in terms of the impact Gaullist ideas 
could have on German politics, the alliance, and therefore the US 
position in Western Europe. Gaullist ideas were, in the eyes of the 
administration, potentially very upsetting to the post-World War II order 
that the US laboriously had built around US unilateralism.   
 The administration believed that de Gaulle’s criticism, calls for a 
reform of the alliance organization, and the potential withdrawal of 
France from the integrated command or even the alliance would pose a 
serious threat towards the alliance’s very existence – at least in its current 
form, and this was largely seen as a threat to America’s position in 
Europe.  
 During 1964-1965, the administration also gradually realized that 
Western Europe – and not just de Gaulle -- may not have the same 
strategic and political interests as the US, and that this divergence of 
interest posed a problem to the alliance, or at least the administration 
needed to address the issue.  
 In face of the challenge from de Gaulle and the possible spread of 
Gaullist ideas within the alliance, the administration came to believe that 
some sort of (further) political consultation within the alliance was 
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needed, either for appearance only or in substance, and the question of 
how to harmonize the political interests in the alliance emerged on the 
agenda. In August, 1965, the State Department’s Bureau of Research and 
Intelligence (INR) suggested that the issue of political consultation 
within the alliance, in fact, was a matter of multilateralism and 
unilateralism; a choice between surrendering American freedom of 
action in foreign policy and thereby entangle US foreign policy with that 
of Western Europe, or choose a lack of political cohesiveness in the 
alliance for the sake of preserving US unilateralism. This was potentially 
a break with traditional thinking and therefore the very principles the 
Western European policy so far had been based on. However, the 
traditional thinking seemed to endure, and with that the protective 
unilateralism and a certain level of detachment.  
 America’s Western European policy was a struggle between mainly 
two lines of thinking, namely multilateralism and unilateralism that was 
brought forwards exclusively by the Cold War paradigm.  
 
Working around de Gaulle 
De Gaulle’s charges against the administration of having hegemonic 
behavior in the alliance and having an instrumental approach to Western 
Europe, did have an impact on the Western European policy thinking in 
the administration. Although with a limited principal scope, a small 
group within the State Department expressed doubts about the 
American policy towards Western Europe, and the means for the policy 
ends in particular. Indeed, in the fall 1964, it became clear that the 
administration probably had to come up with a plan to counter the 
spread of Gaullist inspired mistrust among the other European allies 
towards American intentions in Western Europe. In the spring 1965, the 
State Department requested a report on America’s Western European 
policy, which the department believed needed a fresh look. This possible 
revisionist turn in America’s Western European policy cannot exclusively 
be ascribed to de Gaulle. Although, the Gaullist criticism of the 
American preponderance of power was central to this revisionism, the 
administration in general believed that Gaullism was potentially harmful 
the moment it spread among the European allies, and therefore evolved 
the administration’s response to de Gaulle around hindering the spread 
of Gaullism.  
 In the literature the Johnson administration’s different responses or 
proposed responses to de Gaulle and his attacks on the US, the policy-
making staff is divided between those who wanted to confront de Gaulle 
and those, among whom Johnson was, who wanted to avoid a direct and 
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public confrontation with de Gaulle.316 The confrontationists are 
ascribed a somewhat revengeful objective driven by anger towards de 
Gaulle’s largely, to the contemporary American eye, unfounded 
accusations.  Bohlen, the American ambassador to France are among the 
confrontationists, however, Bohlen and other confrontationists mostly 
argued for the confrontation with de Gaulle to counter the spread of 
Gaullism. Much along the same lines as Rusk’s tactics of intimidation, 
which he had proposed Secretary General Stikker in 1964, as touched 
upon in Chapter 4.  
 Indeed, in the fall of 1964, Bohlen commented on NATO Secretary 
General Brosio’s estimate that de Gaulle would withdraw from NATO, 
to Tyler, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Bohlen 
argued that Brosio’s estimate was wrong and not really anything new; 
however, Bohlen also argued that the US should no longer ‘remain 
quiescent in face of de Gaulle’s gratuitous interpretation of American policy’.317 De 
Gaulle had repeated to Brosio that the US had lost interest in Europe, 
and would not come to Europe’s defense if attacked by the Soviet 
Union. Bohlen, who also claimed it was a statement used for domestic 
purposes to justify the enormous spending on Force de Frappe, argued that 
the American policy of ‘rolling with the punch’ towards de Gaulle might 
backfire, and de Gaulle’s claims would spread ‘to a number of countries in 
Europe’,318 and that it would be quite easy to repudiate de Gaulle’s claims. 
Bohlen’s analysis highlights what would become increasingly more 
evident in American thinking, namely that de Gaulle if seen as an 
isolated ‘incident’ was harmless, however, the moment Gaullism 
connected to Western Europe or Germany it was potentially very 
harmful to America, and the reason for confronting de Gaulle was to 
hinder the spread of Gaullist ideas among the European allies. Tyler 
replied Bohlen, that he would discuss the matter with Rusk to work out a 
plan to counter this possible spread of mistrust in Europe towards 
American intentions.319  
 De Gaulle’s accusations of an American hegemony in the Western 
alliance, and his policy of reasserting France and Europe vis-à-vis the US 
led Tyler to question the validity and success of the administration’s 
Western European integration policy, and even to suggest that de 
Gaulle’s criticisms were perhaps self-inflicted.320 Tyler, who already had 
spoken about the ‘confused sense’ in Europe in March, 1964, as 
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discussed in chapter 4,  was ‘more than ever convinced that we have made a very 
great mistake … in trying to push Europe along one particular road in spite of the 
fact that the conditions for success in this venture was obviously not present, and that 
by exerting such pressures we were tending to justify the suspicion (exploited but not 
originated by de Gaulle) that what the United States is really after is an Atlantic 
framework  within which Europe will be expected to play a predetermined part within 
predetermined limits only’.321 Tyler wrote in confidentiality and in response to 
Bruce, the American ambassador to London. Bruce had argued against 
pushing European integration, and argued for instead letting the 
Europeans work the halted integration process out for themselves, and 
from there create a sound Atlantic partnership.322 Tyler, who did not 
object to the ‘broad lines and goals’ of the Western European policy; the 
Grand Design, objected mainly to ’the constant effort to give this policy a specific 
content in the immediate future by nagging and worrying and lecturing all and sundry 
in Europe or over here who we felt might be useful instruments for our purpose’.323 
This American push for European integration justified, according to 
Tyler, de Gaulle’s charge that American and Western European interests 
in Western organization were not the same, and that the US had a 
hegemonic posture in Western Europe.  
 As an alternative, Tyler argued that those Western Europeans who 
were as convinced as the US was, that principles of ’interdependence and 
partnership’ was in Western Europe’s long term interest, would slowly 
move in that direction, and those who were not convinced, could be 
stimulated to move in that direction, however not by ‘nagging’ and 
forcing them. This however, demanded basic agreement in the 
administration, thus Tyler implied that the Western European policy was 
not necessarily based on common ground in the administration. This 
aspect would present itself even more clearly as de Gaulle’s overtures 
appeared to be materializing during 1965, when the State Department’s 
proposal for a policy, calling for the administration to work out a shared 
position with allies towards France in the military and defense questions 
to force the other European allies to take a stand on de Gaulle’s critique 
of NATO, never was endorsed by Johnson.  
 Tyler’s line of thinking was, however, a discussion of means and not 
ends. Tyler did not deviate from the traditional US thinking on the 
Western European-American relationship, namely the Grand Design. 
Tyler maintained that European integration and Atlantic partnership was 
in the American national interest, and indeed, that the US should 
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promote this. As the Under Secretary put it, the US should ’recast the role 
of United States in European eyes and thus liberate and encourage renewed, and 
hopefully productive, efforts by Europeans to move in the direction of greater political 
unity’.324 It is more strikingly though that even though Tyler recognized 
that the instrumental approach, which de Gaulle criticized the US for 
having towards Western Europe, was or could end up being shared by 
other European allies, Tyler did not stop to consider if this was in fact 
something the US should break away from. Instead Tyler discussed 
means, other than nagging and forcing, to direct Western Europe 
towards political unity upon which the Atlantic partnership could be 
based, in effect, Tyler discussed means to work around de Gaulle’s 
accusations.  
 Working around de Gaulle would be the common coinage in the 
administration’s policies towards de Gaulle as the latter half of 1960s 
progressed. Indeed Tyler argued ’that there have to be basic agreement and 
understanding within the executive branch of the government, not only in our goals, 
but on the nature of the approach required to promote them’.325 Ambassador Bruce 
appears to have had the same errand as Tyler, to redress US means, 
when he claimed that ’the present temper in Washington is in favor of action for 
action’s sake‘  in the Western European policy.326  
 De Gaulle’s challenge to the Grand Design was duly noted in the 
Department of State; however, the issue was how to work around de 
Gaulle. Tyler’s line of thinking implied a somewhat Europeanist 
approach to the objectives of the Grand Design, namely less American 
‘nagging’ and more Europe. Although the objectives for America’s 
Western European policy remained the same, at least if Tyler’s line of 
thinking was followed, de Gaulle had an emerging impact on America’s 
policies, namely on one hand the traditional policies was revoked, and 
other the other hand, the means was possibly being reformulated.  
MLF – America’s raison d’être 
The main purpose of the MLF was to contain Germany in the Western 
alliance by accommodating the German wishes for equality within the 
alliance, and at the same time taming German ambitions for a national 
nuclear force despite how distant the prospect may have seemed at the 
time. The Johnson administration subscribed to a sort of mythical 
perception of German militarism, which should be tamed, and at the 
same time the administration regarded Germany as the key nation in 
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Western Europe, and therefore the administration believed that close ties 
to Germany were essential for American interests.  In sum, these 
considerations were at the heart of the American wish to accommodate 
German wishes for equality within the alliance also in the nuclear field.327 
De Gaulle, who shared the American and Soviet opposition to a German 
finger on any nuclear trigger, saw the MLF as yet another American 
scheme to interfere in European matters, and accused the administration 
for hindering a European Europe, by subjecting Western European 
nuclear weapons to American veto.328 The American veto was (most 
likely) partly a result of a rejection of the European reason of state – and 
as such the US policy towards the nuclear field in the Alliance was a 
policy of detachment, as touched upon in Chapter 4.  
 De Gaulle’s accusations against the MLF and the resonance of these 
accusations throughout the alliance forced the administration to take a 
stand on the MLF, but not the policy of detachment. The Johnson 
administration was also anxious to settle the matter because questions 
about nuclear weapons had the potential to upset Congress and possibly 
divert attention to issues, which inherently could cause a break with the 
bi-partisan Western European policy. Indeed, the Vietnam War, which 
LBJ and an almost unanimous Congress escalated with the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution in August, 1964, and Johnson’s Great Society reforms were 
dependent on this bipartisanship in America’s foreign policy.329  
 The MLF was also about nuclear non-proliferation in broader terms, 
and the MLF scheme was a way to hinder the spread of national nuclear 
deterrence.  The Johnson administration pursued a non-proliferation 
treaty with the Soviet Union to continue Kennedy’s petite détente, and 
the Chinese testing of a nuclear bomb in October, 1964, further 
underlined the world’s ’forces for proliferation’ and therefore the more 
urgent need for a non-proliferation treaty.330 The administration did not 
however, believe that the US could conclude any formal agreements with 
the Soviet Union in 1964-1965. The Sino-Soviet rife was, as put forward 
in chapter 4, seen as a hindrance for any formal agreements, and 
Brezhnev was seen as moving further away from the US and a US-USSR 
détente. Moreover, the petite détente of 1964 was sharply interrupted 
when US forces bombed North Vietnam while the Soviet foreign 
minister Kosygin was in Hanoi.331 Only in October, 1966, did the 
administration detect a shift the Soviet position on formal agreements, 
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and in 1967, the negotiations on the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
took shape.   
 
The MLF Problem 
In November and December, 1964, the MLF developed into a pressing 
issue as de Gaulle’s accusations became even fiercer as he threatened to 
obstruct the MLF and break up NATO.332 Moreover, de Gaulle’s charges 
against the MLF had a potential impact on Germany. Although the MLF 
had been a means to strengthen the Atlantic framework in the wake of 
the 1963 crisis between de Gaulle and the Kennedy administration,333 
and the Johnson administration displayed confusion and disagreements, 
Johnson and the rest of the administration decided to let the MLF sink 
out of sight in December, 1964. Subsequently the administration took a 
stand on the entire nuclear question in relation to Western Europe. The 
administration’s ‘new’ nuclear position, which revealed the 
administration’s traditional thinking on Western European policy, was 
old wine on new bottles, namely to disarm the European allies, although 
within a context of a greater non-proliferation scheme.  
 In November, 1964, Bundy recorded the diverging opinions on the 
matter among the senior advisors. According to Bundy of the White 
House, Rusk, McNamara, and Ball the Undersecretary of State all agreed 
that the MLF was ’the least unsatisfactory means of keeping the Germans well tied 
into the alliance, but we see it as a means, and not an end in itself’.334 However, 
behind that basic agreement, there were divergences. Rusk shared the 
confrontationist approach to de Gaulle with Bohlen, and believed that in 
the light of the ‘outrageous’ French behavior, the administration should 
publicly counter the French accusations against the alliance and the MLF 
to counter the spread of Gaullist ideas. However, Bundy and McNamara, 
according to Bundy, thought it wiser ‘to be more polite and more forthcoming 
than the French deserve … in order to weaken their claim that we are deliberately 
encircling them and trying to prevent a European Europe’.335 Bundy much along 
the same lines as Tyler and Bruce before him, did not stop to consider 
the validity of de Gaulle’s accusations against the MLF concept of being 
an American construct designed to maintain the American position in 
Western Europe as opposed to the creation of a European Europe with 
a nuclear capability. Bundy only considered the means to counter these 
claims and to work around de Gaulle, without losing the Germans and 
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the British, as the MLF question was also still about the British. 
Although the US had succeeded in 1962 with the Nassau agreement to 
‘encircle’ the British nuclear deterrent somewhat, the UK still had a 
national nuclear deterrent, which the US still wished to bring under 
control via an American led nuclear scheme. Although the British Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson (Labour) was not a Gaullist, he was an 
Atlanticist and struggled with maintaining the special relationship to the 
US, at least according to the State Department’s analysis, Wilson was 
skeptical about the MLF and under pressure from the Tories led by 
Macmillan, who shared some of de Gaulle’s views.  
 Bundy suggested different means in November, 1964, to keep both 
the British and the Germans interested and entangled in the concept 
despite de Gaulle’s accusations; means which evolved around convincing 
them both of their common interest, and thereby counter the Gaullist 
scheme.336 The problem the administration faced with Germany was that 
de Gaulle’s attacks on the MLF had provided the Gaullist wing in the 
government coalition CDU/CSU sufficiently ammunition to make a 
quiet solution to the MLF problem more urgent. A direct confrontation 
with the French on the MLF would give the Gaullist wing in the 
CDU/CSU better odds at outmaneuvering the Atlanticist Chancellor 
Erhard at the upcoming German elections.337 Thus, Germany was 
potentially lost to the Gaullist wing in CDU/CSU on the issue, and the 
very purpose with the MLF, namely to contain Germany and promote 
Western European integration would suffer a severe setback.338 
 Congress, which had been kept in the dark for some time, was 
approached by Rusk and Bundy, and the question of retaining American 
unilateralism in the form of control and veto rights over nuclear 
weapons proved to be the key to have the MLF approved in Congress.339 
Accordingly Congress was quite reluctant of any amendment of the 
McMahon Act, which had established US control over the nuclear 
weapons technology. Furthermore, Congress would find it difficult to 
pass the MLF if it was not something that would both strengthen unity 
in the alliance and also was something the allies wanted. This reflected 
the traditional Congressional opposition to interference in Western 
European political affairs.  
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 In the late November, 1964, insecurity about the wisdom of the MLF 
spread in the administration, and Johnson issued NSAM 318 stating that 
within the next months, a decision on the nuclear defense of the alliance 
was necessary. The decision, which Johnson contemplated, did not only 
relate to the MLF but also the ‘concerns’ of the Wilson government.  
Johnson also stated that the primary interest for the US in the matter of 
nuclear defense of the alliance was to find a solution, which would 
advance Atlantic partnership and nonproliferation.340  
 Johnson and Bundy both doubted the wisdom of the MLF. Bundy, 
the White House National Security Advisor, wrote Ball, Under Secretary 
of State, that the administration now ’should let the MLF sink out of sight’,341 
because the political cost of MLF success was too high. Bundy listed the 
political costs, among which, were a ‘deeply reluctant and essentially 
unpersuaded Great Britain’342, a success would spark a constitutional debate 
about the organization of NATO, it would invite more attacks from de 
Gaulle against NATO organization, and it would deliver a blow to the 
Franco-German alliance ’which the Germans will blame on us’.343 The latter 
obviously going against Western European unity, which had been the 
primary reason among the theologians to further the MLF, thus de 
Gaulle’s opposition to the MLF was, in fact, considered strong enough 
to disrupt Western European unity. However, the most important thing, 
namely to keep Germany tied into the Western alliance was achievable 
without the MLF, according to Bundy, because ‘as long as the German 
Chancellor is treated with care and dignity by the American President, I believe we 
can meet the main purposes of the MLF, at least in the short run’.344  
 Bundy argued for the high political cost of the MLF in his response 
to Johnson’s inquiry about Kennedy’s tentative position towards the 
MLF.345 Bundy argued that the devil’s advocate would state two choices. 
One was the  ’full steam ahead’ with which Johnson would face a ’long, hard 
political fight, a major confrontation with de Gaulle, and a possibility of defeat or 
delay which would gravely damage the prestige of the President.’346 The other 
choice being ’half steam ahead’ and although there would ’probably be no 
MLF’ it would not be blamed entirely on the president. Johnson would 
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rather ‘have kept the letter and spirit of the Kennedy readiness to move if the 
Europeans wanted it’.347  
 Bundy concluded that with the latter choice ’there would be plenty of 
opportunities for debate, discussion and delay, and for gradual and ceremonial burial. 
Your wisdom, caution and good judgment will have the praise of the liberals, of 
military men, of the British, of the French, and of many Germans – and you will 
have the freedom to make a different choice later if you wish’.348 The irony aside, 
Bundy’s suggested prospects with the half steam ahead method also 
reflected the administration’s preoccupation with an un-dramatic end to 
the MLF. Naturally the Great Society reforms and the war in Vietnam,349 
had an impact on the administration’s Western European policies to the 
extent that unrest in the Western alliance could divert domestic public 
and Congressional attention from these prioritized matters, but the call 
for less drama was mostly to counter the spread of Gaullism. Any public 
quarrel would highlight de Gaulle’s alternative to the current state of 
affairs between the US and the European allies.  
 The administration’s line of thinking on the MLF question in 1964-
1965 was more about maintaining the US position in Western Europe 
and the existing order, against which national nuclear weapons and de 
Gaulle was a grave danger than the actual desirability of a multilateral 
nuclear scheme within the alliance. The administration’s decision to 
abolish the Multilateral Force was a choice of necessity for the Johnson 
administration. Indeed, the British reluctance to surrender their national 
nuclear deterrent, de Gaulle’s attack on American hegemony, and the 
prospects of opening for both a Gaullist takeover in Germany and a 
debate about NATO’s constitution made the abolishment preferable 
especially as there were other means to contain Germany. The MLF 
debacle of 1964 was essentially a first token of Western European 
realignments, which forced the Johnson administration on the defensive. 
Moreover, the MLF was also a precursor for what was ahead of the 
Johnson administration with the alliance organization.   
 Although there is no doubt that the administration had come to 
believe that the MLF was a non-starter by December, 1964, the 
administration sought to place the responsibility for the MLF’s failure on 
the Europeans,350 the administration reasoned that the possible turmoil 
within the alliance if the US pulled back from the MLF would give 
further grounds to Gaullist attacks or even make Gaullist accusations 
true Thus, although the British tabled a proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear 
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Force (ANF), which was exactly what the administration had wanted 
prior to the December decision, Johnson made it clear at his meeting 
with Wilson, the British Prime Minister, that he did not want to push the 
British into making these decisions.351 In the end the MLF proposal was 
officially taken of the table referring to the fact that nobody really 
wanted it.352 
 Two weeks after Bundy’s ’devil’s advocate response, Johnson issued 
NSAM 322 ‘Guidelines for Discussions on the Nuclear Defense of the Atlantic 
Alliance’, in which he directed that no government officials should seek a 
binding agreement ‘at this time’ and restated that the administration faced 
important decisions and discussions with the allies on the matter. 
Johnson also repeated that any agreement should be supportive of 
nonproliferation.353 Johnson argued, much in line with Tyler’s 
‘Europeanist’ thinking that ’the US is not seeking to force its own views on any 
European nation, but wishes rather to find a way of responding effectively to the 
largest possible consensus among interested allies’.354 Johnson furthermore 
directed how the staff should continue to urge a British-German 
agreement on the issue of nuclear defense of the alliance, and avoid 
public quarrels with de Gaulle.  
 However, the NSAM also outlined the official US position on the US 
nuclear veto and the so-called European clause. The European clause 
envisioned that Europe not be barred from having and obtaining an 
independent nuclear force in the future. Johnson stated in the NSAM 
that the American veto on the firing of the weapons was a precondition 
for the establishment of a collective nuclear arrangement, and in the 
event the ‘major nations of Europe some day achieve full political unity with a 
central political authority capable of making decision to use nuclear weapons’355 the 
US recognized that this would amount to a new situation ‘in which 
reconsideration’ of the nuclear arrangement would be called for. 
However, the US still refused to commit to a revision even in that 
situation, indeed, ‘in any event, revision of the charter [on nuclear defense of the 
alliance] would be possible only with the unanimous approval of the members’.356    
 Following that line of thinking, it is hardly surprising that the 
administration’s ‘new’ position on nuclear defense in the alliance 
advanced certain principles, which would establish the US as the sole 
nuclear power, and maintain structures that would maintain and advance 
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this status. Indeed ‘any agreement’ should advance the disarmament of 
Western Europe, hinder the Western European states from obtaining 
national nuclear deterrents, and most important maintain the principle of  
collective security, in which the US would maintain the nuclear veto. 
Indeed, the UK should be led ‘out of the strategic deterrence and thus reduce by 
one the number of powers aiming at this kind of nuclear strength’,357 the Germans 
should be contained to the extent that they would not seek an 
independent nuclear deterrence, and lastly an agreement on the nuclear 
question should ‘advance the principle and practice of collective strategic defense, as 
against the proliferation of separate nuclear deterrents’ Indeed, these ’advantages 
are of great importance … to all who care for world peace in other countries, and it is 
essential that they be established in any agreement.’358 
 An agreement on the nuclear defense of the alliance based on these 
principles  reflected a traditional reading of Western Europe and a 
rejection of the European reason of state. Apparently, if West Germany 
or any other Western European state were granted the right to national 
nuclear weapons, it followed that they would be used in the context of 
narrow national interest outside the framework of the collective security. 
The granting of a national deterrent invoked the rejection of European 
reason of state in the American thinking so to speak. The independent 
nuclear deterrence in Western Europe would inevitably mean that the US 
had lost control over the policy of deterrence via NATO, and therefore  
national nuclear deterrents in Western Europe also meant, that the US 
could be drawn into European (nuclear based) politics, which was 
inimical to US interests. This would make the policy outlined in NSAM 
322 an actual policy of detachment from the alliance, and not just a 
standpoint of detachment.  
 On the other hand the idea of nonproliferation and nuclear 
disarming could be seen as a reflecting a certain simple logic that lesser 
national nuclear weapons, lesser risk of nuclear war – in essence an 
idealist line of thinking. The point however is that neither of these lines 
of thinking excludes one another. The wish to prevent the proliferation 
of these weapons was also about the overall East-West conflict, and also 
reflects the strategic shift to flexible response that the Johnson 
administration attempted in NATO.  
 
Franco-Soviet Rapprochement 
The Franco-Soviet rapprochement in the spring 1965 did not disturb the 
administration much, mostly because de Gaulle’s efforts were limited by 
the lack of substantial backing from the Western European allies, 
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Germany in particular. Thus, according to the administration, de Gaulle 
risked jeopardizing his position in Western Europe. The administration 
also believed that although the Franco-Soviet Communiqué issued in 
April, 1965, after Soviet Premier Gromyko’s visit to Paris, did not 
change the situation much, the Communiqué put the French ‘in bed with 
the Soviet Union in a number of important issues, which are calculated to create 
discomfort in several places including Washington, London, and Bonn’. 359 Thus, 
the French effort towards the Soviet Union was mostly, as seen from 
Washington, a devised to be a challenge to the France’s allies.   
 The only diverting voice on the matter was Bohlen, the ambassador 
to France, who also consistently argued for a confrontation with de 
Gaulle on his critique of the alliance and claims about American foreign 
policy to stop the spread of Gaullist ideas. Prior to the Soviet visit in 
Paris Bohlen characterized de Gaulle’s statement on France and the 
Soviet Union having agreed to establish an international conference to 
seek peace in Vietnam, as ‘objectively, de Gaulle’s statement appears to violate 
spirit of NATO and certainly of SEATO’.360 Moreover, in effect de Gaulle 
had decided, according to Bohlen, upon a new diplomatic course with 
the Soviet Union to put pressure on the US ‘into action which runs counter to 
US and Western positions’, indeed, de Gaulle had effectively ‘departed from the 
community of Western interest’.361 In response, Bohlen suggested either a high 
level public statement against France or a formal note to the French 
government, either way was rejected by Klein, member of the White 
House NSC staff, who argued that a public statement would be 
counterproductive and that instead, if anything, the administration 
should discretely contact the French foreign minister Couve de 
Murville.362 However, Klein thought that the ‘French shenanigans vis-à-vis the 
Soviets in connection with the Asian problem and the impact of the alliance’ was 
worth Bundy’s time.363  
 Shortly before Gromyko’s visit to Paris in April, Bohlen touched 
upon the Vietnam issue once again. This time though, the prospects for 
an actual Franco-Soviet concord and viable solution were deemed 
unrealistic. Indeed, the possibilities within reach of both Paris and 
Moscow during the visit were limited, as both parties were restricted by 
their respective ‘rears’. The Soviet Union risked by subscribing to 
Gaullist ideas on Europe to lose its position in Eastern Europe, whereas 
de Gaulle with too warm relations with the Kremlin probably would lose 
the position he enjoyed in Western Germany and the EEC. However, 
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Bohlen, suspicious as always, argued that the US could never be sure if 
de Gaulle did not give something of importance to the Kremlin.364  
 Bohlen then went on to argue that European security and Germany 
would be on the agenda of the upcoming meeting, and although de 
Gaulle would not jettison his position in German quarters, he would 
probably agree to a statement to the effect that European security and 
German reunification was exclusively a European matter, rather than a 
matter ‘primarily also affecting the US and the UK’.365 Although this would be 
a departure from the official French position that German unification 
was a ‘quadripartite responsibility’.366 Thus, what seemed most dangerous 
about the French-Soviet rapprochement was the potentiality rather than 
reality.   
 CIA’s estimate of the French dialogue with the Soviets, that reached 
Bundy at the White House, argued that de Gaulle would probably not go 
out on a limp with Soviets; only if his ‘Paris-Bonn axis’ failed to emerge 
de Gaulle would consider an alliance with the Soviet Union.367 However, 
the emerging détente between the two parties served a primary goal of 
ensuring that Moscow and Washington would not attempt a settlement 
of the German problem without European concurrence, and in the long 
run, de Gaulle probably hoped for ‘eventual negotiations on European questions 
between French-led Western Europe and the communist countries in Eastern 
Europe’.368 These hardly sensational estimates were topped with the 
estimate that ‘De Gaulle has no desire to have US abandon its role as the 
guarantor of Europe’s security. The American ‘nuclear umbrella’ over Europe is the 
sine qua non for achievement of De Gaulle’s policies.’369 The State Department 
would concur in this estimate however; they argued that the French did 
not really have a problem in that regard, because the French geographic 
position would guarantee that France was covered by the nuclear 
umbrella in case of a Soviet attack. 
 Moreover, according to the CIA, the Soviet Union also considered 
the US presence in Europe as ‘a valuable check on the present and potential 
resurgence of West German power’.370 The latter perspective, however, runs 
counter to the Soviet perception that the US was about to give the 
Germans a finger on the nuclear trigger with the MLF. The CIA’s 
estimate was thus hardly alarming, unless to the extent that (if) the 
French-German axis failed.  
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NATO and de Gaulle 
De Gaulle’s criticism of the alliance and the integrated structure, which 
Rusk had characterized as the very heart of the alliance in 1964,371 
escalated in the spring 1965, and the administration got increasingly 
occupied with understanding and subsequent estimating de Gaulle’s next 
moves and the impact de Gaulle had on the alliance and the rest of the 
allies. The administration had different opinions on de Gaulle’s critique 
of the alliance and the integrated structure, and as 1965 proceeded the 
matter of alliance organization, alliance principles, and the very purpose 
with the alliance reached a principal level in the Johnson administration.  
 INR argued in May, 1965, that de Gaulle’s objective, in fact, was not 
‘so much to actually destroy the basic alliance … or even the NATO 
superstructure’,372 but rather de Gaulle tried to leverage on both the US and 
Western Europe to obtain French policy ends.373 The alliance, Hughes, 
the director of INR, argued, served French policy ends beyond the 
military protection (which de Gaulle believed France enjoyed despite the 
existence of the alliance or even membership) to French political ends. 
As Hughes had argued in 1964, a diminishing Soviet threat would also 
diminish the need for the alliance in de Gaulle’s perspective, however, 
Hughes added this political dimension in 1965, and argued that de 
Gaulle attacked the alliance and would continue to ‘dis-integrate’ France 
from the alliance to force a reform of ‘the intra-Alliance and Franco-US 
relationships’, however, de Gaulle would not want to restrain the Franco-
German relationship, nor France’s relations with the other European 
allies.374 Thus by May, 1965, the administration at least within the State 
Department was no longer in doubt as to whether de Gaulle wanted a 
reform of the alliance, as Rusk had questioned in 1964.375   
The Principal Considerations the purpose of the Alliance 
In the spring of 1965, Hughes argued that de Gaulle, in fact, had failed 
utterly in Europe among the allies to build a French led Europe. Instead 
de Gaulle had obtained the opposite. Hughes argued that by ‘‘killing off’‘ 
the early political integration between the six and trying to establish an 
‘open French hegemony’ de Gaulle had given the Western European partners 
‘new reason to welcome a political framework which gives them, under the aegis of the 
United States, protection from French hegemony today, and from Franco-German or 
German hegemony tomorrow’.376 Therefore, added Hughes, ‘in this sense it is 
accurate to say that if NATO did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it. That 
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is, even if the Alliance did not serve Western defense needs its members would still 
value it for intra-Western political purposes’,377 indeed; the alliance ‘filled the 
bill’ since no state in Western Europe could dominate. The alliance, 
according to Hughes ‘guarantee a continued US military – an therefore political – 
presence in Europe’,378 and ‘more European governments will continue to prefer that 
the US preside over an Atlantic political system rather than the leadership over the 
European half of a two-pillar system accrue to any one or two European states.’379 
 This understanding of the alliance, its purpose, and the means to this 
end hardly differed from the post-war thinking on the alliance, in fact,  
the French ‘obstructionism’, as it was labeled in the State Department, 
revived the reasoning and the purpose of the alliance of the late 1940s.  
Indeed, in 1945-1948 the presence of the US in Western Europe through 
the establishment of an Atlantic system guaranteed peaceful relations on 
the continent, which would be endangered by European power struggles. 
Moreover the idea that the US would have a political role in Western 
Europe through the military ‘presence’ was also very much like the 
thinking of the late 1940s, when the US had come to consider itself as a 
European power. INR, probably because of this traditional reading, 
failed to recognize that de Gaulle’s critique of the American hegemony 
in the alliance, in fact, had resonance throughout Western Europe, and 
that de Gaulle’s objective was not as simplistic as INR made it out to be. 
De Gaulle’s political project was more sophisticated than INR’s ‘classic’ 
euro-skeptic analysis amounted to, indeed, de Gaulle’s Cold War 
revisionism aimed at overcoming the Cold War in Europe and not 
establish a pre-war system in the process.380  
 In the same traditional line of thinking the Department of Defense 
(DoD) argued in a ‘non-paper’ sent to Francis Bator, Deputy Special 
Assistant to Johnson, in the fall, that apart from controlling German 
rearmament and direct German forces to the benefit of the West, the 
principle of ‘Integration … serves the fundamental purpose of furthering the US 
and Allied foreign policy through the mechanism of the North Atlantic Alliance, 
providing a degree of unity of political attitude and policy in the Atlantic area not 
otherwise obtainable.’381 The central issue in the wake of de Gaulle’s 
continued critique of the integration principle was therefore ‘whether there 
shall be a collective multilateral system between equal sovereign states employing 
integration as needed in the interest of effectiveness, or a system of bilateral power 
politics involving all the dangers of the turn of the 20th century’.382 Should the US 
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reject the European reason of state in the foreign policy realm, which de 
Gaulle’s concept according to this line of thinking was the exponent of, 
or not? DoD opted for a continued rejection. Thus, by the fall of 1965, it 
was a common position throughout the administration to regard the 
possible impact of de Gaulle as a return to European power politics 
through the rejection of the integration principle which moreover 
equaled a loss of American leadership in the alliance. Therefore, as DoD 
argued, the administration had to prevent that de Gaulle became ‘the 
lowest common denominator’.383 The problem was, therefore, how the 
administration could prevent (the possibility of) a return to European 
power politics. Or, in other words, how a renewed rejection of the 
European reason of state should be framed.  
 The Department of Defense rejected pre-emptive and retaliatory 
approaches, and argued that the administration instead should, 
essentially, maintain and retain the allies, and ’a sense of direction and timing 
as to when leadership will be followed is a sine qua non both for the US and others. It 
is important to extend the practices and procedures of political consultation, to improve 
measurably the exchange of information and analysis in the defense field … and most 
importantly, to continue to work for nuclear sharing arrangements. Progress on such of 
these fronts which do not involve basic structural reform in NATO and which are 
thus least subject to French veto, will make NATO far less susceptible to de Gaulle’s 
abrasions and increase its values for its members [underlining by Bator]’.384  
Therefore, DoD concluded, the US was prepared ‘to explore and bring to 
light’385 how NATO could be improved and made stronger, although 
exclusively in action with the allies. The snag was not to push the effort 
too far into the structural area, which would give de Gaulle the 
opportunity to obstruct the alliance even further,386 an obstruction, 
which could result in the implementation of the ‘lowest common denominator’ 
and possibly a return to power politics in Europe. 
 McNamara, to counter the nuclear problem and extend the political 
consultation without moving into the area of structural reform of the 
alliance, had already suggested at the May, 1965, NATO Ministerial 
meeting the establishment of the so-called Select Committee of Defense 
Ministers (SC) under NATO aegis. The Select Committee should study 
two principal items, namely ‘examination of possible means of improving and 
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extending Allied participation in planning for use of nuclear force’387 and work out 
means for communications so that in ‘event of crisis in which use of nuclear 
weapons may be contemplated’.388 The Select Committee would eventually 
propose the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which the administration 
palmed the Western Europeans off with instead of the MLF in 
December, 1966, after the French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated 
command. The NPG’s permanent members were the US, West 
Germany, Italy and Great Britain, and only members of the integrated 
command structure could become members of the NPG, thus reflecting 
how the SC was intended and constructed to maintain and retain the 
integrated command structure, with which the US could maintain 
control with the alliance.  
 Moreover, the SC also reflected that although McNamara had 
ensured at the ministerial meeting in Paris that the SC was not a 
substitution for the MLF but ‘additional’, the MLF was still considered a 
non-starter by the administration. The SC was one of the 
administration’s direct responses to de Gaulle’s obstructionism without 
moving the question of the alliance into any ‘structural’ area, but merely 
working around de Gaulle.  The Select Committee was finally appointed 
in November, 1965.389  
  The Department of State disagreed with the Department of 
Defense, and did not completely reject a structural reform of NATO, in 
fact, Rusk and Ball had already argued during the May, 1965, NATO 
Ministerial Meeting that there was a need for an ‘intensive study of the State 
of the Alliance’390 given de Gaulle’s overtures, and Rusk declared in the 
light of de Gaulle’s probable alliance reorganization proposal that 
although the Department of State  did not want to ‘push far-reaching over-
hasty fundamental discussions’391 the department wished to begin 
preparations ‘where possible [my underlining]’.392 Later in the same month 
Rusk believed that French foreign minister Alphand at their meeting had 
indicated that de Gaulle pushed his time schedule for a ‘revision of 
NATO’,393 and in June, 1965, Rusk informed all NATO capitals that de 
Gaulle intended ‘to ask US in effect to vacate certain military facilities in 
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France’.394  Rusk argued that this particular move, even though it may be 
postponed until after the upcoming French elections in December, 1965, 
was in complete line with ‘emerging’ policies in Paris ‘to disengage France 
from NATO organization and specifically from integrated NATO military 
activities’.395 Furthermore, Rusk warned that any ‘premature’ response to 
any French moves could potentially ‘permit’ France to claim that the US 
had excluded France from NATO, and ‘thus to break up the alliance’, and 
any US premature reaction would ‘also prevent us from engaging in essential 
systematic and intensive consultation with our allies to ensure that the Alliance 
responds effectively to any French political attack, and emerges without unnecessary 
loss of strength’396  
 Thus, during 1965 de Gaulle’s challenge to NATO and American 
hegemony had split the administration on a rather fundamental question, 
namely if the alliance should respond to the Gaullist challenge with a 
reform of NATO in the structural area. Whereas the Department of 
Defense argued against, Rusk the Secretary of State out of necessity 
opted for a reform. Indeed, de Gaulle’s policy of disengaging France 
from the integrated structure obstructed (potentially) an instrument for 
America to lead the alliance. The State Department and the White House 
undertook studies on how to respond to the French political and military 
challenge 
 
The Purposes of the Alliance 
Although the nuclear sharing question was somewhat safely buried with 
the establishment of the Select Committee (and the Paris Working 
Group), the French problem continued its pace, and raised essential 
questions in Washington about the purpose of the alliance and exactly 
how to respond to the contemplated French withdrawal from the 
integrated structure of the alliance. In the fall of 1965, the administration 
went through ‘intensive planning’ with ‘major aspects of European policy’.397 
Although de Gaulle forced the Johnson administration to a Western 
European policy revision, the other European allies were also causing the 
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administration reason to undertake this revision. In Western Europe the 
perception of a lessening of the Soviet threat prevailed, and there were 
an increasing economic and cultural activity across the iron curtain 
between Eastern and Western Europe. These new circumstances in 
Western Europe challenged alliance cohesion according to the 
administration, and the question about how to maintain this cohesion 
was central for the revision of the policy towards the European allies.  
 Hughes and INR tried to answer some of these essential questions 
about the purpose of the alliance in August, 1965; in essence Hughes 
argued that the alliance served a triple purpose for the US.  
 The primary purpose was to regulate Western Europe’s policies. 
According to INR’s analysis was  ‘West Europe … not only economically and 
politically strong but considers that the threat of Soviet attack has been replaced by a 
US-USSR nuclear stalemate. NATO has therefore become to a considerable degree, 
in fact, though not in form and bureaucratic outlook, an instrumentality for regulating 
political issues within the West’398 and therefore NATO remained ‘essential to 
the US as a well established and easily available instrument for exercising American 
political influence in Europe’.399 Indeed, de Gaulle had made it quite easy to 
exercise power in Western Europe – and Western Europe welcomed 
this, as Hughes repeated his observation from the spring, that Western 
Europe in the wake of de Gaulle’s behavior and policies considered 
NATO ‘the established modality through which America can easily and almost 
painlessly make its power operative and in preserving West European stability’.400   
 The second purpose was to geographically expand the area for 
coordination of the alliance members’ policies beyond Europe. Hughes 
argued that NATO remained essential to the US because it served the 
broader purpose of ‘harmonize the many divergent U.S. and West European 
political and economic interests both in Europe and on a worldwide basis’.401  
NATO’s instrumentality for US policies towards the so-called out of 
treaty areas was an emerging subject within the administration, and 
would during the course of 1965 and 1966 gain in strength as the 
European allies failed to support the America war effort in Vietnam, and 
in fact failed to support the domino theory. Indeed, the Johnson 
administration supported and mandated the Harmel study in December, 
1966, because it also served to study the out of treaty area question.   
 NATO’s third purpose, as Hughes analysis reveal, was as an 
instrument to regulate the relations between Eastern and Western 
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Europe with the ultimate purpose of avoiding conflict between Eastern 
and Western Europe, to ensure and safeguard US commercial and 
political interests in Western Europe, and ‘safeguard its [The US’s] position of 
great influence in the area [Western Europe]’.402 This line of thinking was 
identical with the State Department’s thinking that laid the basis for the 
1964 bridge building policy, and as Western Europe’s relations with 
Eastern Europe would only expand in the latter half of the 1960s, this 
particular purpose of regulating the relations between Eastern and 
Western Europe with NATO moved to the forefront of American 
thinking.   
 On the subject of alliance cohesion, Hughes and INR raised a 
principal matter. The question of granting the allies more political 
consultation, which both the Department of Defense and the 
Department of State had argued was one way to ensure NATO cohesion 
and stability, raised, according to Hughes the principal choice between 
unilateralism and multilateralism. Should the US surrender its 
unilateralist position ‘its unhibited freedom of action’403 in foreign policy, to 
accommodate the Western European wish for actual influence on 
America’s foreign policy? Or should the US refuse this surrender and 
instead accept a certain lack of political cohesiveness in the alliance, 
which would be the result of American refusal of more – or actual – 
political consultation within the alliance? This choice, which Hughes 
argued was before the administration, also indicated a fundamental shift 
in the matter between the European allies and the US in the alliance. The 
matter of the alliance shifted from a strictly military matter of how to 
maintain an adequate deterrence to a largely inward looking political 
matter of how to remain allied despite diverging political interests. 
Indeed, Hughes argued that Washington had mostly considered NATO’s 
internal problems as belonging to the military area rather than the 
political field where they, according to him, rightly belonged.  
 Hughes cited McNamara’s Select Committee and the MLF as mostly 
concerned with military perspectives, and claimed that the preoccupation 
with the military perspectives was quite a paradox.  Hughes asked why 
(pre)occupy NATO with the nuclear question when the US had 
supremacy, which was accepted by all members of the alliance (with the 
notable exception of Gaullist France and Gaullist West Germany), and 
also the field where it was most difficult to substantially alter the existing 
state of affairs?    
 In Hughes’ argument the political problem between the US and the 
European allies departed from the fact that the European allies did not 
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necessarily share the American interests, despite the apparent overlap of 
interest in managing the Western European continent. Indeed, Hughes 
recognized that the European allies’ ‘membership of NATO involves or 
potentially involves them in consequences of American actions in many parts of the 
world’,404 and therefore the allies ‘understandably want a chance to make these 
views known beforehand’ and not being ‘cut short by a faits accomplis’[Hughes 
underlining].405  Hughes argued that this perspective was of overriding 
importance for the fabric of the alliance, in fact, if the US did not at least 
give ‘appearance – and occasionally the substance’406 of taking the allies 
viewpoints into political consideration the current strains in NATO 
would continue.  
 The most significant question was therefore, according to Hughes, 
‘the extent to which NATO can and should be used as a forum for the discussion 
and formulation of broad policies’.407 The choice was between either ‘routinely 
submitting important foreign policy decisions to the advance scrutiny, comment and 
perhaps even modification of its NATO allies, and thus surrendering, if only to a 
limited extent, its [the US] unhibited freedom of action, and on the other hand, a 
continuation or even an intensification of the lack of political cohesiveness in the 
alliance’.408  
 Hughes argued that although ‘there is a serious question whether a meeting 
of minds on important issues (except, perhaps, European issues) can often be achieved 
when the 15 nations involved has so many dissimilarities in their respective views’,409  
the question of how making minds meet, was indeed where the ‘problem of 
NATO’s future evolution lies, rather than in NATO’s military or organizational 
aspects’.410 
 The question of political consultation did not reach the same 
principal level in the State Department’s Steering Group’s paper on 
France and NATO as Hughes analysis did. The State Department 
headed the so-called ‘State-Defense Steering Committee on the 
Problems Affecting France and NATO’, which had among its primary 
tasks to minimize the possible damage from de Gaulle to the alliance, in 
particular alliance cohesion, and ‘Advance fundamental US objectives for the 
cohesion of the Atlantic Area, including determination of the nature and timing of 
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any initiative which might be taken’.411 The concept of alliance cohesion 
equaled stopping the spread of Gaullist thinking among the European 
allies.   
 Prior to the final paper, which was an effort to develop a formal US 
position on the issue of alliance cohesion in the wake of de Gaulle’s 
challenge,412 the State Department incorporated the Department of 
Defense’s deliberations on the military aspects of a possible French 
withdrawal. The Department of State’s formal position was based on the 
premise that NATO was, despite the changes in the East-West relations, 
essential for America’s security, and NATO also served a political 
purpose, namely as an instrument to support the underlying interests of 
the Atlantic community. In this perspective the French intentions were, 
in fact, a ‘serious threat to its [the alliance] very survival’,413 as de Gaulle 
especially argued that there were no common interests of the Atlantic 
community. 
 Much in line with INR’s argument, the Department of State argued 
that the hitherto success of the alliance was based on a consensus on the 
need for both the alliance and the integrated command to pose an 
effective deterrence to the Soviet Union, and that this consensus was a 
precondition for balancing the Western European powers, indeed, the 
allies had  ‘exercised sufficient restraint in seeking to press their national interests to 
prevent issues within NATO from being pushed to the point of basic 
confrontation.’414 However, ‘The current French challenge to NATO raises the 
question whether the fundamental NATO consensus can be said still to exist among 
all its members. If it does not, those who continue to regard NATO as indispensable 
must decide what steps they will take to preserve it.’415  The consensus and 
therefore the principle of integration was, in other words,  indispensable 
for the preservation of NATO, and the State Department in effect asked 
those of the allies, that continued to view the alliance as indispensable, to 
recommit to these fundamental principles. Indeed, in another draft of 
the paper, the department reiterated the Department of Defense’s 
position on the choice before the administration (and the alliance), that 
the ‘central issue is whether there shall be a collective multilateral system between 
equal sovereign states employing integration only as needed in the interest of 
effectiveness, or a system of bilateral power politics involving all the dangers of the turn 
of the 20th century.’416 Maintaining the multilateral commitments, i.e., 
maintain the principle of integration therefore was the sine qua non for 
maintaining the military effectiveness of the alliance, and indeed, balance 
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Western Europe. No other means than the alliance could do exactly that 
trick. 417   
 According to the State Department’s undated paper, France posed a 
series of different threats to the alliance, including the withdrawal of 
French forces from the ‘subordination’ of the integrated command, and 
a wish to reform NATO ‘drastically’ if not eliminate it completely, and 
the department believed that because of de Gaulle’s resolve and his 
‘tactical flexibility’ the US was left with very few options to counter de 
Gaulle with. However, ‘if the alliance sways like a mesmerized snake’ de Gaulle 
would be able to achieve his objectives, and therefore the US (and 
others) ‘must play judiciously activist role  in strengthening NATO’, and indeed  
many actions could be taken to both strengthen ‘the fabric’ of NATO, and 
to make the alliance ‘less vulnerable’ to French attacks.418  
 In the joint proposal, the Departments proposed among other 
measures, to strengthen the political consultation with the establishment 
of a post of Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs, however, 
without debating the extent of or the possibility of an actual influence on 
US policy the deputy could have, the Department of State suggested a 
strictly consultative arrangement. The principal question, which INR had 
raised whether the political cooperation should be multilateral or if the 
US should maintain the unilateral position,  seemed however, decided 
upon, indeed, progress in the area of political consultation and other 
areas, should not involve any ‘basic structural reform’.419 The deputy 
should exclusively ‘assume an active responsibility for strengthening political 
consultation’420 and therefore, he should be given ‘direct access to the highest 
level of our own governments.’421 The suggested formal position, in other 
words, was that an expanded and institutionalized political consultation 
within the alliance would provide enough substance to fend off the 
Gaullist accusations of no real partnership and no Western European 
voice in alliance matters.  
 As Hughes had already argued, in the light of the divergent European 
and US interests, that for the sake of the NATO ‘fabric’, the US should 
give the ‘appearance -- and occasionally the substance – of taking its allies’ views 
carefully into account before finally adopting positions and basic policies’.422 The 
departments of State and Defense proposal was probably for the sake of 
‘appearance and occasionally substance’.  
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 The final recommendation from the ‘State-Defense Steering 
Committee’ was that the US with the European allies developed a 
common approach and position against France and de Gaulle. 
 The State Department subsequently began a process of developing 
guidelines for ‘further discussion in dealing with prospective French actions against 
NATO’,423 which was also intended to force the allies to commit to the 
principles of integration. 
 
NSAM  Drafts 
Different draft NSAMs on how the US should engage with the allies in 
response to the French challenge circulated between the State 
Department and the White House in the fall 1965. The draft NSAM 
originated in the State Department, and aimed at ‘providing framework and 
guidance for further discussions with our Allies in dealing with prospective French 
action against NATO’.424 The draft NSAM was based on the State-Defense 
paper’s analysis of the purpose of NATO, and recommended that the 
administration developed a common position towards the French with 
the rest of the allies, with which the allies would be impelled to take a 
stand on the principles that de Gaulle attacked.    
 The formal position, which should be presented to the allies, was 
straight forward: the US remained committed to the alliance as ‘embodied 
in the 1949 treaty, and specifically to NATO as a norganization’.425 The US 
rejected any bilateral arrangement, which incorporated the NATO 
treaty’s article 5, because it would, among other things, dispose with the 
NATO organization and therefore the American ability to tame and 
manage the European political credo.426  The draft NSAM’s also made it 
clear that the US was not willing to compromise the integrated structure, 
indeed, the American objectives, which should be presented to the allies, 
was among other that ‘to preserve the concept of integration, particularly the 
integrated command’.427 However, the US was prepared in addition to ‘the 
defensive measures’ to ‘explore and cooperate in affirmative action which strengthen 
the Alliance’.428  
 The cross departmental debate on the substance of the text was 
mostly an effort to ‘safeguard’ the text against French accusations of 
hegemonic behavior, indeed, to work around France. Such as making it 
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plain in the consultations with the allies that the US ‘are not endeavoring to 
organize the other NATO countries in a campaign to isolate France or to initiate 
action against France’,429 and argue that the issue was one between France 
and NATO, and not between France and the US.430    
 The draft NSAM was never endorsed by LBJ, a lack that underpins 
exactly how difficult the Gaullist challenge was. Indeed, in late October, 
1965, the American NATO ambassadors meet in the Hague and 
discussed the Western European policy in light of de Gaulle, and agreed 
that the ‘most important is for US to make up own policy and get solidly behind 
it’.431Johnson did, however, issue one NSAM regarding France, namely 
NSAM 336 in August, 1965, which called for the prevention of US 
activities that could ‘embarrass United States relations with France’,432 
reflecting how the administration wanted to avoid the direct 
confrontation with de Gaulle. 
 
Brief conclusion 
De Gaulle’s challenge to the alliance, more precisely de Gaulle’s rejection 
of the integration principle and accusations of American hegemony in 
the alliance forced the administration to rethink the purpose of the 
alliance and the American position on central issues, especially as the 
administration feared the spread of Gaullist thinking among the 
European allies. De Gaulle’s challenge largely revived the perceptions 
and reasoning of the late 1940s, in fact, according to the administration 
at large one purpose with the alliance was, as in the late 1940s, to counter 
European power politics,  and provide the US with an instrument to 
control the allies to American policy ends. The question to some extent 
came to be, how a renewed rejection of the European reason of state 
should be framed. 
 De Gaulle’s continued rejection of the integration principle 
amounted to a return of the European reason of state in the foreign 
policy realm according to both the State Department and the 
Department of Defense, and the Alliance’s cohesion was threatened by 
the prospects of a spread of Gaullist thinking among the allies.  The 
State Department’s proposed response to this challenge of cohesion and 
potential return to European power politics, which became the primary 
objective in the course of 1965, was therefore to impel the allies to 
commit to the purpose of the alliance and the principle of integration, 
which served to balance Western Europe, ensured American leadership, 
                                                 
429 Bator to Bundy, Oct. 8, 1965. LBJL, NSF, Bator papers, box 26. 
430 Memcon, Oct. 8, 1965. FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. Xiii, Western Europe Region, doc. 
106. 
431 Memo for the record, Oct. 27, 1965. LBJL, NSF, Bator papers, box 26. 
432 NSAM 336, Aug. 6, 1965. LBJL 
119 
 
and maintained an effective deterrence. The Department of Defense in 
concert with the Department of State proposed to grant the allies more 
political consultation and continue to work for nuclear sharing 
arrangements, despite the administration had decided to let the MLF 
sink out of sight in December, 1964. 
   The Department of Defense argued that these initiatives should not 
amount to any structural reform of the alliance, as this would invite 
further Gaullist attacks. The Department of State however, did not reject 
the possibility of a fundamental reform out of hand.  
 De Gaulle’s critique also led to a debate on principles, indeed about 
multilateralism versus unilateralism as the guiding principle for America’s 
relations with the European allies, as INR argued that the political 
problem between the US and Western Europe derived from the fact that 
the parties did not necessarily share interests. The question was 
therefore, if the alliance should be used as a body to formulate policies, 
and INR therefore asked if the US should surrender American freedom 
of action in foreign policy and instead admit to political entanglement 
with Western Europe. No other agency had raised this principal matter.  
INR did not completely reject multilateralism, but argued that the real 
problem was to gain a meeting of minds between Western Europe and 
the US, implicitly suggesting that it did not involve any restraints on 
American freedom of action.  
 INR also tabled a triple purpose with the alliance, namely to regulate 
Western Europe’s policies according to American interests, to expand 
the area of coordination of policies to out of treaty areas, and regulate 
the relations between Eastern and Western Europe to protect American 
interest and position in Western Europe.  
 As the MLF was sinking out of sight in December, 1964, the 
Johnson administration arrived at a ‘new’ nuclear position and developed 
a fully-fledged policy of detachment from the Alliance in the nuclear 
field. The US would  disarm Western Europe, retain the American 
nuclear veto, and refuse any commitment to a ‘European clause’, by, as 
outlined in NSAM 322, maintaining the existing structures of collective 
security, within which the US enjoyed and maintained the veto right.  
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Chapter 6 Towards Equality? Reforming 
NATO and Peace Initiatives, 1965-1966 
Introduction 
During the spring of 1965, Germany and the rest of the European allies 
demanded political influence on the strategy towards the German 
question. Some of the European allies criticized the monopolistic 
position the Quadripartite Group had towards the German problem, 
which the other allies considered a European matter that affected all 
allies. Instead of the monopolistic approach, some of the European allies 
argued for a multilateral decision-making capacity or at least political 
influence on the strategy and the suggested solutions to the German 
question. The Erhard administration also preferred cooperation on the 
question, but was inclined to consider the question a domestic problem 
rather than international, if the alliance did not manage to move forward 
on the question. The question of unilateralism versus multilateralism 
emerged for the first time as a matter almost amounting to a problem 
between the European allies and the US with the German question in 
1965. By 1965 it was no longer just a matter between the US and France.  
 In March 1966, de Gaulle withdrew France from NATOs integrated 
command, as the Johnson administration had forecasted in 1964-1965. 
Nevertheless, de Gaulle’s move threw the alliance into a crisis, and the 
administration argued, again, for the need to counter alliance 
disintegration. The allies used de Gaulle’s withdrawal as a means to argue 
for more political consultation in the alliance, a push for normalization 
of relations with the East, and a solution to the nuclear problem. The 
Johnson administration responded with a political bargain; the European 
allies were offered political consultation and a move toward 
normalization with the East in return for the allies’ complete backing of 
the integration principle.  
 Moreover, in response to the withdrawal and the attack on the 
integration principle, Western European calls for an Eastern policy, and 
the US recognition of the fact that the US was behind the allies in the 
relations with Eastern Europe, the Acheson Committee proposed a 
formula of détente and deterrence. Indeed the same formula Belgian 
foreign minister Harmel would propose four months later, to contain the 
European the allies’ Eastern policies, and not least maintain alliance 
cohesion. The Acheson committee reasoned that on one hand the 
alliance served a military purpose of deterrence, but on the other hand 
the alliance should at the same time be moved into the political field as 
an instrument for a common NATO policy towards the East. NATO’s 
instrumentality to the administration was also a defensive measure to 
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protect American national interests against the European reason of state. 
Indeed, the Acheson Committee’s proposal was in fact a policy of 
detachment. 
 The 1966 bridge building policy was also a means for the 
administration to control the allies’ policies towards the East. 
 The French withdrawal from the integrated command also re-raised 
questions about the basic assumptions for America’s Western European 
policy, one of which was Western European unity and Atlantic 
partnership. After the French withdrawal, Western European unity was, 
in fact, quite shattered. France and the United Kingdom were not bound 
together with the rest of Western Europe in any institutionalized 
structure, and both French and German nationalism was a will-o-the-
wisp.  
 The administration responded to this Western European 
fragmentation with the tripartite talks. The tripartite talks between 
Germany, Great Britain, and the US were also about the German offsets; 
however, the aim of keeping the alliance (and Western Europe) together 
was the underlying purpose. Furthermore, they served to keep the neo-
isolationists from getting an argument for troop withdrawals.433  
 In October 1966, the question of allied influence on the political 
‘area’ within NATO was forced on the agenda in Washington again. This 
time the Belgian foreign minister Pierre Harmel was the instigator. Prior 
the Harmel’s initiative in NATO to undertake a study about the issue, 
Harmel criticized the tripartite construct as the establishment of a 
precedent for settlement of problems directly between small groups of 
alliance members, thus a breach of alliance solidarity.  Ultimately it 
meant, according to Harmel, alliance dis-integration.  
 
European and West German Realignments  
De Gaulle’s intensive campaign against American leadership in Western 
Europe forced general questions about American leadership in Western 
Europe on the agenda in most Western European parliaments in the 
beginning of 1965, and the question of American leadership in Germany 
was, naturally, of prime importance to the Johnson administration.  To 
McGhee, the ambassador to Bonn, the question of the need for 
American leadership in Western Europe, was not really a question. De 
Gaulle was, according to McGhee, ready to fill out any power vacuum 
left by America in Western Europe, and clearly de Gaulle’s European 
scheme contradicted American aims and ‘designs’ for Europe. 
Furthermore, in the case of Germany – as long as the CDU/CSU was in 
power, ‘the French will be able … to bring great influence to bear on German policy 
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via internal German politics.’,434 thus, McGhee argued, a need for American 
control with events in Western Germany. 
 However, according to McGhee, American leadership in Germany 
rested on two paradoxical circumstances, namely on one hand the 
Germans resented ‘being told what they should do by us’ and on the other 
hand, Chancellor Erhard relied on the US to ‘set a course by which they can 
steer’. Indeed, McGhee argued, that a close American-German 
relationship in foreign policy was necessary even beyond matters 
exclusively relating to Germany, otherwise the German Chancellor 
Erhard was unable to fend off the Gaullists within his own 
government.435  
 The question was therefore not whether the US should ‘exert leadership 
over the Germans’,436 but rather how the US should avoid exerting pressure 
in areas where ‘US leadership is not likely materially to affect the course of events 
… without direct means of control or pressure’.437 However, West Germany had 
an instrumental value for American foreign policy ends. McGhee 
identified four policy areas in which the US should exert its leadership, 
namely NATO military strategy and force goals, the nuclear question, 
political relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the 
reunification question.438 These were all areas, in which America and 
West Germany were in agreement, according to McGhee, which would 
make American influence and ability to steer events in these policy areas 
easier and by the same token not invite Gaullist attacks on the policies.  
 This line of thinking was hardly a break  from past years’ politics, but 
rather a re-confirmation of the wisdom of exerting leadership over the 
Germans  for the benefit of American foreign policy ends and also, 
needless to say,  to contain Germany within the West. The need for 
American leadership in Germany was further reinforced as the German 
question was put on the agenda in Western Europe and Germany. In 
March, 1965, Rostow, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, reported 
to Rusk that American leadership in Germany  was indeed very much 
needed. In Germany, according to Rostow, there was a ‘widespread anxiety 
that, without US leadership that moves things forward again, even modestly, de 
Gaulle will gain in power.’439 Rostow estimated that without US leadership 
Germany would become ‘stronger and more nationally assertive’, however, 
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only Gaullist in ‘the sense that it will imitate de Gaulle in a more forthright use of 
German bargaining power vis-à-vis Washington, Paris, and Moscow.’.440 
 Although the West Germans, at least according to Rostow, preferred 
cooperation with the allies to German unilateralism, this possible 
assertiveness also emerged at a March APAG meeting as the German 
representative Müller-Roschach warned that if the alliance was unable to 
move on the German unity question, no matter how modest a 
movement, Germany would end up considering the entire reunification 
question ‘a domestic rather than international’ matter.441 Rostow also reported 
that the other allies called for multilateralism on the German question, 
and that the allies rejected and was dissatisfied with the hitherto 
‘monopolistic’ approach. Indeed, at the APAG meeting emerged ‘a quite 
strong sentiment to enlarge the role of NATO on the matter of German unity and a 
European security settlement.’442 The ‘familiar dilemma’ facing the US in 
Western Europe was, according to Rostow, that the whole alliance, and 
not just the members of the Quadripartite Group, had vital interests in 
the matter of German reunification and European security, and the allies 
argued that the ‘cost of the present system’ was that no one outside the 
exclusive quadripartite group had any responsibility nor influence on the 
policies or strategy for the unification of Germany. This was a clear 
reflection of the effect of the dual crisis, namely that Western Europe’s 
destiny so far had been managed by the super powers and not the 
Europeans. Rostow recommended that in order to overcome this 
‘dilemma’, that ‘if we can get anything like an agreement of the next year on an 
Alliance strategy towards German unity and a European settlement, either in the 
Quadripartite Group or as among the UK, Germany, and U.S.… we ought to widen 
parallel discussions in NATO – notably on the strategy as a whole and the non-
treaty aspects of that strategy (e.g., policy towards Eastern Europe).’443 Rostow did 
not neglect to recognize the difficulty with obtaining agreement in the 
quadripartite group, and suggested alternatively that an exclusive group 
of the US, UK, and Germany might agree to a strategy on the German 
question.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 In other words, the allies’ call for some sort of political role for 
NATO in this central political challenge for Western Europe was met by 
the administration with a scheme of rather limited scope, indeed ‘parallel 
discussion’, and not the multilateral solution the allies called for. The 
implicit premise for the allies’ suggestion was, much along the same lines 
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as de Gaulle’s claims, a critique of a certain monopolistic approach to the 
entire question, namely that the exclusive group had a superior and 
decision-making role at the expense of the rest of the allies even though 
they had an equal interest in the solution of the matter. Equally 
important, Rostow rejected this ‘strong sentiment’ out of hand when he 
maintained that the exclusive group of the UK, Germany, and the US, 
which Rostow was confident could agree, should maintain the exclusive 
decision-making capacity.  
 In other words, the US was not about to give up any freedom in 
foreign policy decision-making on the German question by including the 
rest of the allies. Belgian foreign minister Harmel would criticize the 
tripartite talks between the UK, Germany, and the US for ’monopoly’ in 
1966. Other considerations, such a getting 15 states to agree to a political 
strategy may very well be more difficult than getting three states to agree, 
may have had an influence on Rostow. However, the rejection of 
involving the entire alliance into this decisive political area was clearly 
based on other considerations, such as the freedom of action in foreign 
policy, as INR discussed in 1965 (see chapter 5).  
 Rostow further elaborated to Rusk on the German assertiveness, and 
argued that the recent ‘lesson’ the Germans had been taught, in 
connection with their unsuccessful sale of tanks to Israel was that it 
would be easier for Germany to navigate in the world without consulting 
US, and instead German policy should be based on ‘a nice, straightforward 
policy of national interest’.444 Rostow had replied to this ‘lesson’ by 
submitting a paper at the APAG meeting, in which he argued for 
consultation ‘on problems outside NATO area, if possible on multilateral basis 
but, if not, on US-German basis’.445  
 The idea behind this official suggestion to multilateralize the Alliance 
members’ relations beyond the treaty area through NATO was both to 
gain backing to the American effort in Vietnam and for the US to 
control the Germans. Indeed, this also extended to the rest of the allies 
in their dealings with the world beyond the NATO treaty area, as INR 
also argued as discussed in Chapter 5. Rostow argued about the nature of 
consultation towards out of treaty areas that the aim with the proposed 
consultation was not to ‘yield total uniformity of action by NATO members’446 
but instead, the aim was to on one hand control the allies, and on the 
other to maintain the American unilateralist position. Indeed, Rostow 
argued that the consultation should ‘produce: a. a common understanding of the 
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problems involved and the common vital interests at stake; b. collective or individual 
policies designed to reflect that understanding and those interests at stake, with the 
subsequent conduct of each member to be determined by the special character of his 
limitations and possibilities for action in the area.’447 This challenge of on one 
hand controlling the European allies and on the other maintaining the 
American unilateralism in the alliance should prove to be the greatest 
challenge in Western Europe to the Johnson administration in these 
years. 
 Rostow also proposed, to overcome the immediate strains in the US-
German relationship, that Johnson ‘gave a statement on [German] unity’448 on 
V - E Day. Johnson did commit the US to German unity on May 7, 
1965;449 however, Johnson also re-committed the US to America’s 
traditional Western European policy when he reiterated the basic 
premises for America’s relationship with Western Europe was Western 
European unity and Atlantic partnership. At the same time, Johnson 
rejected any Gaullist schemes, indeed, LBJ warned in his speech that 
‘there are some efforts today to replace partnership with suspicion, and the drive 
toward unity with a policy of division’,450 and characterized this as ‘narrow 
nationalism’ that had ‘torn and bloodied’ the past, and Johnson also warned 
that this trend could mean a return to isolationism in America. There 
was apparently no doubt in the White House that Gaullism constituted a 
return to European power politics. It followed from this orthodoxy that 
Johnson did not suggest any schemes or recognized the allies’ calls for 
some sort of expanded role of NATO into the political area, e.g. 
German unification or a European settlement. On the contrary, LBJ 
exclusively talked about military matters in relation to NATO.  
 INR picked up on Western Europe’s apparent wish for some sort of 
political role for NATO in relation to German re-unification in the fall 
of 1965 and the apparent need for a close American-German 
relationship as the Policy Planning Council had argued for.  
 INR did not interpret developments in Western Europe as 
demanding more political consultation as Rostow did, rather Hughes, the 
director of INR, concluded, much along the same lines as earlier, that 
NATO ‘has become equally important as a political system which, under US 
‘presidency’, provides the best available structure for regulating the inter-relationships 
of its members and, particularly, for handling the ‘German problem.’ These 
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considerations promise the alliance a long life – provided that it continues … to serve 
the political functions regarding West Germany.’451   
 INR arrived at this conclusion by arguing that although the allies 
professed to German unity, they in fact feared German unity would 
upset the harmonious balance of power in Western Europe, or, more 
urgent, that the West German quest for unification could either spark a 
new war in Europe or result in serious Western concessions to the USSR 
for unification.452 In the face of these bleak perspectives, INR argued 
that the European allies believed that the loss of progress in the Western 
European integration process, mostly caused by de Gaulle, brought the 
containment of Western Germany in Western European structures into 
question, thus the allies looked to the US and the Atlantic structure to 
handle the Germans. INR seemed in agreement with this apparent 
Western European contention about German unification. Indeed, 
according to INR, if the ‘prospects for reunification improve, the intra-West 
European political system which has emerged since the late 1940s would, at the least, 
face its most serious threat to date’,453. Furthermore, the allies wanted ‘the US to 
remain deeply involved in German affairs. They want the US to maintain intimate 
ties to German defense and to be the main spokesman for the West in any future 
dealings with the East on German reunification’.454  
 INR concluded that the alliance remained an ‘indispensible 
instrument’ for political stability in Western Europe, but also, that the 
Alliance was ‘dependent on the maintenance of the same approximate balance [in 
Western Europe]… therefore is the application of firm US support and restrain on 
the promotion of the various and, at times, divergent national interests of the 
European members’ necessary.455 INR, in other words, continued to argue 
that NATO was, much out of necessity, a political means for the US to 
balance Western Europe and counter the European reason of state and 
INR believed that this constituted an American ‘presidency’ within the 
alliance in foreign policy  affairs of Western Europe. This was quite 
contrary to the allies’ call for political influence on how to handle the 
German problem as Rostow had reported, and INR neglected to 
consider the ‘familiar dilemma’ of the monopolist approach to the 
German problem.  
Although INR argued that the German problem had gained 
momentum in Western Europe, even to the extent that it pertained to all 
questions the European allies were raising on alliance matters,456 the 
Policy Planning Council was calmer, and argued that Germany would be 
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returned to the agenda as the most central of issues between East and 
West at some point.457 Turning to the question of the prospects for a 
reunification, the Council argued that the West, including Germany and 
the US, could do nothing to bring about a German reunification, in fact, 
the US did not need a reunification policy, as reunification was utopian, 
instead the US needed a policy towards Western Germany to maintain 
Germany as ‘the asset it is today’.458   
 The Council argued that neither of the different approaches towards 
German unification held in the administration, addressed the real issue, 
namely reducing the overriding interest especially Poland and the Soviet 
Union had in the continued division of Germany. The council argued 
that none of the Western approaches could do the trick.459  The Soviet 
Union had larger-than-life ideological interests at stake, and Poland ‘had 
no desire once again to serve as the shuttlecock in a Russian-German power 
contest’.460 Therefore, the council argued, what was really at stake for the 
US was the ‘vitally important relations with the Federal Republic’.461 Indeed, the 
US-West German relationship had to be handled with ‘all priority, care, and 
delicacy’ even though the Germans were not about, as the European allies 
believed, to cut a deal with the Soviet Union or otherwise act 
hazardously. Rather, the danger lay in a potentially political 
‘demoralization’ and internal division, which would make Germany a 
‘burden and a problem’ for the West.462  
 Indeed much rested on  good relations between West Germany and 
the US, and the Council warned, as the Empty Chair Crisis raged, how 
European integration schemes and other institutionalizing efforts could 
result in divisions within the West, which in turn could force the 
Germans to take sides and even persuade them that German national 
interests were not served with Western association and, in fact, ‘the precise 
institutional forms of West Germany’s association with the West are less important 
than that she be a part of a West which is as politically united as possible’.463 This 
thinking was in line with INR’s claim that the real problem between the 
US and the European allies in the wake of the European rehabilitation 
was how to make minds meet across the Atlantic.464 
 The question about German unity was therefore a somewhat pseudo 
question in the American administration in 1965. The State 
Department’s two bureaus, the INR and Policy Planning Council, agreed 
that the real question was how to maintain and develop the vital 
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American-German relationship and exert leadership over German 
foreign policy as German assertiveness became stronger and threatened 
to become the most serious challenge to the European integration 
scheme and therefore the West. Indeed, INR maintained that NATO 
served a primary purpose of balancing Western Europe, which was faced 
with the most upsetting prospect, namely that of German unification. 
 They also agreed on NATO’s instrumental value in the face of a 
broader tendency of realignment within the alliance. The Council argued 
that NATO could be used to control both Germany and the rest of the 
allies in their out of treaty area policies. Rostow introduced a concept to 
handle the Western European assertiveness in outside treaty area 
matters, namely political consultation in the alliance that would prevent 
the European allies from pursuing policies that collided with the 
alliance’s and America’s interest, without compromising the US freedom 
of action in foreign policy by avoiding a complete uniform policy. This 
concept became the US standpoint at the Harmel exercise during 1967. 
 However, the allies’ call for multilateralism on the German and 
European question was not accommodated. Rather Rostow’s concept of 
‘parallel discussions’ in NATO appeared to be the only response at this 
point in time.   
 In the summer of 1965 Johnson and McNamara held a series of 
meetings with the German Chancellor Erhard in which cordial and 
mutually reassuring exchanges took place,465 and it appears as if the 
German unity question disappeared from the agenda in Washington until 
December 1965, when the Policy Planning Council raised the question 
again, this time in the light of the ‘processes of change going on in Eastern 
Europe and the USSR’.466 These changes made the prospect for a German 
reunification even bleaker, according to the Council, as the Soviet Union 
had reasons ‘beyond Germany itself’ for refusing unification, as the Kremlin 
was losing authority in Eastern Europe a united Germany would weaken 
it further.467  
 
Germany divided indefinitely? 
Although the Council repeated its conclusion from August 1965, that no 
prospects for any Western initiative gaining reunification were at hand, 
and the US should groom the vital relationship with Germany instead, 
the Council suggested, in December 1965, in a less hopeless and 
pessimistic line of thought than in the August report, that the American 
grand strategy should aim at ‘creating preconditions which might, should the 
political forces bearing on the German problem change, help to promote a settlement 
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favorable to Western interests.’468 Among these preconditions were the 
‘strengthening the liberal political order in West Germany. Another is further advance 
toward economic and political unity in Western Europe – on the theory that it might 
be easier eventually to draw East Germany into such an association than it would be 
simply to annex it to a German national state’469 and lastly the Council 
suggested ‘knitting ties of interest’ between Eastern and Western Europe, in 
particular between West Germany and Poland and Czechoslovakia.  The 
Council concluded that although this might not result in any 
reunification, these initiatives ‘to the extent these aims can be realized, the West 
is also placed in the best position to live with a divided Germany indefinitely if 
necessary.’470  
 Thus, the Council’s idealist plan for a settlement did not presuppose 
a unification of Germany, rather it could be argued that despite a policy 
on ‘the strategic plane’ the Council maintained that a German unification 
was somewhat utopian and therefore the administration needed a viable 
policy towards the FRG, and in addition, a policy that both served the 
purpose of relieving the unification process if developments turned 
favorably, and, more importantly, made an indefinite division of 
Germany acceptable to Western Germany, and the rest of the Western 
world. Thus, by December 1965, the Council maintained that the US 
essentially did not need a policy aimed at reunification of Germany.  
 Foy Kohler, the ambassador to Moscow, commented on the 
Council’s analysis, and while agreeing with the argument that making 
West Germany part of a fully united West was ‘the best position to live with a 
divided Germany indefinitely’,471 Kohler argued that it was mistaken to 
conclude it would make an eventual reunification easier. Instead Kohler 
claimed that ‘a price will have to be paid for German reunification, and the greater 
the assets on the Western side (I have in mind those resulting from the economic and 
military integration of the FRG), the higher the Soviet demands are likely to be and 
the more difficult it will be for us the relinquish them’,472 indeed, this was ‘precisely 
the dilemma that makes the problem of German reunification so agonizing from our 
standpoint, and I am afraid the paper fails to deal with it.’473 The Council’s 
efforts to devise a long term scenario and a component long term US 
strategy was, in other words, failing to grasp the real problem, as seen 
from Moscow at least, namely that an integration of Germany into the 
West made it even more difficult to envision a reunification. Kohler, in 
fact, argued that America’s policy towards Germany of containing and 
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tying Germany into the West had been mistaken if the goal was to 
reunite the two Germanies.  
 The question of German reunification stranded with these apparent 
unsolvable dilemmas, only to reappear as part of the bigger problem that 
Western Europe would turn into, seen from Washington at least, as de 
Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated command, and 
Washington realized that Western Europe was way ahead of America in 
their relations with Eastern Europe, all of which happened in the spring 
1966. 
 
Reforming NATO 
The French ‘Attack’ 
When de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated command in 
March 1966, it came as no surprise to the administration. However, as 
Brands argues, by withdrawing France from the integrated command ‘de 
Gaulle demonstrated that Europe was entering a new era. Of necessity 
America entered the same new era’.474 Schwartz argues that in response 
to de Gaulle’s withdrawal, Johnson ‘assumed the role of a statesman, 
determined to rally the alliance behind his leadership to regroup and 
reform NATO for the new challenge of détente.’475 Taken together these 
two statements are more to the point. However, they both fail to 
recognize the decisive role the other European allies had in this process 
towards reorganizing the alliance.   
 On one hand, de Gaulle’s withdrawal signaled that a new era in the 
transatlantic relationship and NATO indeed had begun. The Western 
European allies had for some time called for multilateralism as the 
guiding principle in NATO on the central subject of a European 
settlement, which signified this new era, and immediately after the 
French withdrawal the British Prime Minister Wilson argued that the 
time had come for a restructuring of the alliance. This was also with an 
eye to a détente with the Eastern bloc. On the other hand, the question 
of how détente figured in the Johnson administration has become 
increasingly more central to any study of the 1960s. Schwartz’s claim 
reflects the interpretation that the Johnson administration had a clear cut 
policy and wish for a détente with the East, and that American 
leadership was necessary to bring the European allies into line with this 
essentially American end, and for that purpose a reform of NATO was 
launched.  However, as Wilson’s letter to Johnson shows, détente and a 
reform of NATO was not an exclusively American invention. In fact, 
there was a European pull towards a détente and reform of NATO even 
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before the French withdrawal as the APAG meeting in 1965 and the 
increased trade and exchanges between Eastern and Western Europe 
during the early 1960s revealed.     
 Johnson’s immediate concern was on one hand that de Gaulle’s 
withdrawal would create an anti-French backlash in Congress, which 
could evolve into a genuine anti-Europe backlash, and on the other hand 
that the French withdrawal could result in alliance dis-integration.476 
However, Johnson also saw the French withdrawal as an opportunity, 
according to Schwartz, to ‘solve many alliance related issues’.477 
However, the urge to solve alliance related problems was not reflecting a 
certain level of clear-visioned leadership, but rather as an urge out of 
necessity. 
 On April 22, 1966 LBJ issued NSAM 345 to the departments of State 
and Defense, and asked for nuclear planning and the development of 
‘forward looking proposals that would increase the cohesion of NATO and the North 
Atlantic community. These should embrace two kinds of measures: a. military and 
non-military programs affecting primarily the affairs of the free world; b. Constructive 
political, diplomatic, and economic initiatives addressed to Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union’.478 Johnson’s dual aim was therefore both a détente with the 
Eastern bloc, and more important for this dissertation’s hypothesis, 
measurers that addressed the alliance, including nuclear planning. These 
were two separate matters. The White House appointed the so-called 
Acheson Committee, a combined Department of State and Department 
of Defense group headed by the former Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson, to come up with a response to de Gaulle’s withdrawal, the 
contemplated alliance disintegration, and to study the future of the 
alliance in the light of this very withdrawal, and the much feared anti-
European backlash. The backlash came with the Mansfield Resolution in 
August 1966, which called for substantial troop reductions in Western 
Europe.  
 The NATO crisis culminated in December 1966. Indeed, the CIA in 
concurrence with the Department of State believed that the forthcoming 
NATO ministerial meeting ‘promises to be the beginning of the first fundamental 
reassessment of the Alliance since it was established in 1949’,479 and as a matter 
of fact, it was at this meeting the Harmel exercise was launched and 
McNamara’s Select Committee was transformed into the permanent 
Nuclear Planning Group. Although much of the NATO crisis and the 
subsequent transformation of the transatlantic relationship can be 
contributed de Gaulle’s deviation, the European allies had called for 
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multilateralism, as already evident with the German question. The 
initiatives such as the Acheson Committee and the measures LBJ 
requested with NSAM 345 did, therefore, not exclusively come about as 
a result of American thinking alone, they were also a response to 
Western European demands for a ‘reconstruction’ or reexamination of 
the alliance. Especially the British Labour government led by Wilson and 
the conservative opposition led by Edward Heath were active 
proponents for both a reconstruction and a reconfiguration of the 
alliance towards détente with the Eastern bloc. 
 
The British Impact 
Immediately after de Gaulle officially withdrew France from NATO’s 
integrated command and sent his official Memorandum to the allies on 
March 11th, 1966,  the British prime minister Wilson sent his preliminary 
thoughts on the matter to Johnson, and stated that the French 
withdrawal presented an excellent opportunity for a ‘radical examination of 
its [NATO’s] structure, force levels, and financial arrangements’480 and when 
bringing the structure ‘up to date’ it should be done with an eye to a 
détente with the Eastern bloc.481  Wilson warned that if the alliance 
overcompensated for the French withdrawal, the allies risked making the 
détente more difficult.  
 Although the overall reconstruction of the alliance would turn out to 
be a most pressing issue, Francis Bator, Johnson’s National Security 
Advisor, mostly focused on Wilson’s remarks on Germany in his memo 
to Johnson, reflecting the overall importance Johnson and his advisors 
attached to Germany. According to Bator, Wilson addressed both 
German reunification and most important the nuclear question. Bator 
believed that Wilson argued that the US should ‘encourage the Germans to 
work harder for an East-West détente, and thereby for reunification, and to spend less 
time trying to get their hands on nuclear weapons’.482 Secretary of State Rusk 
disagreed and argued that Wilson instead by implication suggested ‘a 
bilateral effort on the part of our two countries to impose a solution on the Germans’ 
483 on the nuclear question. Despite the internal disagreement on what 
Wilson indeed meant, Wilson, in fact, suggested tripartite talks between 
the UK, Germany, and the US on nuclear matters, these talks would 
proceed in August 1966, and it may even be possible to argue that the 
tripartite talks to a large extent was a British invention, rather than, as 
Schwartz argues, a purely American invention, which Johnson offered 
                                                 
480 Wilson to Johnson, Mar., 21, 1966. LBJL, NSF, France, box 177 (1of2).  
481 Wilson to Johnson, Mar., 21, 1966. LBJL, NSF, France, box 177 (1of2). 
482 Bator to Johnson, Mar., 22, 1966. LBJL, NSF, France, box 177 (1of2). 
483 Rusk to Johnson, Mar. 21, 1966. LBJL, NSF, France, box 177 (1of2). 
133 
 
Erhard in the wake of the financial problems FRG had.484 Johnson 
decided to reply in a ‘soft’ manner to Wilson warning against putting 
strains on the Germans.485 The fear of German assertiveness was also 
practiced in the White House, and Johnson probably believed that the 
Policy Planning Council was right, when it stated that the primary 
objective with US policy towards West Germany was to remain as close 
as possible.   
 Although the White House exclusively addressed the German matter 
in the reply to Wilson, Rusk suggested a much lengthier and substantive 
reply to Wilson that revealed the State Department’s thinking on the 
entire subject matter of NATO organization, which Rusk already had 
forecasted in May, 1965, in the wake of the French challenge to 
NATO.486 Indeed, ‘sounder organization of NATO’s structure, forces and 
financial arrangements will be useful and important. Something more is necessary to 
add strength, purpose and cohesion after de Gaulle’s assault’,487 and ‘a détente with 
the East and the strengthening of NATO seem to me two sides of the same coin. We 
in the West can make progress toward a settlement with the East only by maintaining 
and improving our collective strength both to deter and to bargain.’ [with the USSR 
on the German question]488 Rusk also suggested that as Wilson’s 
assumption was that de Gaulle’s actions offered opportunities, ‘ways and 
means must be found in London, Bonn and Washington. I look forward to your 
further suggestions’.489 There were, in other words, a correlation in the 
thinking between the State Department and the Wilson government, at 
least on the need for some sort of restructuring of NATO and NATOs 
relationship to a détente, and the tripartite approach.  
 On the same day, Secretary Rusk sent out a telegram to all NATO 
capitals interpreting Johnson’s statement on de Gaulle’s actions. Johnson 
had claimed that they ‘raise grave questions regarding the whole relationship 
between the responsibilities and benefits of the alliance’.490 To Rusk, this meant 
that de Gaulle had chosen a ‘second class position’ for France in the 
alliance, and ‘this second-class position will be dramatized if we can demonstrate, 
after French obstructionism has been removed from NATO, that the organization 
will move vigorously forward to become an effective instrument for military security and 
play an important role in developing a common European policy for the alliance’.491 
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On March 29 1966, Wilson sent his expanded and further thoughts 
on the problems de Gaulle had brought on the alliance. De Gaulle’s ‘19th 
century nationalism … and his bull in a china shop tactics’492 was a danger to the 
alliance however, Wilson argued. ‘it would be wrong to conclude from all this 
that all the General’s thoughts are wrong-headed, his assessments of the way the world 
is moving completely wide off the mark and that everything he is trying to do is totally 
unacceptable to all of us’.493 Wilson then went on to argue that de Gaulle’s 
propositions that the nature of threat from the Soviet Union had 
changed, and that, since the danger had decreased, the West should 
follow a policy of détente with the Soviet Union, were in fact correct. 
Wilson also argued that ‘the opportunity that now exists for all of us to re-
examine the structure and the purposes of NATO also provides an opportunity for 
Germany to reassess her legitimate national objectives’.494 Although the message 
about a re-examination of both the structure and purpose of the alliance 
was somehow veiled in the German question, it was nevertheless a 
radical new approach to the alliance Wilson suggested that ran counter to 
the hitherto strategy that had prevailed in the administration throughout 
1965, that is to work around de Gaulle and maintain the alliance in its 
original 1940s dressing.  Wilson also came clean as to the nuclear 
question and Germany. He ruled out a hardware solution because it 
would hinder a reunification, and suggested instead ‘that we should work 
now for a solution of the NATO nuclear problem which will meet the German need 
for a share in the consultative and decision-making process’,495 much along the 
same lines as McNamara’s Select Committee, as discussed in chapter 4. 
The fundamental and almost all-encompassing scope of Wilson’s 
‘background’ thoughts was not wasted on the White House; Bator 
commented to Johnson that ‘since the message has implications for the full range 
of our policies vis-à-vis Europe and the Soviets, the reply will require some careful 
work’.496   
 The British activism puzzled both the American ambassador to 
London, Bruce and probably the rest of the administration.497 In April 
the CIA argued that the British activism rested partly on their position as 
‘stand-patters par excellence so far as the alliance is concerned’,498 their belief that 
NATO was necessary means to keep the US in Europe, that NATO was 
a means for extending British influence via the special relationship on 
the continent, and ‘above all’ NATO was the mechanism which controlled 
                                                 
492 Wilson to Johnson, Mar. 29, 1966. LBJL, NSF, France, box 177 (1of2). 
493 Wilson to Johnson, Mar. 29, 1966. LBJL, NSF, France, box 177 (1of2). 
494 Wilson to Johnson, Mar. 29, 1966. LBJL, NSF, France, box 177 (1of2). 
495 Wilson to Johnson, Mar. 29, 1966. LBJL, NSF, France, box 177 (1of2). 
496 Bator to Johnson, Mar. 29, 1966. LBJL, NSF, France, box 177 (1of2). 
497 Bruce to Rusk forwarded to Johnson, mar. 21, 1966. LBJL, NSF, France, box 177 
(1of2). 
498 CIA, Apr. 2, 1966. LBJL, NSF, France, box 177 (1of2). 
135 
 
and kept Germany tied in.499 However, the CIA also argued that US 
‘reservations as to the precise identity of US and British views regarding every aspect of 
the crisis of the Alliance and how it should be handled may still be in order’ indeed, 
the Conservative Heath had argued that there was a need to restructure 
the balance between Europe and the US in NATO, and that the allies, in 
fact, should work this out with France.500 As for the governing Labour 
Party the ‘desire for disarmament and distrust of Germany’501 was very much 
real, and Labour was even less likely to let a hardware solution pass, in 
fact, ‘if Paris shows any signs of wavering, London [Labor]may see greater advantage 
in pragmatic arrangements to keep the French tied in some way to NATO’.502  
 Whereas there was some uncertainty about the British errand, the 
CIA argued that the rest of the allies was also somewhat in flux, indeed, 
the CIA concluded that ‘On balance it would therefore appear that we face in 
NATO a crisis of indeterminate length and uncertain outcome – and one which has 
the potential for changing in a massive way the whole European outlook’.503 
 
Responses to the NATO Crisis 
The Nuclear Issue 
Wilson’s response to de Gaulle’s withdrawal put the ‘full range of our policies 
vis-à-vis Europe’, as Bator expressed it to Johnson, on the agenda in 
Washington, and one of the most urgent issues was the question of 
nuclear sharing. However, the British Prime Minister was not the only 
Western European ally that argued for a solution to the endless nuclear 
problem, the Dutch ambassador had ‘urged’ the State Department to 
take up the matter ‘since France has made the discussion possible’.504 And this 
was exactly what de Gaulle’s withdrawal made possible, as discussed in 
chapter 4 and 5, the administration’s fear of the German Gaullists in 
CDU/CSU had ultimately restrained the Johnson administration from 
pursuing a solution to the nuclear problem. Indeed, the prospects of a 
Gaullist take-over in Western Germany had effectively stopped any 
discussion of any nuclear issue, and only McNamara’s Select Committee 
had had a chance against Gaullist attacks because the Select Committee 
was entangled in NATO and not subjected to a possible French veto. As 
de Gaulle had withdrawn from the Integrated Command the French 
President had also given up on a certain political leverage, which INR 
talked about in the spring 1965.505 Nonetheless, the administration was 
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still somewhat anxious about providing the German Gaullists 
ammunition in the nuclear issue even after the French withdrawal.506 
 The National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 345 issued in 
April 22, 1966 was the first response from Johnson to the NATO crisis. 
Rostow, who by March 31, 1966 had left as Chairman for State 
Department’s Policy Planning Council to become Special Assistant to 
Johnson for National Security Affairs507 proposed the NSAM. Rostow’s 
proposal, which was backed by the entire administration namely, 
McNamara (Defense), Ball (State), Bator (White House), and Acheson 
(LBJs confidant and former Secretary of State 1949-53), it summed up 
the interim position across departments on the nuclear question in 
particular and the more vaguely formulated ‘greater equality of partnership 
with the U.S.’.508 Rostow proposed the NSAM to on one hand find a 
solution to the nuclear issue, and on the other hand find measures to 
increase the cohesion of the alliance. The departments of State and 
Defense responses to the NSAM were, according to Rostow, the point 
of departure for a response to Wilson’s letter.  
 On the nuclear question the administration agreed that the matter 
had to be resolved, and that the administration ‘must concentrate urgently on 
the design of arrangements for nuclear consultation’  to make it ‘as effective an item 
in our policy as can be done’.509From there, Rostow argued, the 
administration could ‘cautiously feel our way on the hardware issue.’510 Although 
it hardly constituted a disagreement on substance but rather on means, 
the European clause divided the administration. McNamara argued that 
the European clause should be explicitly excluded already when 
examining the possibilities for a NATO nuclear force, whereas Ball and 
Rostow argued that it would be politically dangerous to explicitly exclude 
this from the beginning, as it might play into the hands of Gaullists. 
Instead Rostow suggested that the administration should ‘have an 
understanding … that we would quietly work against it [the European clause] in our 
negotiations’.511 The orthodox position on the nuclear matter reflected that 
the question of equality within the alliance could not, in fact, be realized 
in the nuclear field. Instead what the foreign policy staff across 
departments agreed upon was that with the French withdrawal from the 
integrated command, the UK and Germany had to be pulled closer 
together to provide the political basis for an integrated deterrent towards 
the USSR. This was the way, according to Rostow, to look at the nuclear 
issue.512 In April 1966, Rostow, Rusk and McNamara individually 
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suggested tripartite talks, probably inspired by Wilson, as one way to 
bring these two parties closer together.513  
 The second part of the NSAM aimed at increasing Alliance cohesion 
and how to reach out to Eastern bloc. The idea behind increasing 
alliance cohesion was, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, based on the 
premise that if other allies followed the French example and rejected the 
principle of integration, the alliance would fragment. In the 
administration’s thinking, the integration principle stood between a 
return to the European power politics and the current status quo of a 
balanced Western Europe. Rostow, however, added another argument. 
According to Rostow in the ‘best circumstances’ the Alliance would be 
weakened after the regrouping of the alliance in the wake of the French 
withdrawal, and Rostow claimed that for the European parliaments and 
Congress to ‘back our policy of maintaining an integrated NATO, they will need 
to believe that we are not simply defending our ideas of the late 1940s but recognizing 
two real factors on the present scene and looking into the future’514 namely, as 
Wilson had pointed out, ‘the desire in Europe for greater equality of partnership 
with the US’, and the calls for a détente with the Eastern bloc.  
 
The Political Bargain 
Rostow and Rusk thus considered the question of ‘equality’ and political 
consultation, which Wilson and other European allies had brought 
forward during 1965 and 1966, as equally important to the nuclear 
question because it, in fact, pertained to NATO’s deterrent capability. 
Indeed, in Rostow’s argument ‘equality of partnership’ was something 
the US should grant the allies to maintain the integrated structure, and 
therefore a credible deterrent. The same argument was the reason why, 
Rostow argued, the administration should recognize ‘the potentialities offered 
by changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for moving in the direction of 
normalizing East-West relations.’515 Rostow’s argument was a response to 
the very situation in the alliance, which CIA’s analysis of the NATO 
‘crisis’ that followed from Wilson’s extended response to de Gaulle’s 
withdrawal, had characterized as ‘of indeterminate length’ and having  
the potential to change the European position on the integration 
principle. This was the main reason for Rostow’s preoccupation with 
getting the European parliaments to back the American ‘policy of 
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maintaining the integrated command’.516 In other words, political consultation, 
which would grant some sort of equality, and ‘normalizing East-West 
relations’ was a bargain: the US would offer the European allies political 
consultation in return for backing to the principle of integration, the very 
heart of NATO as Rusk had put it in 1964.517  Thus, the immediate 
reaction from the Johnson administration to the crisis that de Gaulle had 
brought on by the withdrawal from the integrated command was 
essentially to get the European allies to recommit to the idea of the late 
1940s, which the State Department already had proposed with the draft 
NSAM of September 1965.518 Indeed, in 1965 the idea had been to force 
the European allies to take a stand on especially the integration principle 
in the light of de Gaulle’s loud critique of integration in the alliance, and, 
as argued in Chapter 5, the challenge from de Gaulle had, in fact, 
initiated a process of reframing the rejection of the European reason of 
state anno 1960s on the part of the Johnson administration.   
 The question, however, remains if the ambitions to grant more 
equality and political consultation were genuine, or exclusive a strategy to 
maintain a complete and convincing backing to the integration principle 
from the European allies?  Rostow told Johnson that ‘there is a correct 
feeling [within the foreign policy staff] that we need more partnership in the Atlantic 
on issues like … political consultation … more East-West bridge building by 
Atlantic nations’.519 Was it, in fact, an omen for a retreat from the 
unilateralist position? 
 The collective Department of State and Department of Defense 
response to Johnson’s call for proposals to increase the cohesion of 
NATO and the North Atlantic Community was quite traditional in its 
reading of the purpose of NATO and America’s role in the alliance. The 
Acheson Committee, which was headed Johnson’s confidant Dean 
Acheson, argued, much in line with Wilson’s observations, that Germany 
and a possible détente with Eastern Europe was one of  the most central 
areas of interest in the light of the ‘disintegrating forces’ in the alliance de 
Gaulle had sparked.520  The Committee argued that the most serious 
outcome of recent events would be if Germany decided to withdraw 
from the integrated structure and shift to a ‘similar’ unilateralism as de 
Gaulle. The main priority was therefore to keep Germany in the 
integrated structure. State and Defense further argued, that even though 
the Soviet threat had diminished as a consequence of the military 
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strength of NATO, alliance cohesion would rest ‘quite as much on its 
political basis. In short, NATO is not merely a military structure to prepare a 
collective defense against military aggression, but also a political organization to 
preserve the peace of Europe’ indeed, ’As long as the German problem remains the 
chief danger point, the basic political function of the alliance is the collective 
management of the German-Soviet relationship in the unsettled Central European 
setting‘[Bator’s underlining].521 Controlling Germany, in other words, 
continued to be a primary reason for NATO.  
 The Committee also argued that NATO served to control the 
European allies’ outreach to the Eastern bloc – the European détente, 
much in line with the motivations for the 1964 bridge building policy:  
‘implementing NATO’s political function is central to its cohesion during the present 
strains. The first step is to bring home to the NATO allies the need for an agreed 
NATO policy regarding the division of Europe and … Germany’ [Bator’s 
underlining],522 indeed, according to the memo the European allies had 
‘very little understanding that all this [detente] is meaningless unless action stems from 
an agreed policy for healing the division of Europe and Germany on a sound, equal, 
and lasting basis.’523 Contrary to 1964, this line of thinking now had 
resonance in the White House, as Bator’s underlining reflects. The 
Acheson Committee however, had reservations and somewhat 
contradicted their proposal and line of thinking; they warned, implicitly 
against a softening the deterrence posture, that the agreed NATO policy 
should ‘not be identified too closely with NATO. NAT is a military treaty. A 
more flexible Western policy will be vulnerable to Soviet attack and Eastern 
European suspicion if this policy and NATO are tied together.’524 In addition, 
another danger with a concerted Western policy was that the allies could 
eventually use détente as an excuse for cutting down on their defense 
budgets. On the other side of the iron curtain, the Committee warned 
that the Eastern bloc might perceive détente as yet another attempt to 
roll-back communism. Indeed that ‘would be a misfortune as it would defeat the 
purpose of the policy [to control the allies] and open us to an effective propaganda 
charge that the US lags behind its allies in opening peaceful intercourse across the 
division of Europe’.525  
 In essence, the Committee argued that an exclusive European 
détente movement could damage not only alliance and alliance cohesion, 
but also the US position in the Eastern bloc countries. The US, as a 
matter of fact, lagged behind its European allies. The American 
initiatives, which the Committee proposed towards the Eastern 
countries, were designed to keep up with Western Europe, and deal 
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‘effectively and quickly with those aspects of our own behavior that set us apart and 
make us the most restrictive member of the Western community.’526 The latter 
perspective was relayed to Johnson at the meeting that resulted in 
NSAM 352 Bridge Building, which indeed, requested a collective 
Western bridge building effort instead of the Western European practice 
of bilateralism.  
 
Following the French withdrawal from the integrated command the 
administration faced a true challenge in their relations not only with 
France but also the rest of the European allies. The administration 
quickly realized however, that to preserve the fundamental integration 
principle, they had to strike a bargain with the European allies. Rostow, 
argued that in return for European backing to this principle the 
European allies would get political consultation within the alliance and a 
promise to move the alliance towards ‘normalizing’ the relationship 
between East and West.  
 The Acheson committee stressed the alliance’s political function, 
namely managing Germany, and that the implementation of this political 
function was very much needed to preserve alliance cohesion. The 
Acheson Committee also stressed that the alliance ultimately served to 
control the allies in their effort to reach out to Eastern Europe. Thus, 
the administration did, in fact, respond to the crisis with an effort to 
maintain the traditional purpose of the alliance, that is managing 
Germany and tying Western Europe into an integrated military alliance.  
 The Acheson Committee’s line of thinking also, in fact, preempted 
the Harmel formula of 1967. The Committee essentially argued that 
NATO along with its classic military posture, i.e., deterrence should 
move into the area of easing tension between East and West. Indeed, the 
Acheson Committee continuously stressed the need for the move into 
the political field and the need for a coordinated NATO policy towards 
the East on the premise that the deterrence was upheld. However, the 
Acheson Committee’s motivation for this move and establishment of 
dual purpose of NATO differed somewhat from the Harmel proposal, 
as the committee argued this line of policy as primarily a means to 
contain the European allies’ Eastern policies and maintain alliance 
cohesion, and not to overcome the Cold War in Europe.   
 At the same time it was evident that equality within the alliance had 
its limits. On the nuclear question the US maintained its policy of 
detachment.  
 Thus, mostly because European allies believed, contrary to the 
Johnson administration, that the military raison d’être for the alliance 
had diminished, the Johnson administration applied a political raison 
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d’être. This call for moving the alliance away from the strictly military 
field into the political field was demanded by Western Europe rather 
than the US, indeed, both the British Prime Minister Wilson, the Belgian 
Foreign Minister Harmel,527 and the allies at the APAG meeting as early 
as in March 1965, had called for moving the alliance into the political 
area and called for a reexamination of the purpose of the alliance.  
 The move towards more political consultation, equality, and a 
détente with the East was impelled upon the administration as it believed 
consultation would counter alliance disintegration. The Johnson 
administration, mostly the Department of State, had also questioned the 
then purpose of the alliance in several studies in 1964-1965 in the light of 
de Gaulle’s excesses, and it was therefore not surprising that the 
response to de Gaulle’s withdrawal amounted to this move into the 
political field.  
 The question remained, though, exactly how this ‘agreed NATO 
policy’ towards the East and the political equality should come about, 
and if, in fact, it would be a genuine attempt to move from unilateralism 
to multilateralism as the guiding principle for the Atlantic partnership. 
The Acheson group failed to come up with proposals to this end, 
although they forecasted that Johnson could give a speech by September 
1966 to announce that ‘the time will have come for the inauguration of a new 
chapter in the life of NATO’.528 
 
An Agreed NATO Policy? 
The State Department’s Policy Planning Council however, came up with 
a proposal which called ‘for NATO to act as a clearing house and coordinating 
point for East-West contacts’529 as the CIA characterized it a few months 
later, in December 1966. These deliberations did not go into the 
Acheson Committee’s proposal, rather it was a response to the 
continued Western European calls for some sort of action in the East-
West field, and the German calls for a reunification strategy within 
NATO, and a response to the possible Warsaw Pact proposal for a 
European security conference, which the council believed was on the 
horizon in the spring 1966.  
 Henry Owen of the Policy Planning Council argued that Rusk, at the 
Brussels Ministerial Meeting later in the same month (May), should 
deliver a major speech on East-West relations, putting forward that 
NATO had met the Soviet challenge and now the time had come for 
NATO to seek ‘to create an environment in which the division of Germany and 
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Europe can be healed’,530 much in line with the Western allies’ thinking as 
displayed in Wilson’s letters and at the March, 1965, APAG meeting. 
The envisioned strategy to this end was to ‘encourage’ change in Eastern 
Europe by increased trade, exchanges across the Iron Curtain, and 
security guarantees. However, the message Owen urged Rusk to deliver 
to the European allies at the NATO ministerial meeting was one of close 
concert. Accordingly, Rusk should argue for ‘close concert in shaping and 
carrying out this strategy - both among the FRG and the three Western powers with 
special responsibility for Germany, and within NATO as a whole.’531 And once 
the strategy was agreed upon ‘all should agree to work closely together in carrying 
it out; no steps should be taken without the closest consultation’. 532  Furthermore, 
Rusk should bring forward that in the immediate period ahead ‘there will 
be intensive discussions between interested countries – looking to agreement both on 
this broad strategy and on arrangements for close concert in carrying out’533 and the 
US was willing to play ‘its full part in such discussions’.534  
 The idea behind advancing close concert so forcefully was both an 
immediate preparation of the alliance to meet the possible Warsaw Pact 
proposal in concert, but also, more importantly, to launch in the longer 
term the setup of a quadripartite group ‘de Gaulle willing’ within the 
alliance to ‘seek agreement on the broad outlines of a common strategy’, which 
would have a vision for German unification at its heart.  To this end, 
Owen envisioned ‘regular and periodic meetings between’ the members 
of the quadripartite or tripartite group. Only when this exclusive group 
had agreed upon a particular strategy, would there be ‘periodic working 
group meetings at which NATO wide cooperation and support in carrying out that 
strategy can be sought’.535 Owen also spoke about the necessity of sustaining 
Western European moral ‘by holding out a concept which plausibly relates 
presently feasible actions to the end goal, and thus enhances Western governments’ 
ability to pursue the agreed strategy and resist diversionary moves’.536 
 The necessity of close concert was, in fact, an attempt to streamline 
or even control the European allies’ policies to the ends the quadripartite 
or tripartite group would agree upon. Needless to say, America was the 
undisputed leader of this group. Thus, although NATO indeed moved 
into the political field with Council’s proposal, was supplied with a 
political raison d’être, and a certain level of consultation and cooperation 
on the alliance’s foreign policy, the Council in fact did not consider 
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whether this step into a tripartite or quadripartite group entailed 
multilateralism at the expense of American unilateralism.   
 The fact that neither the Acheson Committee nor the Council 
considered this aspect could arguably be seen as reflecting certain self-
assuredness in America’s unilateralist position.  
  
Rusk revealed to the German foreign minister Schroeder that he wanted 
to move NATO into the political field ‘to combat the impression that NATO 
is merely a military alliance, that its hour need has passed and that the defense of 
NATO is simply a defense of the status quo. Therefore I think we should 
demonstrate publicly at Brussels that NATO has an equal concern in moving 
towards improvement of relations with the East’.537 Thus, the deliberations at 
Brussels Ministerial Meeting in December 1966, resulted in a 
Communiqué that established ‘NATO as a clearing house and coordinated 
point for East-West contacts,’538 and equally important, the final 
communiqué established the necessity of upholding a deterrent  as  ‘in 
view of the basic aims of the Soviet Union, the level of its armed forces, and its 
continuing allocation of  a high proportion of economic and technological recourses for 
military purposes, the Ministers concluded that it is imperative for the West to 
maintain adequate forces of deterrence and defence.’.539 The contours of NATO’s 
dual matter of détente and deterrence was indeed, already evident.  Most 
important, however, the political bargain Rostow and others had put 
forward in the spring 1966 immediately after de Gaulle’s withdrawal of 
France, namely in exchange for a recommitment to the principle of 
integration, the European allies would get political consultation and a 
turn towards a détente with the East, also found its way to the final 
communiqué. In a less forthright way the communiqué read: ‘Owing to the 
conditions of security created and maintained by an effective common defence of the 
North Atlantic area, political consultation among partners allows initiatives to be 
taken which can contribute not only to the stability of East-West relations but also to 
the general well being of mankind.’540  
 
Questioning the Atlantic Concert - Europeanism 
Although both the Acheson Committee and the Policy Planning Council 
argued for an agreed NATO policy towards the Eastern bloc, the Policy 
Planning Council questioned what the real target with this line of 
thinking was. Sparked by an article by Zbignew Brzezinski in Foreign 
Affairs, Doherty argued that a concerted Atlantic policy towards the 
Eastern bloc was a means to ‘revivify’ Atlantic partnership and promote 
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‘Western unity under American leadership rather than European unity’.541 Doherty 
argued that this line of thinking was very much like Acheson’s that 
‘American domination’ of NATO was both ‘necessary and inevitable’.542 
In fact, State Department in general appeared to be in agreement with 
this statement. Doherty however, argued differently and advocated 
Europeanism.543  
 Doherty claimed that de Gaulle’s withdrawal questioned America’s 
Western European policy, and taken together with the Cold War’s ‘loss 
of relevance’,544 the US ought to reexamine its role in promoting 
European unity, and ending the division of Germany and Europe, 
indeed, ‘perhaps the time has come to let the Europeans devise their own 
initiatives’.545 Although the US should not withdraw completely from 
Europe, the ‘frantic search’ for a viable Western European policy should 
be avoided (like Tyler’s criticism of the Western European policy in 
1965546) because the Western Europeans were afraid that certain 
initiatives would harm the relationship with America. The question it all 
came down to, according to Doherty, was if not America’s long term 
interest would ‘be served by the promotion of a juridically [sic] based European 
unity rather than preserving an Atlantic partnership which jurically [sic] speaking at 
least, is merely an American-led power bloc.’547 Doherty claimed the former was 
the only way to go, as it was America’s interest and not ‘prestige’ which 
concerned the administration.  Although this line of Europeanist 
thinking was rare, it was discussed at a Council meeting, and portrays 
exactly how this was times of Western European realignments, and that 
the administration’s policy towards Western Europe indeed was, at least 
according to Doherty, about maintaining American leadership in 
Western Europe.    
 
Bridge Building 
Despite the numerous studies and proposals from the Acheson 
Committee and the Policy Planning Council, the administration’s 
Western European policy remained in a deadlock. The nuclear problem 
and the problem of alliance cohesion were unresolved.  Rusk called a 
meeting in June, 1966, with Johnson and the rest of the foreign policy 
staff, in an effort to overcome this apparent bureaucratic deadlock or 
even resistance ‘at the middle levels’548 to develop an agreed policy 
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towards NATO and ‘constructive’ initiatives in Europe.549 Rusk raised 
the nuclear problem and the question of cohesion in the alliance at the 
meeting, and recommended that Department of State and Defense 
initiated tripartite discussion with the British and the Germans to find a 
solution to the nuclear problem.550 Rusk also recommended that 
McNamara’s Special Committee should be made permanent as the 
Nuclear Planning Group (NPG).551  
 Under the heading of ‘Measures to increase cohesion in NATO’ in Rusk’s 
talking points for the meeting with Johnson, Rusk argued that the 
foremost measure to increase cohesion in NATO was ‘preparation for a 
settlement in Eastern Europe’.552 Wilson’s – and other European allies’ – 
demands for a policy towards Eastern Europe forced the US to act, 
indeed, according to Rusk, ‘in many ways the U.S. is behind our allies’553 and 
as the administration ‘already had said much’554 about a détente with the 
Eastern bloc at the May 1966 Brussels ministerial meeting, the 
administration had to make concrete proposals for a policy towards the 
East.555 Rusk also recommended that the department prepared a speech 
to Johnson on NATO to increase the Alliance cohesion.  
 The result from the meeting was NSAM 352 entitled Bridge Building, 
with which Johnson called on the Secretary of State for ‘in consultation with 
our Allies – we actively develop areas of peaceful cooperation with the nations of 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. He [LBJ] has asked the Secretary of State to 
examine and propose to him specific actions the Government might take. These actions 
will be designed to help create an environment in which peaceful settlement of the 
division of Germany and of Europe will become possible.’556 
 In other words, by July 1966, the political bargain was official policy; 
the US should develop a policy towards Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union in political consultation with the European allies. As already 
discussed, the reasoning behind the political bargain was to sustain and 
maintain the alliance and work against the dis-integrating forces de 
Gaulle had set in motion, and NSAM 352 was indeed a call for means to 
overcome this, and probably to compete with the French détente 
scheme. Moreover, in line with the Acheson Committee’s 
recommendation of the ‘Harmel formula’, NSAM 352 was a call to 
launch the ‘détente pillar’ in NATO as a means to contain the allies 
Eastern policies. Apart from this, NSAM 352 was also a token of the 
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extent of Western Europe’s actual influence on US policy. Indeed 
Wilson’s and other European allies’ calls for a policy towards Eastern 
Europe had pushed to US to embark upon this at that moment in time.  
 
The Peace Initiative 
The US-German Crisis 
The American-German relationship was put on the agenda in 
Washington in September 1966, as the German Chancellor Erhard 
(CDU/CSU) was about to visit. The Johnson administration planned to 
launch the tripartite approach to the nuclear problem, and also reassure 
the Erhard administration of American support of German unification. 
However, the German-American relationship was perhaps undergoing or 
was potentially about to undergo some substantial changes in the fall of 
1966, at least according to Hughes of State Department’s Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research.  
 Hughes speculated if there were a turning point in the German-
American relationship on the horizon, and argued that the relationship 
so far had rested on two principles; on one hand the US had provided 
Germany security and ‘respectability’ in exchange for on the other hand, 
that Germany identified  ‘its fate with Washington’,557 however this was, 
according to Hughes, about to change. The German ‘psychological’ and 
economic recovery, the diminishing Soviet threat, and ‘the fact that 
alternative relationships and new horizons are being offered to the Federal republic’558 
not just by de Gaulle, but also by ‘other non-French voices … recommend[ing] a 
‘Europe first’ policy’559 led Hughes to talk about this potential turning point 
in the American-German relationship.   
 Although others than de Gaulle offered alternatives to Bonn’s close 
relationship with Washington, de Gaulle was still considered the primary 
perpetrator to the close American-German relationship, according to 
INR. De Gaulle’s impact in Germany was ‘critical’ especially if the 
Germans chose de Gaulle’s ‘pattern’ to reunification. 560 De Gaulle 
argued for a European solution to the German problem, indeed, the 
European détente would eventually overcome the East-West division 
and thereby create an ‘environment’ for German reunification. German 
reunification would therefore not be achieved through reliance on 
America and Western strength. Although the realization of this 
environment, according to INR, was not unacceptable to the US ‘in 
principle’ it would cut a ‘longstanding policy link’ between the US and 
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West Germany. Hughes also cited Bonn’s activist approach to Eastern 
and Central Europe, an approach which had ‘boomed across the iron 
curtain’561 as a challenge to the American-German relationship. INR 
concluded that although a ‘sharp shift’ in the American-German 
relationship was highly unlikely, the US had to commit itself to a 
‘consistency in policy, consideration for West Germany’s problems, understanding for 
German national objectives and tactics used to achieve them, consultation about major 
issues without undue pressures, and forbearance in the recruitment of German support 
for specifically US interests, aims and policies’.562 INR thus concluded much in 
line with McGhee’s recommendation in the spring 1966, and perhaps 
more important, INR, which based its analysis on intelligence, apparently 
regarded the Gaullist threat very much alive and kicking despite de 
Gaulle’s apparent loss of leverage in the Alliance.  
 INR was not the only branch of government, which talked about a 
crisis or possible crisis in the US-German relationship. The CIA argued 
in October1966 that the state of the relationship with the Germans was 
at ‘a post war low’563 especially following Chancellor Erhard‘s failure to 
negotiate a relief from the offset payments in the trilateral talks that had 
begun in August1966.  The CIA argued, in accordance with INR, that 
the Gaullists within Erhard’s own political party the CDU were plotting 
to take over the leadership, which they did, however, CIA also relayed 
that ‘Even pro-US German politicians now maintain that there is a growing 
divergence between the US and German policies, and point up to the need to improve 
Bonn’s ties with Paris’.564 
 In the end, Chancellor Erhard failed to counter the domestic 
criticism, gave up, and the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition lost the 
elections in November1966, to the Grand Coalition, led by Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger (CDU) seconded by Willy Brandt (SPD) as new German 
foreign minister. Although the literature has claimed that Johnson’s 
tough bargaining style during the tripartite talks in October was the 
direct cause of the Erhard government’s fall, this thesis suggests that 
German domestic politics was the first and foremost reason as argued in 
Chapter 3.  
 
The speech 
In October 1966 Johnson delivered a speech on America’s policies 
towards the Eastern bloc. In the literature, the speech is regarded as a 
defining moment in Johnson’s European policy. In July 1966, the Policy 
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Planning Council proposed three ‘peace initiatives’565 towards Europe to 
overcome the strains in the relationship between the US and the 
European allies.566 These initiatives, essentially, aimed at manifesting the 
political bargain, preparing the ground for initiatives that would, among 
other things, control the European allies’ Eastern European policies and 
align these policies to US policy ends and – not least – stressing NATO’s 
instrumentality to the European allies. The ‘peace’ initiatives should be 
forwarded to Johnson before Prime Minister Wilson’s forthcoming visit. 
 In line with the Acheson Committee, which had proposed that 
Johnson held a speech to confirm American support of NATO in the 
wake of the French withdrawal, the Policy Planning Council of State 
Department, in complete agreement with EUR, suggested that Johnson 
should give a speech to ‘stress the continued need for European unity and 
Atlantic partnership in moving toward a settlement which would resolve the division of 
Europe.’567 However, whereas the Acheson Committee was mostly 
preoccupied with containing Germany and maintaining alliance 
cohesion, the Council’s motivations for this particular ‘peace initiative’ 
was mostly to respond to both Eastern and Western Europe. It will be 
recalled that the British Prime Minister Wilson had called for a collective 
NATO outreach towards Eastern Europe immediately after the French 
withdrawal, claiming that de Gaulle’s exit made it necessary and was an 
opportunity to direct the alliance towards the Eastern Europe (and gain 
some political consultation), and it appears as if the Council’s aim with 
the proposal was to announce concurrence with the British (and other 
European allies’) wishes for an Eastern policy.  
 The political bargain, namely that in return for the allies’ backing of 
the integration principle the allies would get political consultation and an 
Eastern policy, was also inherent in the Council’s line of thinking as it 
stressed the Atlantic partnership – indeed political consultation – on the 
matter of a European settlement on the implicit premise that NATO, in 
fact, remained integrated. Securing the integration principle was among 
the very reasons why the Council proposed the speech in the first place.  
The Council also proposed that Johnson launched a ’doctrinal basis’ 
upon which future initiatives in the Atlantic alliance towards Eastern 
Europe could be based, which Johnson did in his speech in October. 
 Apart from the speech, the Council also proposed that the US, FRG, 
and the UK should issue a joint declaration ‘pledging themselves to renewed 
effort in seeking an East-West non-proliferation treaty … and indicating that they 
will not contribute to national proliferation by launching or assisting new national 
programs’,568 and the early adherence by the remaining 14 NATO allies 
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was foreshadowed.569 The idea behind this non-proliferation scheme was 
mostly to get the non-proliferation ‘negotiations’ on track again with the 
Soviet Union. The main obstacle was still the unresolved nuclear 
position of Germany, and by making the Germans issue such a 
declaration, it would ‘elicit a more watertight German non-proliferation 
commitment’,570 which in effect was the same as the German renounced 
the right to a national nuclear deterrent and the abolishment of the 
European clause. The declaration was, in other words, a means for the 
US to align the European allies to American policy ends as formulated in 
NSAM 322.571  
 The Council also proposed a NATO declaration, in which the allies 
reaffirmed their ‘desire to promote peace and stability in Europe’,572 and the 
Council argued that the NATO declaration should take explicit notice of 
the recent Warsaw Pact statement, ‘notably its call for ‘good neighborly relations 
on the basis of the principles of national independence and sovereignty, equal rights, 
non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage on the basis of peaceful co-
existence among states with different social systems’’.573 The Warsaw Pact 
statement in effect argued against unification and new demarcation, and 
promoted the Brezhnev Doctrine. If the NATO declaration took its 
point of departure in the Warsaw Pact statement it would, according to 
the Council, ‘dramatize’ the NATO declaration and ‘enhance its appeal as a 
peace initiative to US and Western European opinion’,574 however, the basic idea 
behind the declaration was ‘to emphasize the role of NATO as an instrument 
for promoting all-European security’575 and respond the ‘periodic Soviet proposals 
and desires in the West for a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression agreement, while 
avoiding the difficulties involved in trying to negotiate such an agreement’.576 The 
NATO declaration was therefore, as much about promoting NATO to 
the European allies as a statement to the Warsaw Pact countries.      
 The last initiative the Council proposed was the promotion of a 
concerted Western policy in trade and ‘contacts with the East’ via OECD. 
The reason for this suggestion was both to respond to the many desires 
in the Western Europe for increased contacts with the Eastern bloc 
countries, but also to control Western Europe’s bilateral policies towards 
the East, policies which the European allies conducted ‘without regard to 
their political consequences’577 for US policies.  
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 The Council’s proposal and motivations for them can be seen as a 
means to sustain and maintain US leadership of the Alliance and 
protection of US unilateralism. Indeed, the Council wanted Johnson to 
respond to developments in Europe; the WP declaration and the 
numerous Western European calls for a policy towards the Eastern bloc, 
by realigning the Western European policy and outlook to American 
policy ends, such as the suggested non-proliferation declaration and the 
proposal for a concerted OECD policy reflected.  
 Furthermore, by bringing it to attention to the European allies, that 
NATO was the primary instrument for any European peace settlement, 
the Council gave Johnson a recipe for how to control the Western 
European détente, and at the same time promote and preserve American 
unilateralism in foreign policy. The American objective to control the 
allies’ Eastern policies via NATO was a defensive measure to protect the 
American freedom of action in foreign policy and the national interests 
the foreign policy objectives reflected against Western Europe. The same 
can be said of most of the proposals that served to contain the European 
allies from having bilateral or ‘outside’ the treaty framework relations 
with the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Council’s preoccupation with the 
immediate and future Warsaw Pact proposals for a European settlement, 
and the launch of NATO as the exclusive vehicle for contact with the 
Warsaw pact on the subject of a European settlement was designed to 
prevent Western European bilateralism.      
 At the same time the Council’s deliberations revealed exactly how re-
active America’s détente policy was, indeed, the Council forecasted that 
the British would be delighted with these initiatives, especially the 
NATO declaration, since the UK already had proposed a draft for an 
East-West declaration. However, the Council’s proposed NATO 
declaration would avoid, contrary to the British proposal, ‘a pitfall of East-
West negotiation on language. Such a negotiation would almost certainly result in 
communist efforts to promote divisive issue’,578 which in the end, according to 
the Council, would generate heat in the Western alliance. The Council, in 
other words, completely overruled the British approach to the entire 
subject matter, namely that it should be a common East-West endeavor, 
and instead promoted an exclusive Western declaration. This on the 
other hand reflects upon the American unilateralist approach, which was 
also promoted as a defensive measure to protect the American interests.   
 If Western Europe had not called for an initiative towards Eastern 
Europe, and indeed, had not already been exchanging goods and culture 
across the Iron Curtain, ‘without regard for their political consequences’,579 the 
subsequent American Bridge Building policy had probably not seen the 
                                                 
578 P/S to Rusk, Jul., 25, 1966. NARA, RG 59, Policy Planning Council box 313. 
579 P/S to Rusk, Jul., 25, 1966. NARA, RG 59, Policy Planning Council box 313. 
151 
 
day in 1966, and therefore it is meaningful to talk about a substantial 
Western European push for a détente.  
 Johnson gave the speech in October, 1966 before the National 
Conference of Editorial Writers in New York.  The speech was to a large 
extent a response to the European allies and the speech reflected the 
different means the administration had developed to overcome the 
NATO crisis. 
 Johnson’s statement that it was an American purpose ‘to help the people 
of Europe to achieve together … a continent in which alliances do not confront each 
other in bitter hostility, but instead provide a framework in which West and East can 
act together in order to assure the security of all’580, is often regarded as the 
official declaration of providing a security framework to the American 
détente effort, and also often considered a largely American invention.581 
This view fails to recognize the numerous initiatives from the European 
allies in the spring of 1966 in the North Atlantic Council and NATO 
that all pointed towards this end, and the aforementioned Warsaw Pact 
declaration, which also pointed towards this end. In fact, it may be 
argued that Johnson merely responded to Western European proposals 
with this particular statement on the purpose of the alliance.  
 In actuality, in June 1966, the British had presented the proposal in 
the North Atlantic Council on a declaration on ‘European security and 
cooperation’582 that was the first of two British proposals, which they 
intended should be adopted by ‘East and West European countries [to] 
improve the atmosphere in Europe’.583 The British proposal was not adopted 
mostly because the US ‘expressed concern that it concentrated on Europe so much 
that it seemed to exclude participation by the US’.584 In May, 1966, the Danes 
had proposed that NATO should approach the Warsaw Pact and call for 
a European security conference, an initiative which was rejected as 
‘premature’ by the US,585 and in September, 1966, at a Political Advisors 
meeting in NATO, the Belgians proposed the establishment of a 
‘permanent body, composed of an equal number of representatives from East and 
West, in which both sides could exchange views’.586 There were, in other words, 
in 1966 several Western European pushes for establishing the very 
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‘framework in which West and East can act together’ that Johnson declared was 
one purpose of NATO in his speech in October, 1966. An East-West 
framework which until then had been rejected by the administration on 
different grounds such as the exclusion of the US and that an East-West 
endeavor was an invitation to the Eastern bloc to start raising divisive 
issues and thereby cause friction in the Western alliance.587 Instead, the 
Johnson administration had sought to replace the Europeans’ proposal 
for the establishment of an East-West concept with a one-sided Western 
construction that would issue declarations.  
 In the speech Johnson also committed the US to the political bargain 
and the Acheson Committee’s détente and deterrent formula, when he 
declared that NATO must be kept strong and ‘must become a forum for 
increasingly close consultations. These should cover the full range of joint concerns – 
from East-West relations to crisis management’.588 Johnson also declared, in line 
with the European allies’ wishes, that the division of Europe must be 
settled, and argued ‘that our task is to achieve reconciliation with the East – a 
shift from the narrow concept of coexistence to the broader vision of peaceful 
engagement’,589 and announced a renewed effort to build bridges towards 
the Eastern bloc, and added about NATO’s instrumentality that 
‘agreement on a broad policy to this end, therefore, should be sought in existing 
Atlantic organs. The principles which should govern East West relations are now 
being discussed on the North Atlantic Council’.590 Furthermore, Johnson also 
spoke about the steps which should be taken in OECD.  
 Johnson took ‘explicit notice’ about the recent Warsaw Pact 
declaration, as the Policy Planning Council had recommended, Johnson 
declared that ‘Hand-in-hand with these steps to increase East-West ties must go 
measures to remove territorial and border issues’591 a statement, which was also 
addressed to West Germany. Indeed, Johnson announced a new policy 
for the unification of Germany. Contrary to earlier assumptions Johnson 
now claimed that an improvement in the European environment was the 
precondition for a German unification. The possible crisis in US-
German relations was, in other words, defused, mostly by toppling the 
Gaullist alternative to a German unification.  
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Towards the Future of the Alliance 
Tripartite Talks and the Future of the Alliance 
The State Department had continuously argued for tripartism as a 
solution to the outstanding nuclear problem in the alliance. However, in 
the fall of 1966 Johnson expanded the area for tripartite negotiations to 
other areas than the nuclear question as a response to the critical 
financial situation Germany and Great Britain was in. Germany had 
difficulties with meeting the offset agreements, and the UK had 
difficulties with financing their troops in Germany, and threatened to 
withdraw them. Bator warned Johnson in August, 1966, that at the end 
of the day the situation threatened to unravel the alliance.592 The solution 
to this possible disintegration was the concept of tripartite talks, which 
aimed at getting the Germans to pay according to the offset agreement, 
and make the British keep their troops in Germany. Johnson largely 
succeeded in this endeavor.593  
 Tripartism as a format for negotiations sparked Belgian criticism. In 
October, 1966, shortly before the tripartite talks on the financial 
problems were scheduled to begin, the Belgian ambassador conveyed a 
formal protest against these talks. According to Leddy of State 
Department’s European desk, the Belgian foreign minister Pierre Harmel 
had no objections to tripartite talks on subjects on ‘purely’ financial and 
economic problems, however, the Belgians were ‘violently opposed to the 
consideration of related military and security questions’,594 which Harmel feared 
presaged the establishment of a ‘directorate’ within NATO. Leddy 
argued that Rusk needed to interfere in the situation before it escalated, 
and claimed that Harmel’s accusations was completely unfounded.595 In 
Leddy’s line of thinking, the very temporality of the tripartite talks 
suggested that it would not be a directorate, although he recognized the 
financial questions would touch upon questions of troop levels and 
threat perceptions.596 Indeed, Johnson wrote Wilson in October, that he 
wanted to discuss the ‘entire range of relevant questions’ including ‘the 
nature of the threat’ and strategy at the upcoming tripartite talks.597  
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 Harmel reissued his criticism of the tripartite talks ‘in length’ to the 
American ambassador to Belgium Knight, later in the same month.598 
Harmel criticized the tripartite talks on three grounds, namely that the 
talks would create a precedent that future problems of the alliance would 
be settled by these three major powers (which the Council actually had 
proposed) thus excluding the remaining allies from influence on alliance 
matters. Secondly, that tripartism enhanced the status of Germany and 
therefore jeopardized the détente effort, and lastly, that the very 
rehabilitation of Germany raised fears in Belgium of a resurgent 
Germany. Although Harmel recognized that the current arrangement 
was borne out of urgent financial problems, Harmel argued that these 
problems moved into broader issues of strategy, ‘evaluation of menace’, 
and the relations of the West with the Eastern states. Harmel, therefore, 
concluded that the tripartite talks should immediately be brought into 
the framework of the 14 rather than continue in the tripartite forum.599 
Harmel’s criticism resonated throughout the alliance, and John McCloy, 
Johnson’s representative to the trilateral talks, was sent on a firefighting 
mission among the allies in late October 1966.600  
 Harmel’s criticism of tripartism was accompanied by the proposal to 
study ‘certain fundamental questions’ regarding NATO’s future.601 At a 
meeting in Washington in early October 1966, Harmel raised ‘the need to 
start projecting the alliance’s future in areas other than military.’,602 and now the 
time was ripe with de Gaulle’s withdrawal, according to Harmel, ‘to 
designate a la 1957 a three or four ‘wise men’ exercise’,603 at the upcoming 
December1966NATO ministerial meeting. Leddy responded favorably 
to Harmel’s proposal, admitting that up until then the alliance, i.e., the 
US, had been preoccupied with preserving the alliance instead of 
considering ‘what we want in the future’.604 Harmel suggested that the 
‘fundamental questions’ that should be studied was ‘strategy, revision, 
philosophy of the alliance, East-West relations, and Europe-US relations.’605  
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 State Department’s response to Harmel’s proposal was positive, and 
the reasons for the department’s backing were quite in line with the 
hitherto thinking on why the US should respond favorably to Western 
Europe. In an instruction to NATO capitals, Rusk declared that as the 
result of ‘primarily’ Harmel’s initiative, State Department supported that 
at the December NATO ministerial meeting ‘a major study on the future of 
the alliance’606 should be commissioned, because ‘US like many European 
countries is concerned with need to articulate up-to-date role for the Alliance; to assure 
its continued relevance to improved East-West relations in line with the President’s 
October 7 speech [sic]; and, against background of French withdrawal and approach 
of 1969, to assure continued governmental and public understanding and support for 
goals of Western cohesion and deterrent strength of Alliance’.607 The US aim with 
the Harmel study was, in other words, to ‘assure’ the continued Western 
European backing of the political bargain, or put in other words, one 
American objective with the Harmel study was the formalization of the 
European allies’ adherence to the principle of integration at the price of 
détente with the Eastern bloc. Thus, State Department’s long held wish 
to force the European allies to take a stand on the integration principle 
appeared to be within reach.608  
 State Department made clear that the study should be exclusively on 
the ‘political and non-military side of NATO’,609 as Harmel had argued in 
October, and Rusk tentatively suggested a study on how the alliance 
could improve East-West relations, and thereby continue the already 
existing work on European security and the German problem, the ‘general 
Atlantic and European relations’, and the ‘reexamination of the alliance 
machinery’.610 In its totality, this was much in line with the Belgian 
thinking, and the different European calls for a reform of NATO. 
 In a paper presented at a December 1966 NSC meeting, the 
Department of State argued, among other things, that the US’ aim at the 
upcoming NATO ministerial meeting was to bring home to the allies, 
that the alliance had recovered from the French ‘attack’ and that the 
alliance would continue to cooperate with the French, as long it did not 
compromise the alliance’s interests. Furthermore, the US aimed at 
making it clear to the allies that the Soviet threat called for an ‘effective’ 
NATO, that a détente demanded a ‘strong NATO’, and that the US 
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supported the Harmel study.611 Among the more ‘principal’ topics was 
the general US aim ‘to keep the organization very much in the East-West picture 
as a major instrument for coordinating Western policies and, where appropriate, 
specific actions’.612Although the department also argued in the paper that 
some allies were reluctant to use NATO as an instrument because they 
feared it would portray a certain Western rigidity, the department argued 
that a paper to study the matter was likely to be adopted.613 At the NSC 
meeting Johnson concurred with the department’s paper, however, the 
primary topic at the meeting was how to bring home to the reluctant 
European allies that the Johnson administration was losing domestic 
support of NATO. The Mansfield Resolution had called for substantial 
troop reductions in Europe, and the tripartite talks had not resulted in 
any substantial contributions to the alliance from either Germany or 
Great Britain.  
 McNamara also prepared to finally end the ‘talk of the Multilateral 
Force’ by bringing home the Nuclear Planning Group, which, according 
to McNamara, would tie Germany with the US and the UK.614 
 The Belgian proposal to the Harmel study did not receive much 
attention at the NSC meeting, despite it being on the agenda at the 
upcoming ministerial meeting; this possibly reflected that the 
administration, in fact, had adopted a formal policy towards the alliance 
after the many deliberations since the French withdrawal in March 1966.  
 A policy which aimed at maintain the fundamental principles of the 
alliance while directing it at a policy towards the Eastern bloc, because 
the alliance served the purpose of balancing Western Europe, controlling 
Western Europe’s policies, ultimately to protect America’s foreign policy 
from interference from Western Europe, i.e., maintain American 
protective unilateralism. Essentially this was a policy that was motivated 
by a rejection of the European reason of state, and as such a policy of 
detachment. 
 
Questioning the raison of NATO’s political raison d’être  
Although the idea that NATO had a certain instrumentality for 
improving the relationship between East and West, and the US had 
made a bargain with the European allies that there should be an 
increased consultation on relations towards the Eastern bloc in NATO 
and thereby give NATO a political raison d’être, INR questioned this 
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very instrumentality shortly before the NATO ministerial meeting. 
Western Europe ‘In their response to this challenge [de Gaulle], the other members 
have not only stressed that NATO’s integrated military organization is essential to 
the security of its members, but they have also tried to emphasize NATO’s role as a 
centre for political consultation on East-West relations’.615 As a token of this, 
INR cited the British, Danish, and Belgian initiatives that had been put 
forward during the spring and summer of 1966. Interestingly though, 
INR did not mention Harmel’s proposal.  
 INR argued however, that NATO was not a ‘judicial entity’ and 
nobody, including the European allies, wanted it to turn into such an 
entity, NATO, according to INR, was therefore,  as an ‘institution not fitted 
for the role of an ‘architect’ of détente’.616 The question is, however, exactly 
what INR meant by ‘judicial entity’? INR most likely believed a judicial 
entity was a truly multilateral institution with common principles and 
rules for decision-making. In that sense, INR’s rejection of the 
establishment of a judicial entity was the same as a complete rejection of 
a détente anchored in a multilateral institution and subsequent a 
complete rejection of giving up any unilateralism in America’s détente 
policies and role as the ‘architect’ of the détente. Neither would the 
European allies according to INR’s estimate. In a classic INR 
perspective, the paper finished with concluding that a ‘habit of 
consultation’ had significant value, not only for the members to be kept 
informed but also because during periods of reduced tension ‘centrifugal 
tendencies in the Alliance are apt to gather strength’,617 consultation was ‘a 
significant counterweight to these tendencies’.618 
 The CIA, however, worried that the future of the alliance was not 
necessarily bright. In an estimate of the upcoming ministerial meeting, 
the CIA argued that although the alliance had survived the first stage 
after the French withdrawal, de Gaulle had had a certain impact. Indeed, 
the CIA argued that there was ‘a widespread questioning of whether a simple 
prolongation of existing arrangements is a viable long term solution to the problem of 
European and Atlantic security’.619 
 
Brief Conclusions  
In general, the period 1965-1966 saw the beginning and blossoming of a 
movement from a strictly French challenge to American unilateralism in 
the alliance to an actual Western European challenge to the modus vivendi 
of the alliance and more broadly the transatlantic relationship. The first 
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significant expression of this was the German calls for a common 
Western approach towards the German reunification question raised at 
the March 1965 APAG meeting.   
 However, after the French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated 
command in March, 1966, the European allies moved quickly to push 
for more political consultation in the Alliance and less American 
unilateralism, and move the Western alliance towards a détente with the 
Eastern bloc. Especially the British and the Belgians succeeded with 
pushing the US towards the détente and more political consultation. It 
might even be possible to talk about a beginning of a certain 
Europeanization of the alliance’s foreign and security policy.  
 The White House and the Department of State worried that the 
French withdrawal would cast the alliance into further disintegration, and 
feared that other allies would reject the principle of integration, as de 
Gaulle had, the very heart of NATO. Therefore, to preserve the military 
integration the administration led by the Department of State attempted 
to strike a bargain. In return for backing of the principle of integration 
the European allies would get political consultation and an effort to 
move towards normalization of East-West relations. The different 
responses to the NATO crisis pointed towards an American effort to 
maintain the alliance in its original form, with its original purpose. 
Indeed, in the years 1965-1966 the different foreign policy making 
branches claimed that NATO’s primary purpose was to balance Western 
Europe, and that the principle of integration was the only thing that 
stood between the current balance (however un-balanced Western 
Europe was) and a return to the pre-war European reason of state. The 
administration’s preoccupation with preserving integration, and the 
Acheson Committee’s claim that NATO ultimately served to manage the 
German-Soviet relationship was expressions of this. This ultimately 
reflects that the administration upheld this traditional perception of 
Western Europe.  
 The Acheson Committee proposed a détente and deterrence formula 
in their report. The committee agreed in June 1966 that to maintain 
alliance cohesion, i.e., counter a rejection of the integration principle 
among the European allies, and contain the European allies’ Eastern 
policies the alliance should move into the political area and promote 
better relations with the East while at the same time maintain a strong, 
and therefore integrated, deterrent. Contrary to the Belgian proposal of 
November 1966, the American formula of détente and deterrence was 
proposed as a means to control the allies more than a means to 
overcome the Cold War. Nonetheless there was during 1965-1966 a 
substantial Western European push towards a détente.  
  There were only a few diversions from this. Doherty of the Policy 
Planning Council promoted Europeanism, and the Bureau of 
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Intelligence and Research questioned whether NATO could be used to 
devise a détente at all. In actuality, this refusal reflected that INR 
considered the US to be the architect of détente and a complete rejection 
of any multilateral détente policy.   
 If Johnson’s speech of October 7 1966 is seen in connection with the 
foregoing developments in the transatlantic relationship, Johnson mostly 
responded to this in his speech. Indeed, Johnson reiterated the political 
bargain, and moved the alliance towards normalization with the East, 
although it became a one-sided affair contrary to the European allies’ 
proposals in the spring 1966. 
 The policy towards the Alliance the administration arrived at by the 
fall of 1966 was ultimately a policy of detachment. Based on the rejection 
of the European reason of state, the administration moved the alliance 
towards a détente and deterrence to control the allies’ policies and to 
protect the American unilateralism in foreign policy – especially protect 
America’s policy towards the Soviet Union, as the Policy Planning 
Council proposed. 
 Tripartism was suggested by Wilson; however the administration saw 
it as a means to solve concrete financial problems and bring the UK and 
FRG closer together and thereby counter alliance disintegration. 
However, one spillover effect from the tripartite talks was the Belgian 
proposal for the Harmel study. The State Department’s immediate 
response to the Belgian proposal was to see it as an opportunity to 
manifesting and formalizing the political bargain. 
  In general, the literature on the Transatlantic relationship and the 
beyond Vietnam literature neglects to recognize this substantial Western 
European impact on America and indeed, on America’s détente policy. 
Thus, when Schwartz argues that Johnson saw de Gaulle’s withdrawal as 
opportunity to regroup and reform the alliance behind American 
leadership, Schwartz neglects to see this important and indeed, dynamic 
Western European influence on the Johnson administration’s détente 
policy and the ‘regrouping’ of the alliance. The British and the Belgians, 
in fact, saw the French withdrawal as an opportunity to reform the 
alliance and move it to a détente with the East.  
 During 1965 and 1966 the question of NATOs role in out of treaty 
area questions also arrived on the agenda. The administration in general 
sought to get the allies’ support for the War in Vietnam, and there were 
different voices that argued for increased political consultation in these 
matters to obtain the European allies backing. 
 During 1965 and 1966, the German question manifested itself on the 
political agenda in Washington. However, the prevailing line of thinking 
was that the German problem was somewhat unsolvable under the 
present circumstances, and the most important element in America’s 
policy towards West Germany was to counter a new German 
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assertiveness and maintain American control and close relations with 
Germany. Although Johnson’s October 7, 1966 speech launched a new 
way for German unification, German assertiveness continued to be an 
issue in Washington. 
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Chapter 7 The Future of the Alliance, 
1966-1968 
Introduction 
The final years of Johnson’s Presidency was used by the administration 
to consolidate the Atlantic alliance, the principles it had been built on, 
and cement the American protective unilateralism.  
 At the December, 1966, Ministerial meeting in Paris, the Alliance had 
resolved to undertake the Harmel study on the future of the alliance. The 
French withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command had sparked 
British and Belgian demands for expanded political consultation in the 
alliance, a reform of the alliance with an eye to a détente with the 
Eastern bloc, and a solution to the nuclear question in the alliance.620 The 
Johnson administration supported the idea to undertake a study of 
NATO’s future from the beginning, as the Belgian proposal was much in 
line with the Acheson Committee’s formula for maintaining alliance 
cohesion and US control with the allies’ bilateral Eastern policies, thus 
reflecting one of the Johnson administration’s objectives with the 
Harmel exercise, namely to control the allies’ policies and maintain 
American leadership of the alliance, which was manifested in the 
American unilateralism. In many ways this pattern would repeat itself 
during the CSCE negotiations in Geneva and Helsinki, 1973-1975. 
However, the administration saw a clear need to take control with the 
question of NATO’s defensive posture and to protect the integrated 
deterrent, thus, Kohler, the Deputy under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs, was put in charge of subgroup 2, which studied NATOs 
defensive posture.  
 The administration also supported the Harmel study because it was 
an opportunity to raise the sensitive and problematic matter of the 
European allies’ relations with and possible role to play in the out of 
treaty areas – most notably the Middle East and Vietnam. Although the 
US had campaigned for political backing to the war in Vietnam among 
the allies throughout the first half of the 1960s, none, except a reluctant 
West Germany, had met the American wishes. Instead by the end of 
1966, the American intervention in Vietnam was cited among the 
European allies as a threat to alliance-cohesion.   
 A new trend in German foreign policy, namely West German 
‘assertiveness’ was put on the agenda as the Grand Coalition entered 
Bonn in December 1966. The administration resolved to try to ‘turn’ this 
new assertiveness into another Atlantic framework, namely the 
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nonproliferation scheme, since the existing frameworks in Europe and 
the Atlantic appeared too strained to actually handle the new German 
assertiveness. The nonproliferation scheme, which the Johnson 
administration estimated was within reach in late 1966, also posed a 
problem for America in terms of the European clause that was still a 
problem. The Germans, contrary to the British, insisted that a 
nonproliferation treaty did not bar Europe from creating an 
independent, collective nuclear force, which in American optics 
threatened the US unilateralism in nuclear affairs in the Western alliance, 
and the establishment of an independent nuclear force in Europe would 
necessitate a complete American drawback from Europe – a line of 
thinking which reflected the policy of detachment in the nuclear field. In 
the end, the administration succeeded with an interpretation of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty’s Article 2 that established that the treaty did not 
rule out the so-called successor state principle. 
 The Soviet clamp down in Prague in August, 1968, shook the 
alliance; however, the Johnson administration in complete departmental 
agreement also saw the Soviet invasion as an opportunity to ‘cement’ the 
alliance further. The question was, whether or not the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia actually served to reconcile the Atlantic alliance? 
 
The December 1966 Ministerial Meeting 
Although the Belgian foreign minister Pierre Harmel had spoken of his 
preference for considering the problems that de Gaulle’s withdrawal 
from the integrated command presented to the alliancein its entirety, 
Harmel did not propose the study to the Americans until November 21, 
1966.621 By that time the practical issues relating to the French 
withdrawal had been solved, indeed, the move of NATO facilities (from 
France) to Belgian territory was decided upon. This was probably also a 
reason for the timing of Harmel’s proposition, as the move of NATO 
facilities to Belgium had sparked domestic debate about the apparent 
paradox between the Belgian adherence to NATO, solidified by the 
Belgian government’s accept of the move, and the same government’s 
desire for détente.622 However, as Harmel had already stressed in May, 
1966, that there was a need to look at the NATO crisis in its entirety and 
subsequently proposed a study like the wise men’s report at a meeting in 
October, 1966, with Leddy of State Department’s European desk, the 
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Belgian domestic factor can mostly explain the timing of the proposal.623 
Belgium like Great Britain and Germany, as discussed in chapter 6, saw 
the French withdrawal as an opportunity to move the alliance to a 
reform with an eye to a détente with the Eastern bloc.  
 When Harmel first laid out his proposal for the State Department in 
October, 1966, he stressed that focus of the study should be on the 
future, rather than the past, and Harmel declared his ‘satisfaction’ with 
Johnson’s focus on Atlantic partnership in the October 7 speech.624 The 
State Department’s immediate interpretation of Harmel’s proposal was, 
that Harmel sought to counter the widespread misunderstanding in 
Western Europe and elsewhere that the remaining 14 alliance members 
were only occupied with salvaging as much as possible of the ‘old outfit’ 
instead of turning the alliance on to the future. At the same time, the 
department believed Harmel sought to increase the cohesion and 
‘forward movement’ in the alliance before 1969, when it was possible for 
the allies to withdraw from the alliance.625 Harmel scouted his proposal 
in October, 1966, for a study of the future of the alliance with Rusk and 
Leddy of State Department, as discussed in Chapter 6.626  
 Bozo claims that US diplomacy set out to use the Harmel exercise ‘to 
the best of US and NATO interests’, and that Washington’s aim was ‘first and 
foremost to achieve consensus in the Alliance on East-West relations’ after de 
Gaulle’s withdrawal and the subsequent divergence of views among the 
European allies on the relations with the Eastern bloc.627 There were, 
according to Bozo, a struggle between the Gaullist and American 
conceptions of détente, a struggle which took place during the Harmel 
exercise, and the Harmel report was the final showdown between de 
Gaulle’s Europeanism and America’s Atlanticism.628 Therefore it was 
‘key’ for the Johnson administration to maintain French participation in 
the Harmel study to ‘neutralize’ Gaullist thinking.629 The French 
therefore continuously found themselves in a dilemma during the 
Harmel exercise. In the French view the alliance appeared to have 
accepted the Gaullist claim that a détente with the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern bloc were viable and possible, but the French clearly saw the 
entire exercise as a means for America to renew their leadership in 
Western Europe.630  
                                                 
623 Memcon Harmel & Johnson et.al., May 20, 1966. FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XIII, 
Western European region, doc. 167; Memcon Harmel &Leddy et.al., Oct. 10, 1966. 
NARA, RG 59, Defense, DEF 4 NATO, box 1568. 
624 Knight to Rusk, Oct. 28, 1966. NARA, RG 59, Defense, DEF 4 NATO, box 1568. 
625 State to Brussels et.al.Oct. 28., 1966. NARA, RG 59, Defense, DEF 4 NATO, 
box1568. 
626 Memo to Rostow, Oct. 2, 1967. LBJL, Papers of Walt Rostow, box 16. 
627 Bozo (1998), p. 350. 
628 Bozo (1998).  
629 Bozo (1998), p. 350. 
630 Bozo (1998), p. 351. 
164 
 
 While not disagreeing with this argument, the Harmel study was first 
and foremost about maintaining the American leadership of the alliance 
and of alliance matters in light of the challenge from de Gaulle and the 
calls for a reform from the British and the Belgians. Indeed, the US 
delegation largely sought to maintain as much of the old structure as 
possible because the perception of the purpose of the alliance and 
ultimately the perception of the European allies had not changed, as 
discussed in the previous chapters. The Harmel study was, in other 
words, used by the administration to reinforce the integration principle, 
NATO’s instrumentality to American foreign policy ends and as a 
defensive measure to protect American national interests and freedom of 
action in foreign policy.  Whereas the immediate aim was to bring home 
to the allies that the NATO crisis sparked by de Gaulle’s withdrawal was, 
in fact, over. 
 These objectives were evident in EUR’s position paper of December, 
1966, in which EUR put forward that the US recognized the need to 
‘articulate an up-to-date role for the Alliance’,631 however, the main objectives 
were ‘to assure its [the alliance] continued relevance to efforts to improve East-West 
relations consistent with the President’s October 7 speech; and to assure continued 
governmental and public support for the goals of Western cohesion and the Alliance’s 
deterrent strength’.632 EUR’s formal position was, in other words, 
completely in line with the deliberations of the Acheson Committee and 
a reiteration of the political bargain,633 and as such the Harmel exercise 
was a means to cement the political bargain and force the European 
allies to adhere to the bearing principles of the alliance.  
  The Ministerial meeting in December was however, important for 
other reasons than the adoption of the Harmel study, probably because 
the administration already had adopted the deterrence and détente 
formula with the Acheson Committee’s report. The CIA argued that the 
December, 1966, ministerial meeting was of ‘unusual importance to the future 
of the alliance’634 citing the establishment of McNamara’s Nuclear Planning 
Group (NPG), the future military ‘requirements’ of the alliance, and the 
alliance’s role in East-West matters as tokens of the unusualness. The 
CIA also touched upon the political role of NATO, and argued that the 
reason for the movement from the strictly military role to a political role 
of NATO was a convergence of circumstances; the studies of the threat 
to NATO, NATO’s force levels, and NATO’s economy, and the rapid 
approach of 1969 all contributed to ‘stimulate a searching look at the future 
role of NATO’.635 Although the CIA touched upon the Harmel study the 
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agency was in the dark as to what ‘direction’ the Harmel study would 
take. 
 The CIA also estimated that NATO already had reoriented itself into 
the new political ground by entering a ‘major political area, that of assuming a 
greater role in furthering the East-West rapprochement’636 at the June, 1966, 
ministerial meeting when the allies adopted a resolution that called for 
NATO acting as a ‘clearing house and coordinating point for East-West 
contacts’.637 This work was also fast tracking as NATO’s committee of 
Political Advisors had been given the assignment, promoted by the State 
Department, to summarize the current contacts of each member state 
with the communist countries.  
 As to the future of the alliance the agency presented a somewhat 
bleak picture, which had de Gaulle as its point of departure. The CIA 
argued that de Gaulle had had an impact on the European allies, and 
there was a ‘widespread questioning’ of whether the alliance could 
continue as usual and still present a long term solution to European and 
Atlantic security. Even worse, though, de Gaulle’s withdrawal had 
reinforced the beliefs among some European member states that ‘there is 
no immediate military threat to Western Europe. He has aggravated the existing 
imbalance between European and US power in the alliance and has aroused increased 
concern over US hegemony … Finally, he has encouraged an uncoordinated and 
perhaps dangerously competitive drive to further the East-West détente in Europe.’638  
Although these problems, according to the agency, had been on the 
horizon for some time, another challenge was that the circumstances for 
providing the ‘best’ solutions to these problems were hardly the best. 
The US intervention in Vietnam remained ‘a major impediment to the exercise 
of US leadership’ in the alliance. 
 In the end, the US proposed that the Harmel exercise should have a 
separate study of how the alliance should tackle the problems in out of 
treaty areas was as a way to overcome this impediment, which the CIA 
identified. Furthermore, no other governments in Western Europe, 
including the British, at least according to the CIA, had the same level of 
authority in Western Europe as de Gaulle. Thus, the CIA’s estimates 
underlined the necessity for bringing the European allies’ Eastern 
policies in line and stress the need for a credible deterrent to the 
European allies. These different aspects would become part of the 
Harmel exercise, which the allies adopted after minor debate at the 
December, 1966, ministerial meeting. 
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The Future of the Alliance Relations 
Conferring Equality? 
Although the Harmel study had got on the way with the formal adoption 
in December, 1966, and the McNamara’s Nuclear Planning Group was 
formally established as well, the Western European realignments 
emerged more fully than before. The Johnson administration set out to 
discuss the future of the transatlantic relations at a NSC meeting in May, 
1967.639 The Department of State had composed a paper for the meeting, 
in which the department argued that now the time had come to look 
beyond the immediate problems for which the outlooks were ‘reasonably 
good’,640 instead the administration should prepare for the future. The 
Department of State argued in the paper that as the immediate strains in 
the wake of the French withdrawal  in the Alliance were out of the way, 
the climate between Western Europe and the US was about to improve. 
However, the administration should prepare itself for a far more 
assertive Western Europe, which would take distinct Western European 
approaches to certain problems in contrast to earlier times, when 
Western Europe was content to follow the US.641 The department 
apparently announced to the rest of the administration that the time of a 
complete Western European backed American unilateralism in NATO 
was over. This sparked the rather harsh remarks about Europeans. 
Europeans were, in a cross departmental concurrence, selfish and 
difficult to satisfy.642 
 In contrast to the CIA’s assessment of December, 1966, the State 
Department regarded the Western European assertiveness a healthy 
trend and argued it was not based on the old-fashioned European 
nationalism, but rather it stemmed from ’the European unification movement 
fed by increasing European economic strength’643 and there was a ‘growing desire for 
a European ‘voice’, for achieving parity with the United States in decision-making 
which more and more Europeans recognize cannot be approached, much less achieved, 
without a far greater degree of European integration’,644 and therefore, UK’s 
entry into the Common Market was of prime importance.   
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 The State Department continued this idealist approach to the 
transatlantic relation and argued that the US had to consult with the 
allies ‘fully and carefully’ in the dealings with the Soviet Union, because 
the European allies were ‘sensitive to United States efforts to ease tensions with 
the Soviets – even though that is what they themselves are doing – simply because the 
two super powers, unlike themselves, are physically capable of jointly imposing 
solutions which they fear may not be in accord with West European interests.’645 
However, idealism had its limits. Although the department  argued for 
‘fully and carefully’ consultation with the allies on the American dealings 
with the Soviet Union, the Department of State implicitly suggested that 
any Western dealing with the Soviet Union had to be undertaken by the 
US and not Western European countries. In the paper under the heading 
of ‘East-West’ the Department specified that ‘East-West relations’ meant 
‘Eastern-Western Europe and US-Eastern Europe’.646 Much as the 
deliberations of Owen, of the Policy Planning Council, had revealed, it 
was a central feature of US policy that Western Europe should be 
contained from having ‘out of framework’ dealings with the Soviet 
Union on the subject of a European settlement, as discussed in Chapter 
6. Indeed American unilateralism in its dealings with the Soviet Union 
should be protected from interference from Western Europe. Rusk had, 
in fact, subscribed to the same concept, when he in 1964 strove to 
protect America’s relationship with and policies towards the Soviet 
Union from Germany.647  
 The Department of State’s paper was mostly an information 
memorandum announcing the department’s thoughts on and doings 
with the European allies up until May, 1967, to the rest of the 
administration represented at the NSC meeting. The paper explained that 
as the France-NATO crisis was over and the nuclear question along with 
the force level question was about to be resolved, the American 
emphasis should be placed on ‘the political side of the alliance’,648 to which 
end the Harmel study served.  
 According to the Department, the Harmel study was a result of a 
growing public feeling that there was a need to bring the alliance into 
‘harmony’ with the times, and a Western European desire to counter de 
Gaulle’s attack by ‘improving NATO as a forum for concerting policies’.649 
However, the department also recognized that ‘under the surface [sic], there 
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remains the feeling of many Europeans that they deserve a bigger voice and role in 
NATO. The ultimate answer to lack of balance in the Alliance can only come from 
the Europeans themselves – through their unification. … equality is not something we 
can confer.’650  
 The US would, in other words, only accept equality in the Alliance on 
the basis of a united Europe within the alliance. The Department of 
State in effect artificially limited the ways and means for the European 
allies to gain equality within the alliance. The Grand Design remained the 
preferred scheme for managing and developing the alliance (towards 
equality), whereas some sort of multilateralism or Western European 
unification within the alliance separate from the Western European 
integration process, which de Gaulle had so effectively blocked, as a 
means to equality was completely shut out.  The Belgian foreign minister 
Harmel had, in fact, proposed the latter. Equality was thus not 
something the Johnson administration was prepared to ‘confer’ to the 
European allies. This was essentially a convenient way to maintain some 
unilateralism, since a united Europe within the alliance had somewhat 
long prospects in the late 1960s.    
 The Department of State also brought forward that the US had one 
‘point’ to get across to the allies during the Harmel studies, namely that 
in any European settlement there was a need for a United States 
involvement in all phases, mostly, according to the paper, for formal 
reasons such as the special responsibilities the US had towards Germany. 
However, the department added that ‘we and others will want to emphasize 
NATO’s role in concerting Western policies toward the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe. The French will object to this on principle. Several others will be reluctant 
lest it appear that NATO is confronting the East as a bloc’.651 Indeed, how the 
Alliance should approach the Eastern bloc was decisive for America’s 
unilateralist position in the Alliance. 
 Although the high-level staff the NSC meeting ended up discussing 
Western European selfishness, and Western Europe’s lack of financial 
contributions to the alliance, Bator had urged Johnson before the 
meeting to request a paper on ‘what kinds of things might be done to make good 
use of NATO.’652 Bator argued that the US should be well prepared for 
the conclusions that the Harmel report would end up with, and asked, 
rhetorically, in line with INR’s questioning of NATO’s instrumentality as 
a creator of détente, ‘What are the limitations on using a military alliance for 
other purposes? What kind of institutional changes might make sense?’653 And lastly 
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Bator warned ‘We need to avoid getting trapped into supporting proposals for new 
arrangements which lead nowhere. (We do not want another MLF history).’654  
 Although the latter was crossed out, Bator’s line of thinking revealed 
that at least Bator, the President’s Special Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, had severe reservations about the prospects of the Harmel study 
and the use of NATO for political purposes, such as orchestrating a 
détente but also that he was still somewhat unresolved on the purpose of 
NATO, despite the fact it had been discussed for some years at this 
point in time. There was, in other words, some descend among high 
level policy makers as to the extend the alliance could be moved into the 
political area as the opposite of the strictly military area.   
 
Close Coordination and Atlantic Links 
In a back-ground paper from the Policy Planning Council to the State 
Department’s European desk on the future of Europe, Miriam Camps655  
also discussed the relations between the US and Western Europe in light 
of this new mood in Western Europe. Camps argued that two 
developments had changed the character of the American relations with 
Western Europe. One was the diminishing threat from the Soviet Union 
towards Europe; another was the stability and prosperity in Western 
Europe, which demanded less American involvement than in the 1950s. 
Moreover, the European ‘climate of opinion’656 resented a continuation of 
American involvement anno 1950s.657 Camps characterized the relation 
of the 1950s as ‘abnormal and markedly unequal’,658 and argued that the US 
should maintain the ‘closeness’ of the 1950s in the future because of 
Western Europe’s growing strength and unity. Camps elaborated on the 
concept of a ‘uniting Europe’, which referred to the inclusion of the UK 
and other Western European countries into the EC, and argued, 
displaying a certain traditionalism, that the US continued to favor 
Western European unity both because ‘it is good for the countries in Europe 
themselves’659 but also because ‘it is good for the United States to have in a uniting 
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Europe … a partner who shares our basic conceptions about the nature of the world 
order we hope to see develop’.660  
 NATO was according to Camps the ‘institutional link’ between the 
European and Atlantic camp, and the future task of NATO was the new 
role in easing tensions in the East-West relations. Although Camps 
displayed some skepticism towards the Eastern European attitudes, 
Camps believed this was a genuine and important task for NATO. 
However, while exploring the possibilities in Eastern Europe ‘it is 
important that the NATO nations keep each other informed; that we move in 
parallel rather than cross purposes. We are not suggesting that the Atlantic nations 
try to have a single collective approach to the East, but we do need to have a closely 
coordinated approach if the opportunities for improving the situation in Central 
Europe are to be fully and safely exploited’.661 The hitherto existing 
bilateralism, i.e., that Western European states uncoordinated with the 
rest of the allies including the US exchanged goods and culture with 
Eastern Europe, was considered somewhat ‘unsafe’ by Camps, 
completely in line with the State Department’s thinking since the  first 
Bridge Building policy in 1964, with which, as discussed in Chapter 4, 
the administration aimed at controlling the European allies’ Eastern 
European outreach to protect the American position in the alliance and 
Europe at large. At the same time, Camps declared, the US did not want 
a single, collective approach as this would inhibit the American freedom 
of choice in foreign policy, this sort of approach would tamper with US 
unilateralism. Camps added to her analysis that the Policy Planning staff 
hoped that the Harmel study would come up with ‘some imaginative new 
ideas’ about how NATO could play a role in the search for a European 
settlement.  
 Camps did not see the Harmel study resulting in something that 
would inhibit the American unilateralism. Camps, in fact, envisioned that 
the ‘three main strands’ in America’s European policy, namely continued 
European integration, maintenance of the Atlantic ‘link’, and pursuance 
of better relations with Eastern Europe, would be mutually supporting 
and not cause friction if the US and ‘Western Europe see and understand the 
need for all three strands in similar terms’,662 i.e., there was no room for 
Gaullist thinking or any other diverging political thinking, which would 
break with the assumptions  upon which these ultimately American 
strands was based.  Camps’ report displayed a traditional approach to the 
transatlantic relations despite this new political mood in Western 
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Europe. The new mood only caused Camps to deliberate on,  how a 
protective unilateralism was maintained in dealing with the Alliance’s 
new task in Eastern Europe despite this new assertiveness in Western 
Europe (that was the very reason for this ‘future’ task).  Indeed, Camps 
stressed more than once in the report, that there was a ‘need’ to get the 
European allies to see the strands in ‘similar terms’ as America.  
 
Harmel – the Decisive Phase 
The issue of how to maintain US unilateralism when the Alliance moved 
into the political field was a decisive issue for the American delegation at 
the Harmel study, which  went into its formulating phase during the 
summer and fall of 1967.  
  Subgroup 3 on NATO’s general defense policy and posture was 
headed by Foy Kohler reflecting the importance the Johnson 
administration attached to bringing home to the allies the absolute 
necessity of an adequate deterrence based on the integration principle, as 
discussed in Chapter 6, especially the State Department wanted to force 
the European allies to re-commit to the integration principle, and as the 
Department of State was in charge of the Harmel study, this was one 
objective. Another objective was to strike a balance between 
coordinating and controlling the European allies’ policies without 
jeopardizing US unilateralism. Subgroup 1, which studied East-West 
relations, was one venue for the Department of State to find the right 
balance between American unilateralism and coordination of policies. 
Another object was to raise the matter of the European allies’ behavior 
in out of treaty areas, which subgroup 4 was dedicated to.  
 
Protective measures 
Much in line with Camps’ background paper on the future of Europe 
Kohler explained in the summer of 1967 to the British rapporteur 
Watson of Subgroup 1 that the continued blossoming of East-West 
contacts in Europe demanded that the allies were ‘fully cognizant of the 
impact on the security and political cohesion of Western Europe, of the progressive 
effects of these contacts and thus, where possible we should coordinate our efforts.’663 
The administration clearly believed that the difficulty was how to 
maintain and protect the American freedom of action in foreign policy 
while at the same time achieve this coordination and control with the 
allies’ foreign policies within the alliance. Kohler argued that although 
NATO was central for East-West relations there were ‘limits on how far it 
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will be possible and desirable to coordinate East-West relations’664 in NATO, and 
suggested that there should be some ‘benchmarks’ indicating when 
coordination of policy was necessary.  Accordingly Kohler urged Watson 
to consider ‘what action will be particularly important to coordinate, and what the 
feasible limits may be on consultation about East-West matters’, and suggested 
that ‘at least we can expect NATO to serve as a clearing house, which will help to 
provide each member of the Alliance with an over-all view of the state of East-West 
relationships, and reduce the risks of the NATO governments working cross purposes 
with each other’,665 in other words, that the benchmarks would ensure the 
Western European allies did not inhibit or work against Americas’ 
foreign policy ends. Arguably the benchmarks can be seen as a defensive 
measure to protect US interests and policies from direct or indirect 
Western European interference.  
 Watson’s Subgroup 1 submitted paragraphs stating a sort of 
controlled bilateralism, thus ‘bilateral discussions between Eastern and Western 
states are indispensable means for improving relations between East and West in a 
period of relaxation of tension. They can be of great value if proceeded within the 
framework of agreed objectives, and if the governments concerned continue to observe 
their responsibilities to each other as members of the alliance.’666 However, 
Subgroup 1’s final report also stated that there were limits to this 
controlled bilateralism’s possibilities for great achievements. The report 
stated that as the relations between East and West would develop due to 
the bilateral contacts, it was likely that the exchanges would deal 
increasingly with matters that concerned the entire alliance, therefore ‘in 
order to shape a stable larger European structure, involving both the United States 
and the Soviet Union, it will be desirable increasingly to work towards multilateral 
exchanges with Eastern governments in addition to bilateral ones.’667  
 Thus, the benchmarks for when multilateralism was necessary, that 
Kohler had proposed to the British rapporteur, were limited to the 
matter of a European settlement. The benchmarks therefore on one 
hand left America’s relationship with the Soviet Union untouched and 
out of reach by the European allies. Thus, America’s freedom of action 
in its dealings with the Soviet Union was preserved and protected from 
European entanglement and interference. On the other hand, 
multilateralism on a European settlement codified American presence in 
Europe – thus hindered the exclusion of the US from any European 
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settlement as had been discussed in the administration earlier.668  This 
benchmarking exercise also reflected the Johnson administration’s 
ultimate rejection of the Gaullist approach to the European 
settlement.The entire Harmel exercise can, as Bozo argues, be seen as 
the final showdown with French president de Gaulle and the Gaullist 
schemes for Europe.669 Subgroup 1’s final report ended the part on 
multilateralism versus bilateralism with stressing that the alliance was ‘an 
excellent forum for establishing … and for maintaining the necessary degree of co-
ordination both in our bilateral and multilateral dealings with the East’,670 just as 
Camps and the rest of the Department of State had argued throughout 
1966. 
 However, as this may seem right up America’s alley, the European 
allies were, in fact, also keen on maintaining their freedom of action in 
East-West matters. The Gaullist claim that there was a preponderance of 
American power in Western Europe was widely accepted.  
 Kohler also pushed the principle of integration to the British 
rapporteur, and argued  that the Soviet Union despite the relaxation of 
tensions continued to be a major military threat towards Western Europe 
and the US, and therefore demanded an ‘adequate deterrence’ which was 
fundamental for the future relations between East and West.671 Needless 
to say any adequate deterrence was based upon the principle of 
integration. Behind this insistence on the deterrence was the widely held 
assumption in the Johnson administration that Western Europeans were 
inclined to interpret the Soviet Union’s relative peaceful approach to 
them as a genuine expression of peaceful intentions, contrary to the 
administration, which continued subscribing to old perceptions, and 
argued that the Soviet outlook had not changed nor was about to, in fact 
, détente was still a crafty tactic to break up the Western alliance 
according to the Johnson administration672 Kohler’s insistence on the 
adequate deterrence was also an expression of how the staff of the 
Department of State had their hearts set on obtaining a renewed, formal 
adherence to the integration principle from the European allies. 
 
Reviving the Grand Design 
In August, 1967, Rostow, Johnson’s NSA, estimated that France would 
withdraw completely from the alliance in 1968, and in the same month 
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the CIA estimated that de Gaulle was prepared to side with the USSR on 
all matters that would not risk the American nuclear umbrella.673 
However, the administration did not begin to talk about ‘a second 
French crisis’ until September, 1967, when the Harmel study went into 
its final and decisive phase. The administration realized that although the 
French obstructionism was somewhat presupposed, it also posed serious 
problems.  The Department of State argued that if France used the 
Harmel exercise as a pretext for withdrawing completely from the 
alliance, it could have serious impact on the alliance and alliance 
cohesion.674 However, as before, the coupling of Gaullism and German 
politics was something the Johnson administration dreaded, and 
Cleveland, the administration’s Permanent Representative to NATO, 
warned that the Germans probably found it more desirable to 
demonstrate the existence of ‘a Franco-German rapprochement’ than a 
‘forthright result’ from the Harmel exercise.675 Germany was not alone in 
worrying about the relationship with France, that  subsequently 
restrained them during the Harmel study, indeed, both Canada and 
Denmark had these considerations and, according to the Department of 
State, ‘this reinforces their own reluctance to take on additional political commitments 
via the alliance’. 676 The lack of the German backing would puncture any 
study on the future of the alliance.  
 The French especially found it difficult to deal with Subgroup 2’s 
report. Subgroup 2 was led by the former Belgian foreign minister and 
NATO Secretary General Paul Henri Spaak, who had written a report on 
inter-allied relations that ‘was a cry from the heart’.677 Spaak’s report was 
strongly anti-Gaullist and stressed the need for Western European unity 
and Atlantic partnership. Although Rusk characterized the report with 
forbearance, Rusk was in complete agreement with Spaak’s deliberations, 
which were essentially a recast of the Grand Design. Indeed, Rusk’s 
instructions to the relevant posts were an instrument to revive the Grand 
Design: ‘while US would not want to take the initiative in pushing the idea in 
formal meetings, US participants should endeavor to stimulate Belgium or some other 
country to put in appropriate proposal for increased European cohesion in the 
Alliance framework (i.e., a development of the Belgian idea for a ‘European caucus’). 
Such a proposal could relate to the principle of advance discussions among all or some 
European members of the Alliance on subjects for political consultation in NAC. … 
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it would … be very useful for the idea to be advanced as clearly as possible with 
appropriate language to make clear that objective is to improve Western European 
cohesion and cooperation on broad framework of Atlantic cooperation’.678 Implicit in 
Rusk’s instruction and the Grand Design was the idea that European 
skirmishes should be solved without American political entanglement, 
although also without the Europeans escalating the matter beyond 
American control via the NATO framework. Rusk in other words, was 
as traditional in his thinking as he possibly could be.   
 In the end, France did not withdraw from NATO or the Harmel 
exercise. The French feared that they would be isolated in Europe and 
break the bond with Germany if they refused to adopt the report’s 
conclusions.679 Thus, the administration’s fears proved quite unfounded.  
 
America’s Major Interests 
Although the French were ‘a major tactical and diplomatic problem’680 the 
State Department argued by the fall of 1967, that there remained three 
‘important substantive issues’ to be sorted out at the Harmel exercise. 
The first was the East-West relations in a European context, in particular 
‘the general balance to be struck between the continuing need for Western strength and 
efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern 
Europe’681 and in connection with this balance the ‘best arrangements for 
concerting Western policies and positions’.682 The second was the inter-allied 
relations, and the third was ‘the extent to which and the means by which the 
Alliance members should harmonize their policies regarding developments beyond the 
North Atlantic Treaty area’.683 
 The Department of State reiterated that the US had been in basic 
agreement with the Belgian government’s rationale for undertaking the 
study, in fact, the US agreed that there was a need to respond to the 
‘atmosphere of détente’, ‘reexamine the Alliance’s task in light of 
Western Europe’s recovery and increased strength’, and ‘re-cement’ the 
alliance in the wake of de Gaulle’s withdrawal.684 However, the 
department revealed that the US had ‘two points of major interest’ in the 
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alliance study, namely ‘elicit … a greater Allied role and sense of collective 
responsibility on a global basis as well as in the strictly NATO and European 
context’, and ‘to establish the need for maintenance of Western deterrent strength and 
political cohesion; i.e. to strike a careful balance between deterrence and détente’ 
[underlining in original]685  
 In other words, the Acheson committee’s formula was official 
strategy, and the focus on out of treaty area was completely in line with 
INR’s argumentation during 1965 and 1966.686 The Acheson 
Committee’s formula was, as argued in Chapter 6, a means to contain 
and control the allies’ Eastern policies and maintain alliance cohesion, 
which ultimately was a protection of US foreign policy interests, indeed a 
policy of detachment.  
 However, the most ‘difficult’ area in the entire study was, according 
to the State Department, ‘the question of harmonizing Alliance policies beyond 
the North Atlantic Treaty area.687   Although the department did not believe 
it wise to ‘try an engage others directly on Vietnam or Cuba via NATO’688 it was 
nevertheless necessary ‘to build the greatest possible common understanding and 
support for our objectives’ 689[underlining in the original]. However, the 
European allies were, according to the Department, extremely wary of 
American pressure, even though some of them would be willing to 
‘harmonize’ policies. Therefore, according to the Department of State, 
the Harmel exercise was a first step in a ‘continuing process of re-engaging 
Western Europe’s interest and sense of responsibility on a world-wide basis’690 
[underlining in original].  
 The Harmel report’s recommendations were formally adopted at the 
NATO ministerial meeting in December, 1967. In the final report, the 
allies adhered to the principle of integration, the necessity of deterrence, 
a coordinated détente, and maintained that the Alliance was the primary 
vehicle for a European settlement. Indeed the allies largely adhered to 
the formula of the Acheson Committee that was later refined by the 
Department of State. Accordingly the allies stated that  ‘Its [NATO] first 
function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter 
aggression and other forms of pressure .’ And that ’military security and a policy of 
détente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence is a stabilizing 
factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed 
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towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability in Europe 
rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of détente. 
The participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement 
of the political problems in Europe’.691 On the matter of benchmarks, that is, 
the means for the Department of State to maintain a certain 
unilateralism, the allies declared that: ‘As sovereign states the Allies are not 
obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an 
effective forum and clearing house for the exchange of information and views; thus, 
each of the Allies can decide its policy in the light of close knowledge of the problems 
and objectives of the others. To this end the practice of frank and timely consultations 
needs to be deepened and improved. … bearing in mind that the pursuit of détente 
must not be allowed to split the Alliance. The chances of success will clearly be greatest 
if the Allies remain on parallel courses’.692  
 Indeed, US Western European policy aims on the reconstitution of 
the Alliance, which had been developed since at least de Gaulle’s 
withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command in March, 1966, was 
achieved with the Harmel report’s recommendations.. These policy aims 
reflected, besides security needs, a certain purpose of the Alliance based 
on a certain perception of the European allies, namely a rejection of the 
European reason of state. As such, the Harmel report’s 
recommendations and reasoning were an expression of an American 
policy of detachment towards the Alliance as it had moved into the 
political area.    
 Only the question on Allied behavior in the out of treaty areas, did 
the Department of State’s aims suffer a setback. The final report stated 
that although the rest of the world was of great importance, the UN was 
the first and foremost venue for allied contributions to solving problems 
in these areas. This apparent Western European reluctance to commit 
globally via the alliance reflected the level of divergence on global 
policies between the US and the European allies.   
 The Department of State to a large extend succeeded with re-
cementing the alliance, and induce the allies to re-adhere to the 
fundamental principle of deterrence based on integration. Moreover, the 
department also succeeded with securing and protecting America’s 
foreign policies from European interference while at the same time 
NATO was reinforced as an instrument for coordinating policies, and 
therefore an instrument for the US to control the allies’ policies. The 
Harmel report’s recommendations in effect established conditions for a 
policy of detachment. Did this mean that the European allies did not 
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object to a certain level of US unilateralism? Or the other way round, the 
European allies wanted to retain some unilateralism as well.    
 
A New German Assertiveness 
Immediately after the Grand Coalition came to power and Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger entered the Chancellery in December, 1966, the Policy 
Planning Council of the State Department moved quickly to asses ‘the 
implications of a more independent German foreign policy’.693 The Council 
asserted that the current trend towards a more independent or nationalist 
German foreign policy stemmed from a correlation of circumstances 
among which an ‘increasing German frustration over the fact that the policies of 
Western strength and unity’694 had produced no progress towards unification, 
which appeared ‘more distant than ever’.695 The Germans were also, 
according to the Council, disillusioned if there would ever be a place for 
Germany as something more than a client state in a Western European 
community or a united Atlantic community. Moreover, the American 
détente policies were largely read in Germany as a something that would 
underwrite the German division rather than promote a solution or even 
prepare a path for unification. In addition, the German leaders ‘generally’ 
felt that the US had ignored of even tried to override ‘essential FRG 
interests on important issues in the context of intra-Atlantic relations.’696 The 
Council also argued that de Gaulle also had an impact in Germany. On 
one hand by example; de Gaulle had exploited the East-West détente, 
which reinforced the ‘strong inclination to develop relations with Eastern Europe, 
especially East Germany, without regard to ideological restraints.’697 The German 
‘nationalists’, in fact, entertained the idea that German unification was 
reachable with the Soviet Union on the basis of neutralization. On the 
other hand, Gaullism’s claims about US domination were also ‘attractive’ 
to some German leaders. Although the Council argued that German 
leaders still maintained the support for NATO and Western European 
unity, the sense of a new direction in German foreign policy was 
overriding, and by January, 1967, there was no clear course or consensus 
in the Johnson administration on what this new independent policy 
would entail.  
 The Council suggested two solutions to this new German trend. One 
of them was to ‘turn the FRG trend toward greater independence so that it might 
generate increasing maturity, consistent with the maintenance of US-FRG confidence 
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and of political cohesion among the key members of the Atlantic Alliance’.698 The 
‘essential’ US interest in this scheme was that Western Germany found a 
‘politically satisfying role in an increasingly cohesive Western community’,699 which 
made a ‘turning’ of the German trend possible, however only if there 
were a Western community in which Germany could find a political 
appropriate place. The problem was, according to the council, that 
Western cohesion and Western frameworks, both the Atlantic alliance 
and Western European integration, were somewhat fragile and therefore 
not able to absorb an assertive Germany, and the odds were considerable 
for an acceleration of the German trend. The question was, therefore, 
how the US could bring about a sufficient framework to turn the 
Germans into?  
 In a straight forward fashion, the Council argued that ‘there is little, if 
any, prospect of significant progress in the near future toward Atlantic unity. This 
judgment should require no elaboration, for the US itself is not ready for any serious 
limitations on its sovereignty, even if the Europeans were now interested in accepting 
some subordination of their sovereignties in an Atlantic framework’.700 In other 
words, the US was not on the verge to move beyond the existing level of 
political organization of the Atlantic framework and the Council’s 
insistence on unilateralism prevented the creation of a sufficient 
framework to contain the ‘new’ assertive Germany. Thus, the American 
unilateralism was, in fact, not only under pressure from Gaullist claims 
about an American hegemony in Western Europe but was also now 
caught up with by the actual political and economic development in 
Germany. The Council even added that although it was important to 
make efforts to improve the political consultation in NATO, 
consultation did not ‘by its very nature’701 lend itself to any progress on 
Atlantic unity. Thus, the US should merely concentrate on keeping the 
existing institutions ‘alive’.  
 The prospects for establishing a Western European framework to 
turn Germany into was equally scarce. Although a British entry into the 
EEC, which the Wilson government planned to apply for, was probably 
going to be vetoed by de Gaulle, and even in the event of British entry, 
there was no guarantee for a significant political role for Germany in 
Western Europe, according to the Council’s thinking.   
 The Western European integration scheme also posed a separate 
problem for the US. De Gaulle’s key objection to British entry was still 
the special relationship in the nuclear field, and the Wilson government 
was aware of this and had already shown signs to use the British nuclear 
technology as some sort of bargaining chip with the French. The US had 
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refused and continued to refuse letting the French in on American 
nuclear technology via the British, however the British might, according 
to the Council, proceed anyway, which obviously was against the policy 
of disarming the European allies. One option for the US to hinder this 
exchange was the nonproliferation scheme. The NPT could, in fact, be 
turned into the very political framework, which FRG could be tied or 
‘turned’ into, where the Germans would enjoy a politically appropriate 
and equal role among the other Western European great powers.702  
 The NPT framework was the Council’s primary proposal to ‘turn’ 
the new German trend. However, in the event it was rejected the 
Council suggested an approach that would maintain or even expand the 
German confidence in the German-American relationship. This 
however, might at times mean, according to the Council, that the US had 
to support German initiatives and policies which were in conflict with 
US interests and policies.703 Obviously this solution was second to 
creating a ‘new’ Atlantic framework such as the NPT, since it would 
potentially compromise American interests and unilateralism in US 
dealings with the Soviet Union, as discussed in the previous Chapters.  
The protection of America’s policy towards the Soviet Union from 
Germany had, in fact, already been an issue in 1964, when the Erhard 
administration presented their Peace Plan, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Tying Germany in the NPT 
The European clause 
The question of German adherence to the NPT had been going back 
and forth between Washington and Bonn since the fall of 1966 before 
the Policy Planning Council detected the new assertiveness and proposed 
to ‘turn’ the new German trend into a nonproliferation scheme, and 
before the Johnson administration believed there was a shift in the 
Soviet position on the possibility to conclude a nonproliferation treaty in 
October, 1966. The Erhard administration had made it clear that they 
demanded that a nonproliferation treaty would not prohibit a future 
European nuclear force under European command.704 Contrary to this 
the British was against the European option, indeed ‘Her Majesty’s 
Government have always considered that a non-proliferation treaty should exclude the 
possibility of nuclear dissemination to associations of states, whatever their membership 
and whether or not an existing nuclear power should cease to have control of nuclear 
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weapons’.705 The Johnson administration thus faced a delicate question in 
Western Europe.  
 The question of a European nuclear force in connection with the 
administration’s plans for a nonproliferation treaty had been on the 
agenda in both the White House and the Department of State since the 
MLF was finally sunk in December, 1964. NSAM 322 of December 17, 
1964, stated very clearly that the administration was against a European 
clause, and even reluctant to revise such a provision if Europe turned 
federated. This was, as argued in Chapter 5, a policy of detachment in 
the nuclear field.  In the fall of 1966, the administration had decided to 
resume the negotiations with the Soviet Union for a nonproliferation 
treaty in Geneva. The Soviets appeared to have shifted position on the 
matter of détente, in December, 1966, Kosygin, the Soviet ambassador 
to Washington, publicly announced that the US and the USSR had a 
‘community of interests’.706  
 In August, 1966, Walt Rostow, who had become LBJ’s National 
Security Advisor on the condition that he would have close cooperation 
with the Department of State,707 tabled his thoughts on the 
nonproliferation treaty and the central issues, which it raised including 
the issue of a Western European right to fire nuclear weapons.  
According to Rostow, the ‘real issue’ with a nonproliferation treaty was 
whether, if an agreement between the US and the Soviet Union was 
reached, the US would be forced to ‘freeze’ the nuclear organization of 
the West ‘ruling out either an Atlantic collective nuclear system or a European 
system’,708 and not, as was often assumed, primarily German ‘access to 
nuclear weapons or German influence over nuclear decisions.’709 Rostow argued, 
that FRG in fact was, in a limited sense, a nuclear power because of the 
two-key bilateral arrangement Germany had with the US. The limitation 
of American freedom of action that a ‘freeze’ of the nuclear organization 
in both Europe and South East Asia would, in Rostow’s argument, force 
the US to maintain the two-key bilateral system. Although this had one 
great advantage namely ‘the requirement of a U.S. positive decision to fire is 
ambiguous’,710 the disadvantages far overshadowed this.  Rostow claimed 
that if the US accepted this limitation Europe would see it as a step 
against European integration. Furthermore, and more importantly, it was 
possible that Western Europe would settle with a European nuclear 
system with an independent European right to fire, which the Germans 
had argued for, a system which would force the US to pull back from 
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Western Europe. Indeed, ‘as soon as a united Europe claimed a right to fire 
independent of the U.S. we would pull back. We cannot let SAC [Strategic Air 
Command] be triggered without our assent; and our intimate, integrated NATO 
arrangement involve us so deeply that a European firing would involve us.’711 As 
discussed in Chapter 5 in connection with the MLF, an independent 
European finger on the nuclear trigger would drag the US into a 
principally exclusive European war, however, according to Rostow the 
US would retreat from Europe in that situation.  
 However, Rostow argued that ‘thoughtful’ Europeans would ‘accept 
both the advantages of our involvement and a continued US veto.’712 Limiting the 
US from creating an Atlantic nuclear force with a continued American 
veto also inhibited the Johnson administration’s policy, adopted with 
NSAM 345 Nuclear Planning, which formalized that the US should work 
towards hindering further establishments of national nuclear deterrents 
in Europe, and get the UK and France to abolish their national nuclear 
deterrents.713 Rostow further argued that without the possibility of 
creating a NATO nuclear system Germany, Italy and others would ‘go 
national’ because of the pressures from the Force de Frappe and the British 
deterrent.714 In other words, the US would be unable to control their 
European allies in the nuclear field unless, according to Rostow,  an 
option for creating a Atlantic framework was maintained in a future 
nonproliferation treaty 
 The only problem, however, was Western Europe’s insistence on the 
‘European clause’. Birrenbach, one of CDU’s Atlanticists and one of 
‘U.S. best friends on the European continent’,715 let the administration know 
that he could not accept ‘a total elimination of the European option’,716 which 
furthermore was the ‘almost ambiguous opinion of the CDU’,717 including the 
Gaullists, who claimed that an independent European nuclear force was 
the only way to go to for Western Europe. The German insistence on 
the European option was, according to Rostow, a symbolic and political 
issue, which made it more powerful than had it been military or 
technical.718  
 McNamara agreed with Rostow that ‘the heart of the matter’ was that as 
long as the US was committed via NATO to Western Europe, the US 
‘cannot, should not, will not give up our veto over firing nuclear weapons in that 
theater’.719 However, the issues of a Western European insistence on an 
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independent European right to fire from an integrated European nuclear 
force and the American insistence on a nuclear veto the nonproliferation 
treaty constituted a problem between the US and the allies, indeed the 
American veto would lose its significance and instrumentality to control 
a nuclear war.720 Although this had been, at least, a theoretical problem 
for a long time, the prospects of an advance towards an agreement with 
the Soviet Union made the matter of the European clause somewhat 
urgent. 
 The nonproliferation treaty and the European clause, to put it in 
other words, clashed with America’s post-war position as a European 
power and American unilateralism in nuclear affairs. The insistence on a 
European clause was also an expression of the level of Western 
European realignment. Rostow argued that the issue of a European 
clause and the American veto never arose with the MLF scheme because 
the ‘retention of out veto was universally accepted’.721 However, since 1964 when 
the MLF was finally abandoned, Western Europe led by the Germans 
had by the fall of 1966, come to question this nuclear unilateralism as the 
German insistence on the European clause expressed.  
 However, it was not unfounded that the Western Europeans believed 
the US would accept a European clause as Rostow explained Johnson. 
There had been several statements from the administration, statements 
which implied that ‘if the Europeans fully united we would not rule out the 
possibility of their having an independent right to fire nuclear weapons from a 
presumably integrated European nuclear force’.722 However, Rostow 
acknowledged that behind these statements there was no de facto 
American backing to a European nuclear force. The US had merely 
implied their backing to encourage Western European integration, and 
had been confident that ‘if and when’ Europe would be fully integrated 
Western Europe would on one hand ‘in fact, not ask for the surrender of the 
U.S. veto, because they would lose more in the dilution of the U.S. commitment … 
than they would gain by this act of “independence”’,723 and on the other hand if 
Western Europe would reach the stage of ‘true’ integration  there would 
be an equivalent to the American President with whom it would be 
possible to work out a ‘rational  arrangement … consistent with the requirements 
of the alliance.’724 
 Despite the Germans and other allies apparently believed it was 
within reach to have a European clause, Rostow was optimistic that the 
European allies could be made to accept the proposition that in was in 
Western Europe’s interest that the European clause was given up and the 
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American veto thus maintained. Rostow believed that what Western 
Europe really was ‘groping for – although they are not very clear about it [sic] – is 
not an independent right to fire, but an insurance policy against the possibility that at 
some future time some American administration might pick up its nuclear weapons 
and troops and go home’.725 Therefore, the British and the French nuclear 
deterrent and a future common European nuclear force was an insurance 
against Europe being left ‘naked of nuclear capacity’ in the future.726 
Although the Gaullists, either French or German would, in fact, argue 
for an European finger on the nuclear trigger in reality, the fear of being 
nuclearly abandoned by the US was real for some allies, such as 
Denmark.727  
 Thus, according to Rostow, as long the US remained a ‘fully 
committed ally’ Western Europe could be made to see that ‘it is ridiculous 
for them to think of firing their nuclear weapons without ours; and that the threat to 
use a small nuclear force in Europe to engage us in a nuclear war to which we were 
not committed could only lead to the U.S. pulling back and dissociating itself from 
European defense. No American President is going to place in the hands of the 
Europeans – or anyone else – the right to determine when we are engaged in a nuclear 
war’ [underlining in original].728 This line of thinking was the ultimate 
rejection of the European reason of state, and the ultimate outcome of 
the policy of detachment in the nuclear field. The whole idea of keeping 
untangled in European wars had been the guiding line since the late 
1700s, and Rostow’s notion that the US would isolate itself from a war 
the US was not committed to, reflected the proposition that wars in 
Europe, which the US was not committed to, in fact, was a result of the 
faulty European reason of state.   
 Although Rostow still doubted in September, 1966, that the Soviet 
Union was truly interested in nonproliferation; rather the Kremlin was 
interested in breaking up the Western alliance, he argued that 
nonproliferation essentially was in both the American, Soviet, and 
Western European interest that a nonproliferation treaty would not be 
limited, and thereby rule out a collective Atlantic nuclear force in the 
future. A treaty without this limitation would meet Soviet interests in 
tying Germany down (guaranteed by America’s veto) and meet Western 
Europe’s interest in not being abandoned by the US by way of 
maintaining the American veto.729 Rostow proposed that this new 
proposition was suggested to the Soviet Union at ENDC in Geneva. In 
October, 1966, Rostow’s skepticism towards Soviet intentions was 
confounded as Johnson met with Soviet foreign minister Gromyko, and 
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at the meeting the possibility of a summit on nuclear proliferation was 
launched.730 
 Only Owen of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council did 
not see a problem with an independent European nuclear force, in fact, a 
collective European force would (in a distant) future absorb both the 
French and British nuclear deterrents. Moreover, Owen did not see a 
problem with ruling out the possibility for the US to create an Atlantic 
nuclear arrangement without a certain level of European integration. 
 Owen argued that the nonproliferation treaty with a specific duration 
should consist of two protocols one pertaining to the two superpowers, 
in which they pledged not to surrender control over nuclear weapons to 
any country or group of countries, and another protocol for the 
European allies stating that they would not join or create a collective 
nuclear force except when ‘European integration reaches the point at which 
European countries decide to substitute a collective defense for present national nuclear 
forces’.731 Owen’s rationale for this ‘successor state principle’ was that on 
one hand it would prohibit the superpowers from giving up their 
respective vetoes, and on the other hand it would prohibit a collective 
force from being created except when European integration had moved 
substantially further. Owen claimed this was a substantial change in the 
current US position at Geneva since it prohibited the superpowers from 
giving up their vetoes, and prohibited the formation of collective forces 
unless the European integration criteria was met. Owen was probably 
quite in line with the original thinking, namely that a fully integrated 
Western Europe would not consider it an interest to actually have an 
independent nuclear force, however, Owen also claimed that this 
reflected ‘reality’ and revealed himself as quite a theologian. Owen 
argued that ‘it seems unlikely, given developments in this field [collective nuclear 
force] since December 1964, that any collective force will be formed, except as a result 
of progress toward European integration’.732 Thus, by maintaining a certain 
level of European integration as a precondition for the formation of a 
collective nuclear force, Owen essentially re-launched another 
theological MLF scheme to further Western European integration. 
Moreover, Owen also revealed that the administration would not create a 
collective nuclear force without a proper level of European integration.
  
 Owen also argued that the administration should consult with the 
Germans, since, according to Owen at least, the German public opinion 
was preoccupied with ‘equality’ and Wehner, one of the ‘Big three in the 
SPD’ had stated that ‘unconditional support of the SPD for every treaty called a 
non-proliferation was out of the question’, and although the SPD supported a 
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treaty ‘if it can be determined that such a treaty is not meant simply as instrument of 
discrimination against the Federal Republic’.733 The question of whether or not 
there would be a European option was apparently a benchmark for 
discrimination of the Federal Republic in the German government 
across the SPD and CDU. 
 Owen’s proposal for a successor state principle did not become the 
formal position of the US at first. Rather Rostow’s concept, and with 
him McNamara and Rusk set out to maintain the American veto and not 
leaving room for a European clause.734  
 Apart from the US administration’s opposition to a European clause 
the Soviet Union also had grave reservations about such a construct. 
Kosygin and Gromyko were ardently against an article that did not 
explicitly bar the transfer of weapons and control of weapons from a 
nuclear state to a group of states, which they argued merited to arm 
Germany with nuclear weapons via NATO or via the creation of an 
independent European force with either the British or French weapons. 
Although the Johnson administration did see eye to eye with the Kremlin 
on this issue, the administration faced a major challenge with 
accommodating the Germans. Indeed the Kiesinger administration 
picked up where the Erhard administration had left, and declared in 
January, 1967, as the negotiations with the Soviet Union was well under 
way, that they in principle were in favor of the ‘NPT enterprise’735 
however, Kiesinger’s primary ‘preoccupation’ was ‘keeping open the option 
for a European nuclear force’,736 which would, according to Kiesinger, have 
come out of a further European integration.737 This position was 
reinforced again in May, as the administration’s best friend Birrenbach 
once again raised the issue of a European clause.738   
 The solution to the administration’s difficulty was an interpretation 
of the treaty’s article 2 based on the combination of the principle of ‘what 
is not prohibited by the treaty is permitted’739 and a watered down concept of a 
European independent force, namely Owen’s successor state principle. 
The treaty ‘would not bar succession by a new federated European state to the 
nuclear status of one of its former components’.740 This concept also had the 
advantage of British support; the British had, in fact, delivered a note to 
Kosygin stating exactly this interpretation.741  
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 The interpretation also served as something that made the NPT a 
framework, which German assertiveness could be turned into as 
suggested by the Policy Planning Council.742 The Council estimated that 
the successor state principle might well make the German’s accede to the 
NPT, and thereby would the NPT be the very framework, which the 
assertive Germany was turned into.  
 The administration had, in fact, floated the successor state principle 
to the German Foreign Minister Brandt in February, 1967, who stated 
that ‘he and the Chancellor had agreed they could live with the American 
interpretation [of the NPT’s article 2]. Not all of his colleagues, however, were in 
agreement’,743 and Brandt went on to warn against discrimination of 
Germany in terms of the peaceful use of nuclear technology and 
safeguards.  
 Although the administration realized that the Soviet Union would 
not state that they had agreed to such a successor state concept, the 
administration believed it was possible to achieve ‘Soviet silence, or non-
contradiction, when our allies and later the United States, state that the treaty would 
not bar succession by a new federated state to the nuclear status of one of its former 
components’.744 In April, 1967, the administration and the allies presented 
the Soviet Union with this interpretation and warned that if the Kremlin 
‘took an official position in opposition to these interpretations, a very serious problem 
would arise’.745 The Soviet Union did not publicly protest.   
 The NPT was signed in July, 1968, and with the NPT the Johnson 
administration had both created a new framework to turn Germany into 
(although the German’s did not sign the treaty until 1975), and, in fact, 
confronted the essentially Gaullist idea of an independent European 
nuclear force. This also marked a final settlement of the nuclear 
problem, which the administration had struggled with since the MLF 
debacle in 1964. The NPT did not tamper with the nuclear consultation 
in the Alliance, maintained America’s nuclear veto and the current 
organization, and prevented the Western Europeans from establishing an 
independent nuclear force. The NPT was to a large extent a protective 
measure against America’s European allies, and the NPT’s principles and 
articles, which pertained the transatlantic relations was the outcome of a 
policy of detachment.   
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Reconciliation 1968? 
Despite the NPT was a framework to tie the Germans into, the Grand 
Coalition’s Eastern policies troubled the Department of State. In general, 
the department argued in the fall of 1967, that the new trend in German 
foreign policy had been on its way since 1966 – since the Grand 
Coalition took office. Although the department did see an abolition of 
the client state relation, and Germany’s outreach to Eastern Europe and 
subsequent Ostpolitik as coinciding with American interests, the 
department still feared that the Western bloc might lose control over 
Germany. The new trend in German foreign policy also revealed itself in 
the renewed effort to improve relations with France.746 The Policy 
Planning Council speculated in the fall of 1967, if Germany in fact would 
pursue a neutralization of Germany to obtain unification. 747 The 
perception of Germany was, in other words, not very different from the 
immediate post-War years – and not very different from the estimates of 
1965-1966. As de Gaulle had blocked British entry into the EEC again, it 
was hardly surprising that the Department of State concluded in the 
spring of 1968, that European integration was not enough to tie 
Germany in.748 
 American relationship with France did not reach a new stage of 
accommodation after the French withdrawal from the integrated 
command in March, 1966. To the contrary, France had objected to the 
NPT as both another structure for the US to command and control 
Western Europe and a creation of a super power condominium in 
Europe. In the late summer of 1967 there were several estimates floating 
in the administration that de Gaulle would withdraw France from 
SEATO and NATO entirely, as de Gaulle’s concept of alliance rested on 
the principle that the existence and necessity of alliances were directly 
related to the level of the threat, and by late 1967, the détente had 
created conditions for a complete French withdrawal. Coupled with the 
level of American hegemony in Western Europe, de Gaulle was set on 
creating irreversible situations according to a cross departmental line of 
thinking.749 
 Johnson announced his intention of not running for a second term as 
President in March, 1968, primarily because of the increasing public and 
Congressional critique of Johnson’s Vietnam policies, an announcement 
that is often characterized as initiating a lame duck period in American 
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politics, including the foreign policy. However, the Johnson 
administration was not that lame duckish in the foreign policy area 
during 1968.  
 As the nonproliferation negotiations had progressed throughout 
1967 and the 1968, the administration had also launched a proposal for 
arms limitations talks in May, 1968, which would turn into the SALT 
negotiations during Nixon. The primary reason for the administration’s 
failure to begin arms limitations talks, despite them being scheduled to 
begin with the Soviets, was not the Soviet intervention in Prague in 
August, 1968, but the President elect Richard Nixon’s refusal to 
accompany LBJ to a summit with the Soviets on arms limitations.750  
 However, the Soviet intervention in Prague on August 20, 1968, did 
influence the transatlantic relations. The Johnson administration saw the 
Soviet intervention as a means to get the European allies to contribute 
with ‘substantive inputs’ to the alliance by which the Department of State 
meant ‘military forces and budgets’.751 Rusk urged that the Alliance did not 
call a high level ministers’ meeting in the light of the Soviet intervention 
but rather began a process of consultation on how each NATO member 
could contribute to strengthen NATO.752  
 At a NSC meeting in September, 1968, Johnson asked his staff ‘how 
we can use this crisis to strengthen Western European defense and NATO’.753 
Although France was reported to uphold the Gaullist foreign policy 
despite the intervention,754 the Department of State in general argued at 
the meeting that the effect on the European allies was substantial and 
that there was a ‘real need to reassure the Alliance’.755 At the NSC meeting 
there was a cross departmental agreement that the crisis was an 
opportunity for the US to find out if the European allies were ready to 
carry a fair share of the burdens in NATO, and Clifford, the new 
Secretary of Defense, argued hawkishly that ‘we must use the crisis to prompt 
NATO states to improve quality of their troops and to improve their mobilization 
potential. We should push hard on the Germans to increase their budgets, we should 
request more from NATO members’.756 Moreover, Clifford argued, that 
NATO members should react promptly by calling a meeting between 
NATO’s defense and foreign ministers to assess the Soviet threat.757 
Fowler, the Secretary of Treasury, interjected that ‘It is well to recall that the 
Berlin crisis led to the first agreement by a NATO member to offset our military 
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expenditures in Europe’.758 Johnson rebuked Clifford, and argued that there 
should be no ‘hurry-up meeting’ and that there was ‘no need to restate our 
commitments’ to the Germans. Instead Germany should take action on 
‘some thing we want them to do’,759 and then the US could reassure the 
Germans. Although the allies had already agreed to assess the 
implications of the Soviet intervention on the NATOs defense policy, ‘in 
particular force postures’, Johnson argued in line with Rusk that it was 
important to, in terms of the European allies, know what they were 
going to do by means of consultation, thus reflecting the long held 
conviction that the European allies potentially could drift. Indeed, 
despite the administration was quite convinced that the European allies 
were frightened by the Soviet intervention, the administration recorded 
that the allies continued to favor negotiations with the Soviet Union, and 
had upheld trade deals with Eastern Europe. The allies’ continued 
détente effort was further highlighted by de Gaulle’s continued Gaullist 
foreign policy and Germany’s continued development of an Eastern 
policy. 
 The Johnson administration did, in fact, see the Czech crisis as an 
opportunity to further consolidate the alliance not only by means of 
offset and force contributions, which was also motivated by a financial 
overburdening of the US, but also by reassuring the allies about the 
American commitment to Western Europe’s defense. At the NSC 
meeting it was discussed how the US could extend the ‘life’ of the treaty 
beyond 1969 at this point in time. Naturally these considerations also 
reflected that there was, according to the Johnson administration, a real 
need to reassure the allies.  
 In the end the Johnson administration succeeded with ‘strengthening’ 
the alliance. NATO adopted a Final Communiqué in November, 1968, 
stating that the allies ‘consider that the situation arising from recent events calls for 
a collective response. The quality, effectiveness, and deployment of NATO’s forces will 
be improved in terms of both manpower and equipment’760 and ‘they also acknowledge 
that the solidarity of the Alliance can be strengthened by co-operation between the 
members to alleviate burdens arising from balance of payments deficits resulting 
specifically from military expenditures for the collective defence’.761 Moreover, the 
European allies were called into line as the Communiqué read that as 
peaceful relations between East and West remained an objective, the 
allies would be, in their pursuance of peaceful relations, ‘bear[ing] in mind 
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that the pursuit of détente must not be allowed to split the Alliance’,762 in return the 
allies was granted that ‘By its constitution the Alliance is of indefinite duration. 
Recent events have further demonstrated that its continued existence is more than ever 
necessary.’763  
 Lastly the communiqué also revealed France’s catch 22, indeed ‘The 
foreign minister of France recalled that, for its part, unless events in the years to come 
were to bring about a radical change in East-West relations, the French government 
considers that the Alliance must continue as long as it appears to be necessary.’764 
The deal was sealed at NATO’s Defence Planning Committee’s 
ministerial session in January, 1969, when a new NATO force plan was 
adopted. 765 The Czechoslovakian crisis did reconcile the allies’ policy 
outlook. 
 
Brief Conclusions 
The years 1966-1968 saw a Johnson administration which was 
increasingly preoccupied, in the relations with the European allies, with 
maintaining and re-cementing over and over again the allies’ adherence 
to NATO’s fundamental principles of integration and deterrence, thus 
reflecting a certain perception of the European reason of state. In this 
process the administration, the Department of State in particular, was 
focused on consolidating the alliance as a means to control the allies’ 
policies and at the same time protecting US interests and foreign policy 
from Western European direct or indirect interference, a line of thinking, 
which rested on a rejection of the European reason of state. Moreover, 
the administration recognized that the Allies wanted equality, however, 
rejected to ‘confer’ equality in the Alliance lest it be to a united Western 
Europe. 
 The years 1966-1968 were the years during which the Johnson 
administration, the Department of State in particular, created the 
conditions in the transatlantic relations that made it possible for the US 
to conduct a policy of detachment in NATO’s political area. The 
administration believed it was compelled to move the Alliance into to 
political area to accommodate the allies since the French withdrawal 
from NATO’s integrated command in 1966.  
 The policy of detachment was reinforced or completed with the 
adoption of the Harmel Study’s principles for the organization of the 
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political cooperation between the US and the European allies. The 
benchmarks, which the administration urged Subgroup 1 to formulate 
served to on one hand, keeping America’s relationship with the Soviet 
Union protected from direct or indirect interference from the European 
allies, and on the other hand, securing American presence and influence 
on a European settlement.  How to protect America’s relations with the 
Soviet Union from the Allies’ policies had continued to be a primary 
subject of study in the Department of State in 1967.The only area in 
which the administration did not succeed at the Harmel exercise was 
with establishing some sort of ‘sense of responsibility’ in the European 
allies in global affairs. France was considered by the administration as a 
separate problem at the Harmel exercise, and the Department of State 
feared that de Gaulle would use the exercise as a pretext to withdraw 
from the Alliance. However, the administration’s fears proved 
unfounded and perhaps even exaggerated.  
 The Non Proliferation Treaty was in terms of America’s relations 
with the European allies also a final settlement of the nuclear problem, 
and the establishment of principles, upon which the US could continue 
the policy of detachment in the nuclear field. The successor state 
principle solved the problem with the European clause, and, in fact, 
confronted the Gaullist claim to an independent European nuclear force. 
Moreover, the NPT served to control the new West German 
assertiveness.   
 Although the administration had succeeded with the Harmel study to 
bring home to the allies the need for deterrence, the Soviet intervention 
in Prague in August, 1968, served the purpose of further reconciling US 
and allied policies in this area. The administration took the opportunity 
to further push the allies to contribute substantially to uphold the 
credible deterrent, and in some ways, the Soviet invasion served to 
reconcile the policy outlooks of Western Europe and America.  
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Chapter 8 Perspectives the Nixon-Ford 
Administration in Comparison, 1973-1975 
Introduction 
The Johnson administration’s policies and perceptions of Western 
Europe were to a large extent based on a certain traditionalist approach 
to Western Europe and NATO. The Johnson administration reasoned 
upon this line of thinking that the US should both protect the 
unilateralist position the US currently had and had held since the 
inception of NATO in 1949, and protect its policy towards the Soviet 
Union from Western European direct or indirect interferences. 
Seemingly the Johnson administration’s policies towards Western 
Europe was an effort to on one hand control or align the allies to US 
policy objectives, while at the same time preserve US unilateralism. 
 Was this line of thinking traditional Democratic or a generic 
American way of looking at Western Europe during the Cold War? Is 
the continuum of involvement and detachment a methodological grip 
that is meaningful beyond the Johnson administration? In the first place 
to encompass a republican mindset? 
 An answer is attempted by comparing the Johnson administrations’ 
policies towards the European allies with that of the republican Nixon 
and Ford administrations in the period 1969-1975.  
 A first glance the Nixon- Ford administration’s policies towards the 
European allies suggests that there were similarities between the 
Democratic Johnson administration’s relations with and policies towards 
the European allies and the Republican Nixon-Ford administration’s 
policies. This despite the fact that things had truly changed in Western 
Europe by the time Nixon came into office in January, 1969.   
Western Europe: Ruptures and Continuities  
The premises for America’s policies towards Western Europe and 
relations with the European allies that the Johnson administration had 
based its policies and perceptions on had changed. The political 
landscape in Western Europe in the 1970s was quite different than the 
landscape of the 1960s. Indeed, the central issues of the 1960s were 
largely resolved or had evaporated by the time Nixon took office in 
January, 1969. 
 After de Gaulle’s departure from French politics in April, 1969, 
Gaullism was no longer the guiding principle for French relations with 
the rest of the world. Pompidou was more pragmatic than de Gaulle, as 
the French acceptance of British entry into the EC was a token of. De 
Gaulle, Gaullism, and the spread of Gaullist ideas, all of which the 
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Johnson administration had considered a primary problem for America’s 
policy towards Western Europe therefore no longer existed. Indeed, the 
ultimate Gaullist objective to create a ‘European Europe’ and in the 
process get rid of America and the  fear of spread of Gaullist ideas in the 
Alliance and in West Germany in particular, were no longer scenarios 
upon which the American administration could base its policy towards 
Western Europe. 
 In the same manner the question of Germany’s orientation no longer 
had an alarmist aura because West German politics had changed. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the struggle between Atlanticism and Gaullism 
was mostly fought during the Erhard Chancellorship (1963-1966), and 
largely faded under the Grand Coalition (1966-1969). By the time Brandt 
took over in 1969, the German Gaullists were a minority, and – in 
addition -- there were a significant popular and political backing to the 
Atlanticist orientation. The Brandt administration’s Ostpolitik also 
brought resolution to the central question of what approach West 
Germany should take towards German unity, which had caused the 
Johnson administration grievance and grounds for wild speculations 
about the future orientation of West Germany, as discussed in Chapter 6 
and 7 in particular. Although the Nixon administration did not receive 
the Brandt administration and the West German Ostpolitik with 
unqualified enthusiasm,766 the fundamental insecurity about West 
Germany’s approach to German unity was no longer a premise for the 
formulation of America’s policies. 
 With the departure of a strong Gaullist voice in both France and 
West Germany, America’s nuclear monopoly were no longer contested, 
as it had been throughout the 1960s. McNamara’s Nuclear Planning 
Group, the Nonproliferation Treaty and the successor state principle had 
also helped closing the issue by the time Nixon entered the White 
House.  
 The Johnson administration’s insecurities about European allies’ 
adherence to NATO’s fundamental principles had largely passed as the 
NATO treaty was up for renewal in 1969, and all 15 allies had renewed 
the adherence to NATO. Although France remained outside the 
integrated command system, France’s adherence to NATO was 
steadfast. The Ailleret-Lemnitzer accords of 1967, resolved that in time 
of East-West hostility and war France would cooperate militarily with 
the Alliance. The French claimed that with the accords, the situation, in 
fact, differed very little from the situation before the French withdrawal 
from the integrated command in March, 1966.767 
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  In other words, the central issues of the 1960s that had been 
imperative for the Johnson administration’s formulation of policies 
towards Western Europe, and the administration’s perceptions of the 
state of America’s relations with the European allies, no longer existed. 
Indeed, by 1974, according to Hanhimäki, there was somewhat of a turn 
in Western European politics towards Atlanticism,768 which arguably 
prevented the state of alarm of the 1960s.   
 The European Community also overcame the strains of the 1960s. 
De Gaulle’s departure resulted in the very first round of enlargement, 
and Britain, Denmark, and Ireland became members of the Community 
in January, 1973. Moreover, the EC moved to develop a common 
foreign policy. Indeed, during the CSCE negotiations, the EC 9, to some 
extent, acted as an entity with common positions on central issues. The 
integration process was, in other words, no longer stalled. 
 However, there were also continuities in Western Europe. Most 
significant, the Western European détente movement continued 
undaunted, and the general move to greater political independence from 
the US continued as the allies’ behavior during the CSCE process 
revealed. The political and economic rehabilitation, which was a 
precondition for this independence, was a matter of fact already in the 
1960s and certainly by the 1970s during the Nixon and Ford 
administrations, despite the passing insecurities about the degree of 
independence from the US in the wake of the Prague Spring in 1968. 
These insecurities were indeed passing, especially as NATO remained 
the guarantor of Western Europe’s security. 
 The question is whether this very different situation in the 1970s in 
Western Europe had an effect on America’s policies and relations with 
Western Europe? 
 
The Constitution of America’s Western European 
policy 1970s 
Institutional Structures 
The formulation of the Nixon administration’s foreign policy was 
contrary to the Johnson administration’s foreign policy exclusively in the 
hands of the President and the National Security Advisor; Kissinger (at 
least until Kissinger became Secretary of State in 1974). Although the 
Department of State continued its day to day management of US 
relations with the world, the department lacked the authority of the 
White House and was informally stripped of its power to formulate and 
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conduct foreign policy on a greater scale. Indeed, Kissinger’s NSA 
institution effectively occupied America’s foreign policy.769  
 This institutional shift from the practice of the Johnson 
administration is partly explained by Kissinger and Nixon’s foreign 
policy philosophy of creating a superpower equilibrium, and coupled 
with the diplomatic style, the so-called linkage strategy, US unilateralism 
was perceived as a precondition for the success of US foreign policy.  
 
The Nixon administration’s Foreign Policy Observations  
Although it is commonly held that the Johnson administration was 
mostly occupied with the Vietnam War at least after the escalations in 
1964, the preceding Chapters are a token of a certain preoccupation with 
preserving and securing America’s most central alliance; NATO and in 
general the Atlantic partnership. By the time Nixon took over, the 
foreign policy focus was however, on Vietnam and how to end the 
war.770  
 The Vietnam War had by 1969 effectively broken the explanatory 
force of the Cold War paradigm, and the bipartisan foreign policy no 
longer existed. The global containment and the domino theory, which 
had guided the Johnson administration’s policy towards Vietnam, had 
broken down gradually in the last years of Johnson’s Presidency, and 
with the Nixon Doctrine the new administration reintroduced a 
hierarchy of interest in American foreign policy. In essence the Nixon 
Doctrine came about as a consequence of the loss of the bipartisanship, 
a loss which indeed had been motivated by a domestic rejection of the 
global scope of America’s commitments.  
 The doctrine stipulated that the US (of course) remained committed 
to the treaty obligations and the nuclear deterrent, but was not 
committed to fight communism everywhere. This line of thinking was a 
break with the global containment policy’s zero-sum calculations of 
power of the previous administrations, including Johnson’s. The Nixon 
administration believed that communism could gain territory for instance 
in the Third World without it necessarily affected the East-West 
balance.771 This also reflected that the new administration’s thinking on 
the post-War structures, in fact, entailed a recognition that the US could 
not continue to sustain these structures endlessly. The overextension of 
America had become a reality. The administration let the Bretton Woods 
system collapse in 1973, as the administration recognized the extent of 
the global overextension.  
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 However, this seemingly new thinking about the balance of the world 
and America’s place in it was, according to Del Pero, ‘compulsory’ and 
Del Pero claims that Humphrey, the Democratic candidate and 
Johnson’s Vice President, would have chosen a similar path for 
America’s foreign policy if he had won the election in 1968.772 This is not 
entirely unfounded, as the Johnson administration in fact did move to 
end the Vietnam War in an ‘honorable way’ and indeed did pursue the 
arms limitation talks despite the Soviet clamp down in Prague. Clearly 
this had to do with Johnson being preoccupied with his legacy; however, 
the fact was that the Johnson administration pursued these goals based 
on genuine political choice. Indeed, Nixon’s opening to China had, in 
fact, been contemplated in the Johnson administration.773  
 In the same manner as Nixon and Kissinger re-thought the extent of 
US commitments; the White House also re-thought and in the end re-
introduced the hierarchy of interest in US foreign policy.774 However, the 
extent of new thinking was limited. The relations with the Soviet Union 
remained the primary interest, and the objective remained containment 
of the Soviet Union and communism in a continued bipolar world. 
Despite the talk about triangular diplomacy and pentagonal structures, 
Kissinger and Nixon believed that the bipolar structure should be 
maintained as it served US interests best.775 Indeed, Kissinger 
contemplated that the primary adversary measured on military power, 
which was, given Kissinger’s realist convictions, the only parameter for 
power, remained the Soviet Union.776  Moreover, according to Del Pero, 
the real invention in the US foreign policy was the discourse used to 
explain and justify the American foreign policy. As in the previous 
administrations, the need for a foreign policy consensus was considered 
important, and with the breakdown of the Cold War paradigm, the 
incoming administration had to build a new consensus.777 
 Kissinger thus sought to build a superpower equilibrium based on 
the belief that bi-polarism was the most meaningful organization of the 
relationship between the two superpowers. Indeed, Kissinger retreated 
from the idea that the Soviet Union could be overthrown or the Cold 
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War won, and set out to build this structure as a meaningful organization 
of this relationship in the 1970s, and the policy to this is end was 
détente. The Nixon administration’s détente policy towards the Soviet 
Union, it was believed at least, would draw the Soviet Union into this 
new state of balance in the relationship and add a certain and necessary 
legitimization to the equilibrium, through for instance arms reductions 
agreements. The US was however, still depicted as the leading power in 
this equilibrium. This essentially structural interdependence would in the 
long run establish a far more intimate relationship between the Kremlin 
and Washington, in fact, the Nixon administration attempted a code of 
conduct the so-called ‘Basic Principles of Relations Between the United 
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ of 1972.778  
Apart from the quest to provide legitimacy to the superpower 
equilibrium, the Nixon administration was driven by, like the preceding 
administration, the pursuance of the ultimate goal of avoiding a nuclear 
war.779  
 The primacy of the superpower relations in the Nixon 
administration’s thinking also meant a stern belief that détente was a 
matter between the US and the USSR. Kissinger’s diplomacy the so-
called linkage, and with this strategy, Kissinger  aimed at binding the 
Soviet Union into the superpower equilibrium, and yet place the US in a 
central position, from which it was possible to uphold the containment 
of communism. 780 With linkage Kissinger conditioned resolution of 
different areas of negotiations upon each other to force concession upon 
the Soviets, such as the linkage of the CSCE and SALT negotiations.  
The linkage strategy also highlights a certain amount of pragmatism in 
the Nixon administration’s foreign policy because linkage, in fact, 
allowed tradeoffs.781  
 In comparison with the Johnson administrations foreign policy and 
more specific the policy towards the Soviet Union, the Nixon 
administration’s foreign policy was, as a matter of fact,  in several ways a 
continuance of the Johnson administration’s line of thinking at least 
towards the Soviet Union.  Although the Nixon administration’s 
negotiations on arms limitations and détente with USSR  had been under 
way during the Johnson Presidency, it now became the constitution of 
US foreign policy. Moreover, the Johnsons administration’s urge and 
effort to protect and preserve America’s unilateralism in the West’s 
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dealings with the Soviet Union became the central principle for 
America’s foreign policy with the Nixon administration. However, the 
ideational foundation for these policies and objectives was different. The 
Johnson administration believed in the global containment, domino 
theory, and the Cold War paradigm, and that it was possible to overcome 
communism – to transform communism from within to which end 
détente was applied. Nixon and Kissinger’s thinking was a complete 
retreat from this belief, and détente was turned into a strategy to achieve 
peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union. The question remains if and 
how this largely ideational break with Johnsonian thinking affected US 
policies towards the European allies and the relations with the allies?  
Nixon’s Western European policy 
The primacy the White House attached to bilateralism and the need for 
an organization of a superpower equilibrium in the foreign policy 
resulted in, on one hand a wish to freeze the status quo of Europe, and 
on the other hand it resulted in an inherent opposition to any 
autonomous Western European initiatives that would affect the 
establishment of the superpower equilibrium, and the very modus 
operandi of the superpower relations.782 The Nixon administration’s 
approach to the European allies was, in other words, preservation of US 
unilateralism in America’s dealings with the Soviet Union, and pursuance 
of influence on the allies’ policies at least those that affected the 
superpower balance.  
 The problem with the Nixon administration’s policy to create the 
superpower equilibrium was that the European allies had aspirations and 
incentives to continue the Euro-détente, which necessarily would involve 
the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the allies had, as in the 1960s, an 
intrinsic interest in the matters of arms control and more broadly in the 
peaceful relations between the superpowers. The lesson from the crisis 
year; the extent to which Western Europe’s destiny was intrinsically 
linked to the superpower relationship, was not forgotten. Arguably the 
lesson had become the inherent premise for Western Europe’s foreign 
policies. In other words, the European allies’ détente policies would per 
definition clash with the Nixon administration’s quest to create the 
superpower equilibrium. Moreover, it would clash with the linkage 
strategy. As Garthoff argues, the linkage strategy failed to recognize that 
the different elements of policy are not easily controlled. Indeed, the 
efforts to ‘manipulate’ the Soviets time and again came up against the 
interests of the allies.783  
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 The CSCE was a prime example of just that. The CSCE process had 
many similarities to the developments of the latter half of the 1960s, and 
was, in fact, a continuation of on one hand, the Euro-détente and the 
reformed NATO agenda, and on the other hand, a continuation or 
illumination of the new role NATO was assigned, in the Johnsonian 
mind, in the East-West relations. 
   In general the CSCE came about as a result of the European 
détente movement. On the Western side of the Iron Curtain the 
European allies’ call to move the Alliance to a détente with the Eastern 
bloc, and the Harmel formula of détente and deterrence was a 
precondition for the CSCE. Arguably, the European allies’ adherence to 
a strong deterrence was a precondition for any American backing to the 
European allies’ talk with the Warsaw Pact.  On the Eastern side of the 
Iron Curtain, the Soviet Union was under increasing pressure from the 
Warsaw Pact members and Eastern Europe’s continued strive for some 
sort of independence from the Kremlin. The Warsaw Pact’s Budapest 
Appeal of March, 1969, which resulted in the commencement of the 
CSCE, was a result of these centrifugal tendencies in the Eastern bloc. 
The USSR believed that a conference on the relations between Eastern 
and Western Europe could counter this development, and the Kremlin 
recognized that without admitting the US into these negotiations on 
cooperation and security in Europe, there could be no such negotiations. 
As the Kremlin came to recognize this in the late 1960s the path for a 
conference on security and cooperation in Europe was paved.784 With 
the Appeal of March 17, 1969, the Warsaw Pact called for a conference 
and invited the US to take part in the negotiations. The Western 
European states immediately embraced the Appeal.  
American Motives for Commencing the CSCE, 1969-
1972 
Although the Johnson administration had succeeded with getting the 
European allies to re-commit to the fundamental principles of the 
Alliance, and established measures that was presumed would counter 
alliance disintegration and cement alliance cohesion, the continued 
Western European détente movement and the continued Western 
European criticism of the Vietnam War threatened, according to 
Hanhimäki, to strain the Atlantic Alliance, at least in the eyes of the 
incoming Nixon administration. Much along the same lines as both the 
State Department and the White House thinking on Western Europe’s 
relations with Eastern Europe during the 1960s, which led to the Bridge 
Building policies, Kissinger feared (in hindsight) that if the US did not 
respond to the allies’ calls for a détente, the US ‘risked being isolated within 
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the Alliance and pushing Europe toward neutralism’.785 In the end, after some 
hesitation the US agreed to participate in the CSCE conference, however 
mostly out of necessity. 
 Indeed, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 7, in 1964 and again in 1966 
the US Bridge Building policies had been driven partly by the fact that 
the US was lacking behind its European allies in the relations with the 
Eastern bloc, which, it was believed, isolated the US within the alliance, 
and partly by the belief that if this Western European bilateralism 
continued, Europe would evolve into something foreign to American 
interests.    
 The alliance was also strained, according to Hanhimäki, by 
divergence of views on the war in Vietnam. As discussed in Chapters 6 
and 7, the US increasingly came to see the European allies’ policies and 
behavior towards the out of treaty areas as a problem and although the 
Johnson administration had pursued a first step in getting the European 
allies to take global responsibility and essentially back America’s global 
containment at the Harmel exercise in 1967, the administration had not 
succeeded. 
  By the time the Budapest Appeal arrived in 1969, the Western 
European allies immediately embraced the idea. The different Western 
European states had national interests at stake however; the Budapest 
Appeal fitted quite well to the continued European détente movement, 
and, as discussed in Chapter 7, different Western European states had in 
fact called for some sort of initiative, which would facilitate a dialogue 
between the two halves of Europe in the late 1960s. Moreover, the 
Western European public opinion was strongly in favor of steps to 
lessen tension in Europe, and, according to Snyder, especially the UK 
was driven by this motif.786 This European idealism was however, not the 
only motivation for Western Europe; it was widely believed that Western 
Europe could gain strategically by the negotiations.  
 The situation the Nixon administration faced was therefore quite 
similar to the situation the Johnson administration confronted the 
moment it came to believe that Western Europe would not mind 
bypassing the US in the outreach to the Eastern bloc, and that Western 
Europe pursued a détente with the Eastern bloc no matter how much it 
contrasted or even obstructed the, by the US formulated, overall foreign 
policy goal of the Atlantic alliance.  
 Although the Nixon administration strived for a détente with the 
Soviet Union, a multilateral conference on security and cooperation in 
Europe was not the administration’s policy of choice. The Nixon 
administration sought to continue the detente with the Soviet Union the 
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Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) that proceeded from 
November 1969 to May, 1972 and the subsequent negotiations on 
Mutually Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) that began in 1973, and 
ended inconclusively in 1989, was the Nixon administration’s primary 
foreign policy objectives in the area of détente. The SALT negotiations 
were an exclusive US-USSR affair, though to the benefit of the rest of 
the world, and the MBFR was regarded by Kissinger at least as a bilateral 
affair. Nixon and Kissinger realized that the administration’s unilateral 
approach to the Soviet Union would most likely come under pressure 
from the CSCE negotiations, thus despite Kissinger rejected the 
‘multilateral mushiness’ of the contemplated CSCE,787 America had no 
choice but to participate in the endeavor.  
 Moreover, the Budapest Appeal put a dual pressure on Nixon and 
Kissinger to agree to convene the conference. On one hand the 
European allies embraced the appeal of a conference on European 
security and on the other hand, the Soviet Union, from which Kissinger 
was seeking concessions, had a strong interest in the very same endeavor.  
  All this led to the curios situation that the Nixon administration 
agreed to participate in the CSCE to, according to Hanhimäki and 
Snyder, accommodate the European allies and America’s primary 
adversary; the USSR.788 However, not to reach the same objectives as 
these parties set out to reach an agreement on, namely European security 
and cooperation but out of necessity. Clearly, the Soviet Union like the 
rest of the participating states had specific more or less ulterior motives 
at the conference, but none lacked a genuine interest as did the US in the 
very subject of the conference, namely the organization of European 
security, indeed, principles that would govern East-West relations.789  
 Although Hanhimäki and Snyder argue that the Nixon administration 
accommodated the European allies’ wishes to counter a fragmented or a 
strained alliance, the Nixon administration also moved to control the 
allies in their dealings with the Eastern bloc, in an American effort to 
protect the bilateral US-USSR détente process. If anything was done on 
part of the Nixon administration to accommodate the Western 
Europeans it was the Year of Europe initiative of 1973.  
  Arguably, this apparent lack of interest in the real issue is not 
completely unexplainable. As Hanhimäki argues, the US was faced with a 
potentially explosive situation: on one hand being too accommodating to 
the USSR that could result in a transatlantic crisis, on the other hand, 
being too little accommodating towards the Soviet Union that could 
result in a break down in the SALT negotiations. Thus a certain US 
restraint was demanded from the situation. However, Hanhimäki’s 
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argument borders apologetic interpretation, as Kissinger’s unilateralist 
behavior in this line of thinking translates into (excellent) statesmanship 
rather than unilateralist behavior without any reciprocity despite being in 
an alliance, perhaps even based on distrust in the European allies’ 
political capabilities under the present circumstances. Nonetheless, the 
Nixon administration thus balanced between the allies and the adversary. 
 The Year of Europe was designed to overcome the strains in the 
Alliance that had resulted from American unilateralism in the dealings 
with the Soviet Union, and also to underpin that the Western alliance 
indeed was as important as previously. The administration also wanted to 
‘revitalize’ the transatlantic relations, according to Hanhimäki, because 
the EC had been enlarged, in particular with the British entry.790  
 The Year of Europe turned out to be a fiasco, and the European 
allies saw it as an expression of the very unilateralism that the US sought 
to address and make somewhat acceptable with the Year of Europe. In 
Kissinger’s speech announcing the initiative, Kissinger managed to 
offend all and sundry in Western Europe, by stressing that the US had 
global responsibilities and interests, whereas the European allies only had 
regional interests. Responsibilities were apparently exclusively reserved 
to the US. In Western Europe this message ultimately translated into on 
one hand, confirmation that there were no equality in the Alliance, and 
on the other hand, that nothing had changed in the transatlantic 
relations. Indeed, British Prime Minister Heath complained to former 
NSA Rostow that the US ‘must stop treating Europe as a group of nations that 
can be issued public instructions. Europe must be treated as a serious partner’.791 
  
Differences in the Western World, 1973-1975 
From the outset the CSCE process was inhibited on the Western side by 
divergence of objectives, and divergence of approaches. Kissinger, who 
was heading US foreign policy leaving the Department of State to 
negotiate the CSCE without a mandate from the White House, had three 
objectives with the CSCE. First Kissinger wanted to use CSCE in a 
linkage scheme to get Soviet concessions in the SALT negotiations and 
later the MBFR talks. Second to accommodate the Western European 
allies to counter a crisis in the transatlantic relations, especially in the 
wake of the crisis the Year of Europe792had brought on, and third, to 
control the European allies to protect the bilateral negotiations from 
direct or indirect interferences from Western Europe. The linkage 
strategy was, as Garthoff argues, dependent on a certain allied 
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concurrence in means and ends. However, as Kissinger did not have a 
habit of consultation with the allies, allied concurrence was not ready 
available.793 The linkage of CSCE and SALT had the profound impact on 
the entire CSCE process that Kissinger, despite the presence of the State 
Department staff, slowed down the negotiations to leverage the 
Soviets.794  
 From the outset in 1972, Kissinger treated the CSCE peripherally, 
and the real and pressing issue remained the bilateral negotiations with 
the Soviet Union. Although this reflects the very unilateralist foreign 
policy, it also illuminates that the Nixon administration did not perceive 
the transatlantic relations or the state of affairs in Western Europe with 
the same state of alarm as did the Johnson administration. The central 
issues of the 1960s were, as discussed above, solved, leaving Western 
Europe’s relations with the US in a somewhat peaceful state – at least 
compared to the 1960s. Arguably the failed Year of Europe initiative of 
1973 had left the transatlantic relations in a strained state however; it did 
not reach the state of alarm as in the 1960s. 
 Kissinger entered the CSCE negotiations rather late, in July, 1974, 
mostly to speed up the negotiations as leverage in his SALT negotiations 
with the Soviet Union. Kissinger positioned himself as the mediator of 
the Western side,795 to take control with the European allies, and as a 
consequence of general concerns that the direction of the East-West 
détente process at the CSCE affected the direction of the détente the US 
had struck out. Kissinger was also motivated by the belief that 
reconciliation between Eastern and Western Europe might reduce the 
Western European allies’ support for the military programs in NATO.796  
 The Western Europeans by contrast had a genuine interest in seeking 
a new agreement on cooperation and security in Europe, the West 
Germans for instance, guided by Ostpolitik had clear national interest in 
the border issue. In general, the Western European allies’ embracement 
of multilateralism at the negotiations was in stark contrast to the 
unilateralist negotiations Kissinger pursued with the Soviet Union. 
Although the Western European states had difficulties with arriving at a 
common NATO position because of the divergent national interests, the 
European NATO allies in the end became the guarantor’s of the West’s 
collective interests in the preparation for the conference.797 Moreover, 
the EC became a caucus to coordinate positions.798 In general, Kissinger 
did not see a value with multilateral negotiation on a variety of issues, 
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unlike the European allies that held the opinion that any concessions 
that the Soviets were willing to give was a benefit to the West. 
 The diverging importance attached to different détente measures was 
also striking. The Basket 3 provisions are a case in point. Kissinger 
believed that they had no real value compared to measures that involved 
the strategic balance, whereas the Europeans – or the British at least – 
regarded the Basket 3 provisions as regulating governments’ relations 
with citizens and therefore, a highly valuable outcome, especially if the 
aim was to overcome communism.799 
 The gap between Western European adherence to multilateralist 
negotiations and American unilateralism illuminates the Nixon 
administration’s reluctance to commit the US to a multilateral scheme, 
which inevitably would entail giving up freedom of action in the 
American policy towards the Soviet Union. Kissinger eventually acceded 
to the multilateral approach however, on the premise that the US was 
positioned as the key power and mediator between the Eastern and 
Western side.800  This did not merit to multilateralism.  
 When Nixon stepped down in August, 1974, and Ford took over 
linkage continued, and Kissinger still considered the entire CSCE 
process peripheral. When the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975 
Kissinger – and Ford – remained skeptical of the true value of the 
Helsinki Final Act, and multilateral negotiations.801   
Perspectives 
Although the 1970s differed on several parameters from the 1960s, there 
was also striking similarities.  
 The central issues of the 1960s, which the Johnson administration 
was confronted with and which had been imperative for the policies and 
perceptions of the transatlantic relations were largely gone by the time 
Nixon took office. In fact, important issues such as the preservation of 
America’s nuclear monopoly and NATO’s fundamental principles were 
no longer issues between America and the European allies. However, the 
Western European détente movement continued undaunted. 
 Although the Nixon administration to a large extent merely 
continued the détente process with the Soviet Union that the Johnson 
administration had launched, Nixon and Kissinger broke with past years 
politics on an ideational level. The somewhat idealist idea that 
communism could be overcome yielded for Kissinger’s realism. 
However, either way; idealism or realism, US unilateralism in the 
relations with the Soviet Union was imperative for America’s policies 
towards the Soviet Union. Apparently both administrations believed that 
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the European allies’ interference or even influence on the policy towards 
the Soviet Union could be damaging to America’s purposes.  
 The Johnson administration, as discussed throughout the preceding 
Chapters, was driven by – among other things – a rejection of the 
European reason of state. Kissinger and Nixon, without having studied 
the archival material, were likely driven by the same kind of Euro-
skepticism. Clearly Nixon and Kissinger believed the US was superior in 
terms of political capabilities.  
 The foundered Year of Europe initiative displayed the 
administration’s perception of Western Europe’s political capabilities as 
something qualitative lesser. By stressing that Europe only had  regional 
interests, and Western Europe was unfit for taking responsibility for 
(world) peace,  compared to the US global interests and global 
responsibility for world peace (much to dislike of the Western European 
self-image), indeed, made Western Europe’s political capabilities lesser 
than America’s. It was also evident with the CSCE negotiations, which 
the European allies attached much importance to and believed was a 
means to gain political results that might help overcome the division of 
Europe, including the Basket 3 provisions, whereas Nixon/Kissinger 
believed the multilateral mushiness offered no possibilities for the West 
to win anything from the negotiations, in contrast to the bilateral 
negotiations the US had with the USSR.  
 However, given Nixon and Kissinger’s realist convictions, the 
opinion that Western Europe had a lesser ability to influence events in 
world could be explained as a result of the fact that in a realist perception 
Western Europe lacked power to actual influence events.  
 However, it could be suggested that the continuum of involvement 
and detachment apply to both these administrations despite the much 
dissimilarity of the surrounding circumstances. Indeed, as long as a 
rejection of a European reason of state informs US policy towards the 
European allies it is possible to talk about either detachment or 
involvement.  
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Chapter 9 Conclusions 
Throughout the 1960s France, West Germany, and different NATO 
allies sought to realign the status quo in the transatlantic relations by 
different means and with different strengths. In Western Europe, the 
crisis year 1961-1962 had sparked a movement of realignment of 
Western Europe vis-à-vis the US. The crisis year also prompted the 
Western European détente movement. Although these two movements 
are not easily separated, in fact, the Johnson administration perceived the 
European détente as realignment; the present study has sought to 
answer: What were the Johnson administration’s perceptions and 
interpretations of this movement of realignment in the period 1963-
1969? 
 From the point of departure that the US sought to maintain its 
unilateralist position in the alliance and more broadly in the Atlantic 
partnership, I hypothesize that the administration sought to maintain this 
position, not only as a function of its superpower status but also because 
the Johnson administration rejected the European reason of state. The 
rejection of the European reason of state was a historically based 
rejection of Europe’s political capabilities in foreign policy. Thus, US 
unilateralism had a corollary of self-protection from Western Europe. 
The Western European realignments sparked questions about what 
principles NATO and more broadly the Atlantic partnership should be 
based on. As Hughes put forward; the choice was essentially between 
multilateralism and unilateralism.  
 In the literature on the transatlantic relations, the relations between 
the US and Western Europe is mostly considered as a series of conflict 
and cooperation. However, as a result of the inclusion of this historically 
based rejection of Europe’s reason of state in the present study’s 
analysis, a continuum of involvement and detachment is introduced to 
characterize America’s policy towards the European allies. A policy of 
detachment refers to a policy towards the European allies that, as a result 
of the rejection of the European reason of state, guided the US towards 
a detachment from the allies, and vice-versa in the case of involvement. 
A policy of detachment did not stipulate a complete withdrawal from the 
Alliance, but rather dictated preservation of US unilateralism. As it turns 
out, in the present period, the US did not follow or was remotely close 
to a policy of involvement The present study therefore also seeks to 
answer if the US political responses to the realignments essentially were 
involved or detached? 
 The present study rests on archival material from the central foreign 
policy-making departments in Washington.  
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The beginnings of the Western European realignments in 1963-1964 
were recorded by the administration with potential alarm. De Gaulle was 
considered the primary culprit, and de Gaulle’s rejection of the 
integration principle and critique of the nuclear arrangement in the 
Alliance were, in fact, a critique of America’s post-War unilateralist 
position in the Alliance. The administration believed that if de Gaulle’s 
ideas caught on in Western Europe it would merit to a return to 
traditional European power politics. The analysis shows that, from the 
beginning, the administration had a completely traditional reading of de 
Gaulle’s critique, errand, and the potential results of Gaullist policy. INR 
and Rusk in particular believed that a lack of structures in Western 
Europe would result in a return to European power politics, and the 
administration therefore fostered a fear of the spread of Gaullism in 
1963-1964 since this tampered with these structures. This fear would 
become imperative during the 1960s.  
   The administration also perceived the beginnings of a Western 
European challenge of America’s relations with and policy towards the 
Soviet Union during 1964. The Erhard administration’s calls for an 
approach to the German question, and the general Western European 
outreach to Eastern Europe tampered, in the eyes of the administration, 
with America’s unilateralism in its relations with the Soviet Union, the 
American leadership of the Western world, and alliance cohesion.  
 The White House attempted to resolve the different problems the 
beginnings of the Western European realignments presented to America 
with a call for a policy towards Eastern – and Western Europe, with the 
so-called NSAM 304 of April, 1964. In response, the Department of 
State proposed the first bridge building policy. The analysis shows that 
the 1964 bridge building policy aimed at establishing a structure, within 
which the US could control and align the allies’ policies towards Eastern 
Europe with the American objectives in Eastern Europe, and tie the 
German question into. NATO was enrolled as the primary instrument 
for these American ends, and was also a framework in which the US 
could maintain its unilateralist position.  
 Although, the 1964 bridge building policy was a failure, it created 
precedence for using NATO as a political instrument. At the same time, 
Western Europe actually pushed America onto a détente path in Europe.  
 The French challenge was indeed a challenge. Most of all to the 
foundations of America’s policy towards the European allies, and a 
period of clarification of US political concepts and policy towards the 
European allies began in 1964-1965. The argument is made that, de 
Gaulle’s rejection of the integration principle led the administration to 
reconsider and recapitulate the purpose with of the Alliance, and the 
American position on central issues, such as the integration principle. 
The analysis shows that, de Gaulle’s rejection largely revived the 
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reasoning and perceptions of the late 1940s, as the administration in 
cross-departmental concurrence agreed that NATO served to balance 
Europe, and that the integration principle was the only thing standing 
between a return to European power politics and the current balanced 
Western Europe organized in a collective security scheme. The 
integration principle was also standing between Alliance cohesion and 
Alliance disintegration.  
 In the present study, the argument is made that, in fact, the challenge 
from de Gaulle became an exercise in how the administration could 
frame the rejection of the European reason of state anno the 1960s.  
 During 1965, preserving the integration principle and counter 
Alliance disintegration took forefront in the administration’s thinking, 
and even though 1965 did not produce a solution, the clarification of the 
US position on means and purposes with the Alliance was a precondition 
for the solutions of 1966 in the wake of de Gaulle’s withdrawal from the 
integrated command.  
 This clarification process in 1965 evolved around US unilateralism 
and the revived reasoning of the 1940s. Whereas INR touched upon the 
principal matter of unilateralism versus multilateralism in Alliance 
organization, the rest of the administration, the Departments of State 
and Defense, implicitly presumed that any scheme to counter Alliance 
disintegration would be based in a preservation of US unilateralism, and 
therefore the departments rejected multilateralism as an organizing 
principle for the relations in the Alliance. The argument is made that, 
because NATO was seen as an instrument to hinder a return to 
European power politics, the unilateralism, which both departments 
implicitly presumed should be preserved in the Alliance structure was 
ultimately protective. .  
 According to the present study, the clarification process also revealed 
that at least INR saw a triple purpose with the Alliance. Apart from 
regulating the allies’ policies according to America’s interests, expand the 
geographical area for coordination of policies to the so-called out of 
treaty areas, INR also claimed that NATO should be used to regulate the 
relations between Eastern and Western Europe. 
 By 1965 Johnson had directed a new policy in the nuclear field, 
which essentially was a policy of detachment. With NSAM 322 of 
December, 1964, Johnson declared that the US should work against the 
spread of nuclear weapons in general, and in Western Europe in 
particular. This policy of disarming Western Europe and 
nonproliferation took its point of departure in the maintenance of the 
American veto, and the policy is partly explained in the study as a result 
of an American rejection of the European reason of state, indeed, 
Western European’s could not be trusted with nuclear weapons. This 
latter perspective was further highlighted by the NSAMs rejection of the 
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European clause and indeed, any American commitment to discuss a 
revision of the prohibition of Western European nuclear weapons 
should circumstances in Western Europe change in the future.  
  It was not until 1966 shortly after de Gaulle’s withdrawal from the 
integrated command that the administration found a solution to the 
problem of getting the European allies to recommit to the integration 
principle, and thereby prevent a return to European power politics. 1966 
was arguably a formative year for America’s policy towards the European 
allies. This was partly brought on as a result of substantial Western 
European calls for increased political consultation in the Alliance and a 
move towards a détente with the East. 
 In the present study, the argument is made that the administration 
made a ‘political bargain’ and moved the Alliance into the political field 
to get the allies to commit to the integration principle. By granting the 
Allies political consultation, though without compromising US 
unilateralism, and accommodating  Western European wishes for both a 
détente with the Eastern bloc and more political consultation in the 
Alliance, the administration believed they could get the European allies 
to recommit to the integration principle.  
 The ‘political bargain’ was followed by the Acheson Committee’s 
recommendation. In the present study’s reading the Acheson Committee 
recommended that to counter the perceived alliance disintegration in the 
wake of the French withdrawal, the US should move the alliance to a 
détente with the Eastern bloc while at the same time maintain an 
adequate deterrence. I argue that, in fact, the Acheson Committee 
proposes the formula of détente and deterrence in June, 1966, which 
Belgian foreign minister Harmel would propose four months later. 
Contrary to Harmel, the American administration proposed this to 
preserve NATO, and American unilateralism rather than as a genuine 
outreach to the Eastern bloc.  
 ‘The political bargain’ and the Acheson Committee’s détente and 
deterrence formula rested on certain assumptions about Western 
Europe’s capabilities in foreign policy, namely that without this principle 
and American leadership of the alliance, Western Europe would return 
to a state of power politics. In the present study the argument is made 
that this fundamental rejection of the European reason of state in the 
core of the recommendations, makes the détente and deterrence formula 
a policy of detachment towards Western Europe. Moreover, the 
argument is made that the policies of 1966 also sought to protect 
America’s unilateralism in the policy towards the Soviet Union from 
Western European direct or indirect interference despite the 
administration granted political consultation. The administration, in fact, 
contemplated to grant ‘multilateralism’, i.e., political consultation, 
without jeopardizing US unilateralism. 
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 Given the developments in 1966; the French withdrawal and the calls 
for a détente with Eastern Europe via NATO made in the wake of the 
French withdrawal by the British, the Dutch, and the Belgians, and even 
before the withdrawal by the Danes and the British, coupled with the 
fear of alliance disintegration put Johnson’s October 7th speech in a 
different light, indeed, the argument is made, that Johnson merely 
responded to these developments in Western Europe that had been 
under way since 1964, rather than presenting new, bold thinking. The 
administration was re-active rather than proactive. Moreover, by 1966 
NATOs policy was arguably ‘europeanized’. 
 The German question also arrived more forcefully on the agenda in 
1965-1966. The Erhard administration and the rest of the European 
allies had come to regard a solution to the German problem as a matter 
of national interest, and sought a solution to the problem in a multilateral 
setting. This was according to the present study an expression of the 
greater movement of realignment in Western Europe, and as 1966 
passed, the problem of German ‘assertiveness’ arrived at the agenda in 
Washington.  
 The argument is made that during 1967-1968 the Johnson 
administration sought to re-cement the Alliance’s fundamental 
principles, and the Department of State in particular was preoccupied 
with consolidating the Alliance as a means to control the allies’ policies 
and protect the American unilateralism. The analysis shows that the 
Department of State moved to (finally) create premises for the new area 
of political cooperation in NATO that allowed for the US to conduct a 
policy of detachment. The benchmarks, which was agreed upon with the 
Harmel study was a means to this end. The benchmarks marked the fine 
balance between political consultation and US unilateralism. At the same 
time as the benchmarks protected the American policy towards the 
Soviet Union from the Western European allies’ interference, they also 
codified American influence on the vital issue of a European settlement. 
The US to a large extent succeeded at the Harmel exercise, indeed, the 
allies recommitted to the integration principle and therefore a strong 
deterrent, and the US probably supported the exercise willingly because 
the Harmel formula of détente and deterrence already had been 
‘invented’ by the Acheson Committee, and because it indeed was an 
opportunity to get the European allies to recommit to the fundamental 
principles and arrange the principles for cooperation in transatlantic 
relations.  
 The West German assertiveness was also curbed during 1967. The 
Policy Planning Council proposed that German assertiveness could be 
turned into the NPT framework. Thus, although the nonproliferation 
scheme was contemplated to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, it 
also turned out to be yet another framework to tie Germany into. The 
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nuclear question was also largely resolved with the NPT. In December, 
1966, McNamara’s NPG had been adopted, and the interpretation of the 
NPT’s article 2 solved the problem with the European clause, and at the 
same time the American veto was preserved. According to this study, the 
policy of detachment in the nuclear field was continued. 
 Although the Soviet invasion of Prague in August, 1968, surprised 
the administration, the preoccupation with cementing the alliance quickly 
turned the invasion into an opportunity to induce the allies to contribute 
to the collective deterrent, the argument that in American thinking 
deterrence was the primary matter of the Alliance is attempted, and it is 
proposed that the Soviet invasion served to reconcile the European 
allies’ policy outlooks with that of the US.   
 
The present study is on America’s relations with and policies towards the 
European allies. Although, the intention has not been to neglect the 
importance of and possible impact on the policies of ‘outer’ 
circumstances, the focus of the study is to analyze the transatlantic 
relations on its own premises, in particular America’s perceptions of 
Western Europe, perceptions which were hardly under the influence of 
‘outer’ circumstances.  
 Based on this study a few broader conclusions on the Johnson 
administration’s relations to the European allies can be drawn. One is, 
that the administration was remarkably likeminded. The divergence of 
views was, in fact, minimal.  
 Despite the fact that the European allies’ policies towards the 
Eastern bloc, and the movement of realignment vis-à-vis the US was 
new thinking reflecting a Western Europe’s rehabilitation and therefore 
new status in the world, the American administration maintained the 
traditional reading of Western Europe’s reason of state. Power politics 
was presumably lurking right under the surface on Western Europe.  
 By looking at Western Europe through this traditionalist lens, the 
different political developments in Western Europe and Western 
Europe’s détente policies, in fact, came to be seen as inimical to US 
interests. What scholars of the European détente movement praise as 
new political thinking and a necessary pretext for the end of the Cold 
War, the Johnson administration perceived the Western European 
détente as potentially inimical to US interests and policies, and in some 
cases as a policy of the past. Arguably some of the Western European 
détente policies were realignments in the eyes of the administration.  
 The traditionalist line of thinking also resulted in general exaggerated 
and suspicious estimates of possible turn of events in Europe. Arguably, 
the Johnson administration was in a state of alarm when it came to 
Western Europe. Traditionalism led the administration base its Western 
European policy on the fear of a spread of Gaullist thinking. Indeed, the 
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administration feared a collective Western European rejection of the 
integration principle, and feared a general turn to European power 
politics if Gaullist thinking came to rule in Western Europe. Accordingly, 
the Johnson administration’s Western European policies to a large extent 
aimed at capture and recommit the European allies to principles that 
counteracted this return. Moreover, the administration displayed certain 
insecurity about the de Gaulle’s intentions. The fear that de Gaulle 
would use the Harmel study as a pretext to break up the alliance was 
exaggerated. 
 The traditionalism also led the administration to largely tailor their 
Western European policies to the same pattern as the 1940s. Arguably 
the policy of detachment was a policy in line with the thinking of the late 
1940s, namely to protect US unilateralism from Western European 
entanglement. The policy of detachment was, essentially, the 
administration’s rejection of the European reason of state anno the 
1960s. 
 As the analysis shows the US did not follow a policy of involvement, 
because the strength of traditionalism was overwhelming. The few times 
the administration posed the principal question whether to abandon the 
unilateralist position in the Alliance, it was either explicit or implicitly 
rejected on the ground of a rejection of the European reason of state. US 
wishes for unilateralism can also be explained by other circumstances 
than a rejection of the European reason of state; Such as the US were 
the only power to have the means to go up against the Soviet Union. 
However, as the present study shows, the preservation of US 
unilateralism in the relations with the allies was quite often based on a 
rejection of the European reason of state. 
 At the same time as the Johnson administration clung to traditional 
perceptions, Western Europe’s impact on America’s policies towards the 
Eastern bloc was quite substantial. Although the Johnson administration 
had aspirations after a détente with the Soviet Union, and arguably had 
success, the impact from Western Europe on the Western alliance’s 
détente policies was substantial. The British and Belgian pushes for a 
détente in the wake of the French withdrawal pushed America to a 
détente. Indeed, the Alliance would probably not have adopted the 
Harmel formula had America not been pushed by Western Europe 
throughout the 1960s. In addition, the state of alarm in the 
administration in its dealings with Western Europe arguably produced a 
relatively high impact on US policies. Relatively high, because Western 
European states – even the great powers – was compared to the 
American superpower small states.  
 The results of the present study suggest that the transatlantic 
relations during the 1960s and perhaps even the 1970s rested on an 
‘internal’ transatlantic dynamic and not just on the premises of the Cold 
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War. However, the present study might also tamper with the 
rehabilitative beyond Vietnam historiography’s conclusions. Arguably, 
the results to some extent confronts the claim that Johnson 
administration’s detente policy and the reform of NATO was a 
Johnsonian invention reflecting a certain level of political capability on 
part of Johnson. Although the present study does not investigate or 
analyze the motivations and background for the administration’s détente 
policy towards the Soviet Union, the Western European impact on the 
administration’s détente policies cannot be overlooked, nor can the 
European allies decisive impact on the timing of the reform of NATO 
and indeed, the very reform of NATO. It takes two to tango, and 
perhaps the European allies were leading.  
 In comparison with the Johnson administration’s relations with 
Western Europe, the argument is made that the Nixon administration’s 
relations with Western Europe, despite highly different circumstances, in 
fact resembled the previous administration’s relations. Maintaining US 
unilateralism in its dealing with the Soviet Union was imperative for the 
Nixon administration, and the study suggests that a reason for the 
insistence on unilateralism is a continued rejection of the European 
reason of state. Arguably, the Nixon administration viewed the allies as 
‘lesser’ in terms of political capabilities. Should archival research confirm 
this suggestion, the continuum of involvement and detachment may add 
to the further study of the transatlantic relations. 
 In principle the continuum of involvement and detachment serves to 
highlight the processual character of America’s policy towards the 
European allies. The continuum has allowed for identifying the lack of 
development in US thinking on Western Europe indeed, there was a 
remarkable similar thinking and policy in the 1960s compared to the late 
1940s, despite the fact that the US participated in a reform of NATO 
that granted the allies more political consultation, and moved the 
Alliance into the field of détente by adding détente to the   Alliance’s 
tasks.   
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Abstract  
Between Involvement and Detachment  takes grasp with the Johnson 
administration’s (1963-1969) perceptions of and responses to the 
Western European realignments.  Arguing that the Johnson 
administration set out to maintain the American unilateralist position in 
the transatlantic relation, not just as a function of America’s position as a 
superpower, but also as a function of certain historically based Euro-
skepticism, the thesis suggests that America’s Western European policy 
can be seen on a continuum of involvement and detachment. Based on 
archival research, the thesis concludes, that these policies, essentially, 
were detached as America rejected the European reason of state. 
 The Western European realignments were recorded in the Johnson 
administration with de Gaulle’s critique of US hegemony in Western 
Europe in the early 1960s. The thesis argues that the administration to a 
large extent had a traditional reading of de Gaulle’s policies, and feared 
that if Gaullist thinking spread among the European allies, it would merit 
to a return to traditional European power politics. The analysis shows 
that, by 1964 the administration believed, according to this study, that 
NATO’s principle of integration stood between the current ‘balanced’ 
Western Europe and the Europe of the pre-War period. In addition the 
administration held the opinion that the German problem and the 
Western European détente tampered with the US unilateralism in its 
relations with the Soviet Union, and its position as the leader of the 
Western world. 
 De Gaulle’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command in 1966, 
and the subsequent British and Belgian calls for a reform of the alliance 
and a détente with East, contributed to the administration’s fear of 
alliance disintegration and return to European power politics. The thesis 
argues that the Department of State attempted a ‘political bargain’, with 
which the allies would be given political consultation and a détente in 
return for re-commitment to integration, whereas the Acheson 
Committee proposed a détente and deterrence formula in NATO to the 
overcome this perceived alliance disintegration. Thus the US proposed 
the Harmel formula before Harmel.  
 In general, the developments in Western Europe put the Johnson 
administration in a state of alarm, and the European allies therefore had 
a larger impact on America’s policies, except in the essentially detached 
nuclear policy, which the administration maintained. 
 Despite changed circumstances, the Nixon administration’s relation 
with and perceptions of the European allies largely resembled the 
traditionalist view of the Johnson administration. 
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Resumé 
Between Involvement and Detachment omhandler Johnson administrationens 
(1963-1969) perceptioner af de vesteuropæiske opbrud og de deraf 
følgende politikker. Der argumenteres for, at Johnson administrationen 
stræbte efter at bevare den amerikanske unilaterale position i forholdet til 
de europæiske allierede som følge af en historisk baseret Euro-skepsis, 
og derfor ikke alene på grund af USA’s supermagtsstatus. I afhandlingen 
foreslås det, at USA’s vesteuropapolitik kan ses på et kontinuum fra 
involvering til distancering. På baggrund af arkivstudier konkluderes, at 
den amerikanske vesteuropapolitik grundlæggende var distanceret fordi 
administrationen afviste den europæiske statsræson.  
  Johnson administrationen observerede de begyndende 
vesteuropæiske opbrud med de Gaulles anklager om amerikansk 
hegemoni i Vesteuropa i begyndelsen af 1960’erne. Analysen viser, at 
administration i vid udstrækning havde en traditionel forståelse af 
Gaullismen, og at denne frygtede, at hvis Gaullismen spredtes i alliancen 
ville det svare til en tilbagevenden til den traditionelle europæiske 
magtbalancepolitik. Der argumenters i afhandlingen for, at 
administrationen fra 1964 anså NATO’s integrationsprincip, som det 
eneste der stod imellem den daværende fredelige balance i Vesteuropa og 
denne tilbagevenden. Ligeledes vises det, at administration mente, at 
skiftende tyske administrationers genforeningspolitikog den 
vesteuropæiske detentebestræbelse negativt påvirkede den amerikansk 
unilateralisme in relationen med USSR, og USA’s position som leder af 
den vestlige blok. 
 De Gaulles tilbagetrækning fra NATOs integrererede kommando i 
1966 og de følgende britiske og belgiske krav om en reform af alliancen 
og en detente med Øst, førte til en vis frygt i administrationen for en 
tilbagevenden til den europæiske magtbalancepolitik. I afhandlingen 
argumenteres for, at Department of State forsøgte sig med en ’politisk 
aftale’ med hvilken de allierede blev tilbudt politisk konsultation og en 
detente med Østblokken mod, at man forpligtede sig til 
integrationsprincippet. Acheson komitéen foreslog en detente og 
afskrækkelse-formel for at imødegå den formodede alliance 
disintegration. Med andre ord foreslog Johnson administrationen Harmel 
formlen inden Harmel. 
 Generelt førte de vesteuropæiske opbrud til en vis alarmisme i 
administrationen, og de europæiske allierede havde derfor en relativ 
større indflydelse på amerikansk udenrigspolitik. Dette gjaldt dog ikke 
USA’s nukleare politik, hvor administrationen fastholdt en distanceret 
politik. 
 Til trods for anderledes omstændigheder opretholdt Nixon 
administrationen i vid udstrækning Johnson administrationens 
traditionelle syn på de europæiske allierede.  
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